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Abstract 
 
The study of cognitive fear networks and associations, indirect experimental 
paradigms like the Implicit Association Test ('IAT', Greenwald et al., 1998) or the 
Extrinsic Affective Simon Task ('EAST', De Houwer, 2003) may be helpful, as they 
promise to assess the structure of specific associations using a performance based approach 
without having to ask the participant for a verbal report. Three studies investigated the 
usefulness and characteristics of IAT and EAST from a clinical point of view as well as 
from a methodological perspective.  
The aim of the first study was to measure fear associations towards spiders among 
spider phobic and non-phobic participants as well as in a group of spider enthusiasts. It was 
sought to determine whether the IAT is useful to assess fear relevant associations and 
schemata and to predict anxious behavior. Results indicate that the paradigm is sensitive to 
the strength of fear relevant associations and able to predict anxious behavior beyond the 
predictions of direct measures such as questionnaires. 
The second study focused on methodological questions about some of the 
mechanisms that underlie IAT effects. With a newly developed 'masked' IAT, the 
experiments of Study 2 investigated the influences of individual stimuli and superordinate 
categories on IAT performance. Besides offering theoretical implications, the results also 
provide practical, relevant applications for the use of IAT experiments in clinical 
psychology. 
A third study applied the EAST to investigate how different context conditions lead 
to differential activation of cognitive schemata in fear of spiders. Data suggest that spider 
fearing participants have activated threat associations towards ambiguous target words 
(e.g., legs, net), only when the spider concept was primed. Non-fearful participants did not 
show threat associations with either type of priming. One can conclude that the impact of 
threat associations depends on the activated context, and that the EAST is suitable for the 
assessment of fear associations and their current activation level. 
The results of this dissertation lead to the conclusion that the performance based 
methodology of the IAT and EAST is a useful and practical approach to reflect fear 
associations in phobia indirectly. At this point, the use of indirect measures in clinical 
psychology is still at its beginning, and requires intensive methodological and theoretical 
efforts. These paradigms, however, may become useful for possible implications in 
psychopathology, such as the prediction of treatment outcome and the likelihood of relapse 
after therapy, or for the identification of cognitive factors of vulnerability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is the adoption and application of indirect measures 
of associations in clinical psychology, particularly in anxiety. These indirect, or implicit 
paradigms originate from cognitive and social psychology and are utilized across several 
domains to estimate constructs like attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes without having 
to ask the participant for a verbal report. It is assumed that these techniques directly tap 
into cognitive structures by measuring the strength of associations between certain 
concepts. From a clinical perspective it would be of great interest to use methods which 
offer a closer look at mental representations in emotional disorders, beyond the use of self-
reports. 
Looking at the high prevalence rates of anxiety disorders, the first chapter will 
emphasize the necessity of experimental research in anxiety. The importance and influence 
of cognition in anxiety disorders will be discussed in the following chapter, including some 
theoretical approaches that describe cognitive representations in anxiety. It will become 
apparent why self-reports and classical experimental paradigms are not always useful to 
reflect on the structure of cognitive representations in clinically orientated research. This 
leads to the application of indirect tasks in the assessment of cognitive fear representations, 
investigating if they offer additional information beyond traditional measures.  
 
1.1 Cognitive representations in anxiety 
1.1.1 Anxiety disorders 
 
In many etiological theories of anxiety disorders, the focus is on the evolutionary 
significance of fear. These emotional responses are clearly adaptive in many situations; 
they mobilize and help one to survive in the face of danger and threats. Anxiety disorders 
can be viewed as problems that arise in the regulation of these response systems (Barlow, 
1988). When anxiety becomes excessive, or when intense fear is triggered at an 
inappropriate time or place, these response systems can become more harmful than helpful. 
Anxiety disorders may develop from a complex set of risk factors, including genetics, 
brain chemistry, personality, and life events and represent the most common mental illness 
with a life time prevalence of about 25 % (e.g., Kessler et al., 1994). About 9 - 15 % of the 
adult population suffers from anxiety within one year (e.g., Kessler et al., 1994; Wittchen 
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et al., 1999; Wittchen & Jacobi, 2001). The symptoms of various anxiety disorders overlap 
considerably. Brown and Barlow (1992) found that 50 percent of the people who met the 
criteria for an anxiety disorder also met the criteria for at least one other form of anxiety or 
mood disorder. According to Brown (1996) comorbidity is found at the highest rate for 
generalized anxiety disorder (82%) and severe cases of panic disorder with agoraphobia 
(72%), and at the lowest rate for specific phobia (20%). 
There are also significant gender differences in several types of anxiety disorders. 
Pertinent data from several epidemiological studies found that gender differences are 
particularly large for specific phobias, where women are about 2 to 3 times as likely as 
men to experience the disorder (e.g., Kessler et al., 1994; Wittchen et al., 1999). In general, 
specific phobias are the most common type of anxiety disorders. They involve a severe and 
persistent fear of specific objects, situations or activities, such as fear of animals, heights, 
storms and illness or injury. Chapter 1.3.1 will discuss the aspects of epidemiology and 
etiology of simple phobia in detail. 
The extremely large number of people suffering from anxiety disorders, in particular 
from simple phobia, also has a significant impact on economic costs that are associated 
with the repeated use of healthcare services and/or therapy, and indirect costs because of 
limited job performance and lack of work. People with an anxiety disorder are three-to-five 
times more likely to go to the doctor, and six times more likely to be hospitalized for 
psychiatric disorders than non-sufferers (Anxiety Disorders Association of America, 
2003). For example, in the US, the total costs for anxiety disorders represent the highest 
expenses of all mental illnesses (Rice & Miller, 1995). In the light of the dramatic negative 
effects of anxiety disorders for personal life as well as for health policy and social concerns 
there is an urgent need to improve and increase our knowledge about anxiety. In order to 
understand the etiology and factors that maintain anxiety disorders, one must consider a 
variety of psychological and biological systems that have evolved for the purpose of 
triggering and controlling these alarm responses. 
Over the last two decades, an increasingly large body of psychological work, both 
empirical and theoretical, has been developed to investigate cognitive factors on emotional 
disorders, such as anxiety. There are two theories that have been of particular importance 
in the development of cognitive approaches to emotional disorders: Beck's schema theory 
and Bower's network theory.  
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1.1.2 Theories on cognitive representations in emotional disorders 
 
According to schema theories such as the ones proposed by Beck (Beck, 1976; Beck, 
Emery & Greenberg, 1985) anxiety is characterized by cognitive structures called 
'schemata', a stored body of knowledge about the feared content which interacts with 
encoding, comprehension, and retrieval of information. It is supposed that schemata in 
anxiety concern personal vulnerability and danger. The activation of such a schema 
directly influences the contents of a person's perceptions, interpretations, and memories as 
well as the behavioral pattern of flight and feeling of anxiety. According to this 
explanation, an individual with spider phobia is distinguished by having a spider schema 
which selectively stores fear-related information and details like fear-provoking situations 
(e.g., basement, wood, autumn), or information about appearance and occurrence of 
spiders. Confronted with certain internal or external stimuli, the spider schema is activated, 
and it influences various conceptually driven ('top down') processes, such as attention (e.g., 
scanning all basement rooms for possible spiders) or interpretation (i.e. dark spots on the 
wall are interpreted as spiders). The activation of this schema would also activate fearful 
reaction and avoidance behavior. 
A major problem with schema theories exists because relevant schemata can not be 
detected until activated by appropriate events (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews, 
1997). Thus, the schemata have to be seen as latent cognitive structures, which get re-
activated when the person is confronted with the phobic stimuli. Moreover, Beck's 
approach is not based on experimentally testable studies, and lacks on clear definitions and 
predictions. Beck's theory was, however, applied to the therapy of emotional disorders 
(e.g., Beck, 1976), in order to investigate and change schemata and characteristics of fear 
during treatment. This approach was evidently quite successful. (e.g., Chambless & Gillis, 
1993; Chambless & Ollendick, 2001).  
Another enormously influential theory for cognitive research on emotional disorders 
was Bower's network theory (Bower, 1981; 1987). Based on earlier work about 
representations of knowledge in memory (Human Associative Memory Network - HAM, 
Anderson & Bower, 1973), Bower proposed that events are represented as configurations 
of associative connections or pathways between concepts or nodes that describe the 
features of the event. When a cue stimulates the network, activation would spread through 
the entire network, concurrently activating relevant and associated information from long 
term memory. The important assumption of Bower was, that each distinct emotion (e.g., 
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pleasure, fear) is represented by a specific emotional node in memory linked with many 
other aspects of this emotion (e.g., behavior, situations, verbal expression, physiology etc.). 
Based on these assumptions, the theory was set up to explain that learning is biased 
towards material that is congruent with mood at encoding, and that memory is biased to 
material, that is congruent with mood at retrieval. According to Bower (1981), a specific 
mood increases the level of activation of nodes associated with it, and information nodes 
activated through this will be favored in memory and learning.  
Various problems arise, however, when this rather general model is applied in its 
original sense to describe emotional representation and schemata in anxiety. Bower's 
network model originated from studying the structure of information in narrative texts, 
asking questions about the way semantic meaning and emotion is represented in the brain 
and how emotion may influence processes that are responsible for text comprehension. 
Nevertheless, there is a crucial difference between a) activating a concept of an emotion 
and b) activating the emotion itself.  
Although Bower and Cohen (1982) explicitly provided nodes for both kinds, it is still 
not clear that it is appropriate to represent actual emotions in what is essentially a semantic 
network. It becomes clear that Bowers model falls short and definitely was not designed to 
function as a comprehensive model of cognitive representations in emotional disorders.  
 
1.1.3 The Bio-Informational Theory and neural basis of fear 
 
An influential integration of network views with behavioral, cognitive, and 
psychophysiological aspects of fear was developed in a series of experiments and theory 
papers by Peter Lang in his 'Bio-Informational Theory' (e.g., Lang, 1977, 1979; Lang, 
Cuthbert, & Bradley, 1998). Similar to the views of Bower (1981), emotions are coded in 
memory as networks of mutually activating information units (Lang et al., 1998). 
However, they differ from other knowledge structures in the brain because of direct 
connections to the brain's primary motivational system, consisting of neural circuits 
developed in early stages of evolution in primary cortex, subcortex, and mid brain. 
Although emotions vary widely in their expressions it is argued that emotion's 
motivational organization has a simple, biphasic structure (e.g., Konorski, 1967). Pleasant 
emotions are associated with an appetitive system (neural mediation of approach, hunger, 
or sexual behavior) whereas unpleasant emotions are driven by a defensive system, 
associated with withdrawal, escape from pain, and defensive aggression. This biphasic 
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structure is consonant with an array of theories that have focused on two broadband 
motivational systems to regulate approach and withdrawal behavior in response to 
environmental cues, called the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and behavioral 
activation system (BAS) (see Carver & Scheier, 1998; Depue & Collins, 1999; Gray, 
1982). The BAS is expected to generate increased approach behavior, motor activity, and 
feelings of elation, desire, and hope (i.e., appetitive system). In the face of conditioned 
signals of punishment and novelty, BIS is hypothesized to activate responses of inhibition 
and avoidance, as well as feelings of anxiety and arousal (aversive/defensive system). It is 
the latter system that is presumed to be active in human fear and anxiety.  
The aversive/defensive motivational system activates behaviors necessary to the 
survival of individuals and species, such as a general mobilization of the organism, and the 
development of reflexive approach and withdrawal behavior. It mediates the formation of 
conditioned associations based on primary reinforcement (Lang et al., 1998). 
Neurophysiological findings suggest, that the amygdala is a physiological mediator of 
defensive behaviors and most important for the aversive motivational system (e.g., 
LeDoux, 1993, 1995). 
Neural connections between the sensory and associative cortex to the amygdala (e.g., 
Herzog & van Hoesen, 1975) indicate that cognitive processes are able to trigger emotional 
reactions, but are also influenced by emotions. According to Lang, the fundamental 
emotional network is neural, only partially accessible to consciousness, and consists of 
three basic types of higher level representations. First there are meaning units, which refer 
to declarative semantic knowledge about the event or situation. On this level information 
processing does not necessarily involve affect or valence. Second there are stimulus units 
which represent information of perceived sensory information. The third type of 
representations are response units, coding three basic output systems, behavioral acts, 
physiological mobilization, expressive language. These response units activate output 
procedures. Figure 1-1 illustrates a possible fear network in spider phobia. Persons with 
spider phobia would hold specific declarative knowledge about spiders, for instance, that 
spiders are actually not dangerous and even useful, difficult to find, small, unpredictable, 
and trigger fear. Contrary to what is found in individuals without spider phobia, these units 
are closely connected with stimulus units representing situations and sensory stimuli (e.g., 
dark small sports, basement, wood) and fearful responses like avoidance behavior or 
physiological arousals. Although language labels are certainly part of the network, the 
network is not fundamentally language based (Lang et al., 1998).  
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Figure 1-1. A spider phobic network, showing relevant stimulus, meaning, and response 
 representations 
 stimulus representations 
am 
run 
accel. 
is 
say feel 
is 
see 
is in in 
I - Me dark SPIDER away 
unpredictable crawls heart alone 
small basement I'm afraid fear 
 response representations  meaning representations 
The network can be activated by any input that matches the representations in its 
assembly. Thus, a dark spot on the white basement wall readily prompts processing of a 
spider phobic network. Because of the associative connections between the represented 
units, activation of the network does not depend on a real existing stimulus. Moreover, it 
can be cued externally by language descriptions, pictures, and other symbolic stimuli 
remote from the actual context, or internally, by neuromuscular patterns and semantic 
associations (Lang et al., 1998). 
But how do these activated structures refer to conscious feelings of fear or threat? 
Several theorists have proposed that consciousness has to do with working memory 
(Johnson-Laird, 1988, Kihlstrom, 1987). When a stimulus comes present, working memory 
integrates stored representations from different areas of the brain. First, information comes 
from sensory processing systems (serving as a short-term memory buffer as well as 
perceptual processor). Explicit knowledge about the stimulus derives from the long-term 
explicit memory system (associative network). Here the hippocampus plays a crucial role, 
because it is thought to be necessary for acquisition of declarative or explicit memory, 
memories that can be verbalized and are available to conscious awareness (LeDoux & 
Phelps, 2000). Moreover, the hippocampus seems to be important in the evaluation of 
contextual cues in conditioning or learning (e.g., individuals with spider phobia learned the 
connection between a specific context and fear). If the immediate stimulus is affectively 
charged (e.g., it is a spider), sensory and hippocampus-dependent memory systems will be 
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activated; in addition, working memory will become aware of the fact that the fear system 
of the brain has been activated. The amygdala communicates with working memory 
network and integrates information about the aversive property of a stimulus or event. In 
addition, the amygdala projects to nonspecific systems that regulate cortical arousal and 
controls bodily responses, which then provide feedback that can influence cortical 
processing indirectly (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000). Because of this independent and 
automatic fear reaction of the amygdala, an individual with spider phobia may show bodily 
responses (behavior, autonomic, endocrine) before having processed the stimuli in explicit 
ways. This dissociation between automatic and uncontrollable expressions of fear and 
explicit knowledge about the feared stimulus is an important feature in so-called specific 
phobias, such as fear of spiders. Here individuals with phobias explicitly know that spiders 
are harmless little animals, however, they report no intentional control about their fearful 
reaction (see chapter 1.3.1). 
The bio-informational theory offers a useful model to describe cognitive 
representations in anxiety. Besides the representation of declarative knowledge and 
stimulus features it also integrates psychophysiological processes and response behavior. 
There is strong experimental support that the amygdala plays a central role integrating 
aversive and defensive responses and storing emotionally significant material in the 
emotional memory system (LeDoux, 1993, 1995). This integration of cognitive and 
biological aspects is most important to understand cognitive, physiological, and behavioral 
aspects of fear. 
 
Based on the theories of Beck and Bower and the continuative aspects of Lang's bio-
informational theory I use the term fear schema to refer to maladaptive fear-related 
cognitive structures that can be activated automatically. Posner and Warren (1972) offered 
a useful definition of cognitive structures, writing, "When we say a structure exists in 
memory, we are really saying that one item will activate another in a quite direct and 
simple way, even perhaps when the subject does not intend for it to occur. If we had 
methods to tap structure uninfluenced by conscious search, we might reflect the structure 
of memory more simply," (p.34). Following the statement of Posner and Warren, it would 
be challenging and important for anxiety research, to apply methods that help analyze and 
evaluate maladaptive schemata. This would not only help to understand cognitive 
particularities in anxiety, it could also be applied detecting factors of vulnerability and 
examining fear schema change following treatment. 
Introduction  
 
8
1.2. The assessment of cognitive structures and associations 
 
As concluded in the previous chapter, the assessment of cognitive structures and 
associations in anxiety would be of great importance and interest in clinical research. The 
following chapter addresses the most common approaches to test such schemata. Copious 
research has been done on biased information-processing in anxiety, a cognitive 
phenomenon that is ascribed to maladaptive fear schemata. Another way to assess thoughts 
and cognitions in anxiety is the use of self-reports. Based on the insufficiencies of the 
biased processing approach and self reports, indirect association tests are introduced as a 
relatively new and useful alternative to tap on schemata.  
 
1.2.1 Biased information processing in anxiety 
 
Schema and network models lead to a tremendous amount of research and were used 
to predict biased processing in emotional disorders. When present in anxiety, maladaptive 
schemata and fear networks may lead to selective processing of anxiety-related 
information in several areas. In perception there may be improved attention to or higher 
distraction by threat cues. In interpretation and judgment, ambiguous cues as may be seen 
as threatening. Better recall of fear-related information is often an affect on memory.  
Because the important schemata are distorted towards danger and vulnerability or 
loss and failure, patients with anxiety often preferably attend to feared stimuli, for instance, 
to words or pictures expressing fear-related contents. With regard to memory processes, 
correspondingly general predictions are made: Anxious patients may exhibit better 
memory for stimuli related to their schema and show improved recall of threatening 
information. However, the empirical evidence for attentional and memory biases appears 
inconsistent. 
Regarding attentional biases for threatening information, one has to distinguish 
between two important processes: enhanced detection of fear stimuli and distractibility 
caused by threatening material. Enhanced detection was shown in a number of studies, but 
only when there was competing other information. This enhancement effect was also 
restricted to early stages of attention allocation at short presentation durations, compared to 
longer ones (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 
1999; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). The few studies in which patients with anxiety 
were asked to detect a single threatening stimulus, however, suggest that there are hardly 
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any 'profits' gained from the attentional bias in terms of enhanced detection. Results 
indicating the 'costs' in terms of higher distractibility caused by threatening stimuli are 
more consistent (e.g., Lavy, van den Hout & Arntz, 1993; Thorpe and Salkovskis, 1997; 
Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, and Becker, 2003). 
The empirical evidence regarding memory biases in anxiety disorders has been 
reviewed by Coles and Heimberg (2002). Looking at memory effects one has to distinguish 
between explicit and implicit memory tests. Explicit tests require conscious recollection of 
previous experiences or knowledge (e.g., a list of verbal materials), that is, the participant 
is explicitly asked to recall or recognize the information presented earlier. In implicit 
memory tests, however, previous experiences affect current behavior in the absence of 
conscious recall of those experiences (for reviews, see Roediger, 1990; or Schacter, 1996). 
According to Coles and Heimberg (2002) explicit memory biases for threatening 
information depend on the anxiety disorder investigated: there is support for a bias in panic 
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, but not in 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and social phobia (SP). Regarding implicit biases in 
anxiety, there is relatively consistent evidence for biases in each of the anxiety disorders.  
Other empirical research concentrated on other information-processing biases, such 
as interpretation bias (Mathews & Macintosh, 2000), judgmental bias (Tomarken, Mineka, 
& Cooks, 1989), inference bias (e.g., Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), and higher order 
processes such as deductive reasoning (e.g., de Jong, Mayer, & van den Hout, 1997).  
Looking at the complex and heterogeneous pattern of results, network and schema 
theories fail to predict this large number of empirical data. One of the limitations of 
theories of Beck, Bower, and Lang is that neither makes distinction between different 
levels of cognitive processing. There has been growing convergence in the idea that a 
theory of cognitive processing in emotion needs more than one level of cognition. In this 
respect conscious, non-conscious, and automatic aspects of cognition must also be 
included.  
In recent years several clinical models have been suggested to explain selective 
information processing in anxiety (e.g., Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Williams et al., 1997; Mathews & Macintosh, 1998). On a much more complex 
basis, however, these approaches rather meet the requirements to explain biased processing 
in emotional disorders. 
On the other hand, schema and network theories were not developed to explain the 
heterogeneous pattern of information processing. Moreover, it seems doubtful that 
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cognitive processes in memory and attention offer a satisfying and comprehensive picture 
of the structure of stored fear-related information in memory. At this point it can be stated 
that cognitive processes which are described above are functionally related to an 
underlying maladaptive schema or network (e.g., Mansell, 2000) and definitely tap into 
some aspects of cognitive representations in anxiety. Nevertheless, they provide rather 
indirect information with respect to the hypothesized schemata and fear networks itself.  
 
1.2.2 Measuring cognitive representations through self-reports 
 
The previous chapter pointed out that testing elements of a fear network, traditional 
cognitive paradigms are circumspect because they investigate how cognitive structures 
affect information processing (e.g., memory and attention). Assessing how specific anxiety 
disorders affect information processing, these paradigms offer little information about the 
structure of fear networks and schemata. A different and probably common way to look at 
schemata is to ask people, by using interviews and questionnaires. Dysfunctional beliefs 
are usually directly measured by self-report instruments (e.g., Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1995). 
As an example, specific fear questionnaires like the 'Fear of Spider Questionnaire' 
(Szymanski & O'Donohue, 1995) or the 'Spider Phobia Questionnaire' (Watts & Sharrock, 
1984) do not only ask questions about behavior and reactions when confronted with a 
spider, but also self-related questions about cognitions and associations towards spiders 
(e.g., 'If I saw a spider now, I would think it will harm me.'; 'When watching television do 
you think more about the danger of there being a spider in the room than about the 
program?'). Although these measures are useful tools in diagnosis and fear research and 
show strong correlations with fear behavior, there are also clear limitations in using them 
to assess dysfunctional associations and schemata.  
First, self-reports are susceptible to deception and self-presentation strategies. For 
instance, it is assumed that men are less willing to talk about fears than women (Bekker, 
1996). Mack and Schroeder (1979) asked a group of girls and a group of boys about their 
fear of injection in a questionnaire and later conducted a behavior assessment test to 
measure fearful behavior. Results indicated that two groups did not differ in the behavior 
assessment test from each other. Boys, however, reported significantly less fear of 
injection in the questionnaire. Moreover, other than reports about actual behavior, it seems 
difficult to verbalize mental processes without the risk of demands, distortions, 
attributional biases (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
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A second argument concerns the difference between automatic and 
strategic/controlled activation of information in anxiety. Talking about fear (e.g., in 
interviews or questionnaires) assesses immediate consciousness experience in explicit 
memory. However, researchers from several fields of psychology points out the 
importance of automatic and unconscious activation of fear concepts. Anxiety contains 
acute and intense emotional reactions with a strong automatic component, but also long 
termed cognitive elaboration around themes of risk and danger. As Williams et al. (1997) 
suggest in their theory, information and its retrieval involves automatic as well as strategic 
components. On one hand, this could explain why cognitive research in anxiety found such 
a complex pattern of biased processing in attention, learning, and memory. On the other 
hand this makes clear that self-reports will not be able to access all cognitive components 
of anxiety. There is a partial dissociation between rational and automatic cognitive 
processes in people suffering from simple phobias (Williams et al., 1997). They often 
believe that there is no reason to be frightened of their phobic object like spiders and 
consequently feel that their phobia is stupid and irrational. Nevertheless, in the presence of 
phobic objects they automatically become frightened and experience little intentional 
control over the reaction to spiders (Mayer, Merckelbach, and Muris, 2000). It appears as if 
automatic and uncontrollable expressions of fear associations represent important 
additional information about cognitive characteristics of phobia, and might complement 
explicit reports when trying to predict fear-related behavior. From a biological and 
neurophysiological perspective, there is evidence that the amygdala plays an important role 
in processing and reacting to fearful stimuli (LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux & Phelps, 2000). 
Because of a quick subcortical (automatic) pathway, sensory information about fearful 
stimuli activates the human fear system rapidly, and leads to fast activation of bodily 
responses. Stored cognitive representations of feared stimuli in explicit memory also send 
information to the amygdala on a much slower cortical pathway from the prefrontal cortex. 
In return, the immediate conscious experience of a specific stimulus (e.g., a spider) in 
working memory integrates information from sensory processing systems, hippocampus-
dependent explicit memory representations, and from the amygdala-dependent emotional 
system (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000). These various influences and interactions highlight the 
above assumptions that automatic and unconscious, as well as explicit and accessible 
components are involved in cognitive fear processing. 
The above arguments display clearly, that self-reports and other introspective 
methods are very limited alternatives to measure cognitive representations, because 
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relevant cognitions might be unavailable to introspection and verbal descriptions (e.g., de 
Jong, Pasman, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2001; Dovidio and Fazio, 1992), and are influenced 
by deception and self-presentation strategies. An alternative approach would be the 
assessment of cognitive structures and states of specific fear associations through indirect, 
performance based, and seemingly unrelated tasks. 
 
1.2.3 Indirect measures of associations: New tools in cognitive research 
 
In recent years, a large number of indirect or implicit measures have been proposed. 
In the following chapter I give a short introduction to several methods which try to 
estimate evaluative responses and cognitive representations of emotionally valenced 
stimuli. Subsequently, the focus will be on one of these measures, the 'Implicit Association 
Test' (IAT), which was used in most of the experiments reported in this dissertation.  
In cognitive research a variety of different indirect measurement techniques have 
been employed. All these approaches have in common that they want to provide an 
estimate of the construct of interest without having to directly ask the participant for a 
verbal report. Therefore, these indirect tasks seem to be free of social desirability concerns 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003). More differentiated is the discussion of whether the paradigms 
assess attitudes, stereotypes, or schemata without participants' being aware that these 
constructs are actually assessed. Another important issue concerns the extent to which 
these methods measure automatically and not strategically activated responses to a person 
or object. These and other theoretical aspects will be discussed separately for the IAT used 
in this dissertation.  
One of the first tasks that was developed to provide an indirect measure of attitudes 
was the affective priming task by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986). In an 
affective priming study, two stimuli are presented in succession and participants are asked 
to evaluate the second stimulus, that is, to determine whether the second stimulus refers to 
something good or to something bad (e.g., by saying 'good' or 'bad' or pressing a certain 
key). When the second stimulus (also called target) has the same valence as the first 
stimulus (called prime), less time is needed to express this evaluation (pressing a key or 
saying 'good' or 'bad'). This task also allows one to assess associations and attitudes. If the 
presentation of a prime leads to faster processing of the positive than negative targets, this 
indicates, then the participant has a positive attitude or association toward the prime. If a 
prime facilitates the processing of a negative target, one can assume that the prime is rather 
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negative for the participant. For example, Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams (1995) 
used a priming experiment to measure racial associations or attitudes, by priming 
participants with photos of black versus white undergraduates. The black and white faces 
had different consequences for the latency with which participants responded to the 
subsequently presented target adjective. Black faces facilitated responding to negative 
adjectives and interfered with responding to positive adjectives; the opposite pattern was 
shown for white faces. The pattern suggests that, on average, negativity was automatically 
activated by the black primes. Priming techniques are employed to measure constructs like 
self-esteem, racial prejudice, or stereotypes. (For an overview see: Fazio & Olson, 2003).  
De Houwer and Eelen (1998) introduced an affective variant of the spatial Simon 
task as an indirect measure of attitudes. Participants have to discriminate targets regarding 
a certain grammatical feature of this stimulus (e.g., noun/adjective). The task is to respond 
by saying 'positive' or 'negative' depending on the grammatical feature (e.g., participants 
have to say 'positive' when it is a noun, and 'negative' when it is a adjective). Because the 
target stimuli vary in their valence, this leads to congruent trials, in which the valence of 
the target and the correct response have the same valence (e.g., saying 'positive' to 'flower' 
because it is a noun), and incongruent trials in which there is response competition (e.g., 
saying 'negative' to 'happy' because it is an adjective). Despite the fact that participants 
were explicitly instructed to ignore the affective meaning of the presented words, reaction 
times were faster when the affective connotation of the presented word and the correct 
response was the same (congruent trial) than when it differed (incongruent trial). The 
results further supported to the hypothesis that stimulus valence can be processed 
automatically. 
A rather new and most prominent indirect technique is the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT), developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). The IAT assesses the 
strength of associations between a target concept and an attribute dimension by measuring 
the latency with which participants can respond on two response keys, when each has been 
assigned a dual meaning. Greenwald et al. (1998, Experiment 1) asked participants to 
categorize stimuli as they appear on the screen. The stimuli were targets representing 
names of flowers and names of insects, and attributes, representing positive adjectives, and 
negative adjectives. In a first practice trial participants categorized the targets (target 
discrimination task) by pressing one key for flower names and the second key for insect 
names. Here, the response keys were labeled 'flower' and 'insect'. In the second practice 
trial (attribute discrimination task) participants categorized a variety of clearly valenced 
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attribute words (e.g., 'poison' or 'gift') as pleasant or unpleasant. In the critical phase of the 
experiment (combined tasks), these two categorization tasks were combined. Participants 
performed this combined task twice - once with one response key signifying 
flower/pleasant and the other labeled insect/unpleasant, and once with one key meaning 
flower/unpleasant and the other insect/pleasant - in counterbalanced order. The question is 
which response mapping participants find easier to use. Greenwald et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that participants are faster to press one key for flower names and positive 
adjectives and another key for insect names and negative adjectives (compatible task) than 
to press one key for flower names and negative adjectives and the other key for insect 
names and positive adjectives (incompatible task). These results indicated that the attribute 
concept of positive is more closely associated in memory with the target concept of flower 
than with the target concept of insect and that the attribute concept of negative is more 
closely associated with insect than with flower. 
Because of the assumption that attitudes, stereotypes and other psychological 
constructs are stored in memory as an association between the representation of the 
specific object or subject and the representation of positive and negative valence (e.g., 
Fazio, 1986), one can argue that the IAT provides an indirect way to measure such 
constructs. 
Since its first publication in 1998, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been used 
repeatedly to measure implicit attitudes and other automatic associations. Its applications 
are primarily in social cognition research but also in psychology of personality, and health 
psychology.  
Several studies are on social attitudes towards groups and minorities (e.g., Banse, 
Seise, Zerbes, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), or 
towards behavior (e.g., Maison, Greenwald, & Bruin, 2001; Plessner & Banse, 2001; 
Marsh, Johnson, & Scott-Sheldon, 2001; Swanson, Rudman, & Greenwald, 2001; Steffens 
& Buchner, 2003). Automatic or implicit stereotypes and prejudice was conducted in many 
studies (e.g., Greenwald, et al., 1998; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999; 
Phelps, O'Connor, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, & Gore, 2000; Ashburn-Nardo, 
Voils, & Monteith, 2001; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001; Kuehnen, Schiessl, 
Bauer, Paulig, Poehlmann, & Schmidthals, 2001; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; 
Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Ashburn-Nardo, 
Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Richeson, & Shelton, in press; Richeson, & Ambady, 2003). 
Another field of great interest concerns implicit self-esteem and self-concept (e.g., 
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Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000, Asendorpf, Banse, & 
Muecke, 2002; de Jong, 2002; Hummert, Garstka, O'Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002; 
McFarland & Crouch, 2002; Asendorpf, Banse, & Schnabel, 2003). The IAT was also used 
in a differential psychological perspective to measure constructs of personality (e.g., 
general anxiety: Egloff, Wilhelm, Neubauer, Mauss, & Gross, 2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 
2002; Schmukle & Egloff, 2003). Recently there are several interesting studies on implicit 
attitudes and health behavior, such as alcohol consumption (e.g., Wiers, van Woerden, 
Smulders, & de Jong, 2002; Jajodia, & Earleywine, 2003; Palfai & Ostafin, 2003) and 
relations to high fat foods (e.g., Roefs, & Jansen, 2002, Teachman, Gapinski, Brownell, 
Rawlins, & Jeyaram, 2003). 
 
Most of the research on indirect measures that has been conducted in social 
psychology has concerned either various forms of priming or the IAT. Affective priming 
tasks, however, seem to be unfavorable to assess the activation of fear relevant structures 
in anxiety. Searching through clinical literature there are barely any examples about the use 
of subliminal priming experiments to detect group differences between high and low 
anxious participants. Meyer and Merckelbach (1999) examined 31 undergraduate students 
reporting a high or low fear of spiders, who viewed images of spiders and snakes, preceded 
by 8-msec subliminal primes of either smiling faces, scowling faces, or neutral 
configurations. Subsequently, participants evaluated the negativity and fearfulness of each 
image and completed questionnaires concerning snakes and spiders. Results show that 
individuals who were not spider phobic reported more fear following negative priming. No 
effects of primes were observed for individuals with spider phobia. Mayer and 
Merckelbach (1999), nevertheless, suggest that subliminal affective priming has little or no 
clinical potential.  
Moreover, priming methods and the IAT do not seem to measure the same cognitive 
structure or processes. Priming measures are based on the spontaneous activation of a 
single evaluation in response to the subliminally presented primed stimulus. The IAT has 
little to do with what is unconsciously activated in response to a given stimulus (see 
chapter 1.3.3-1). It rather represents an indirect method to assess a specific association of 
interest between a target category and an attribute dimension. Because of the indirect 
approach, the IAT seems to be useful to tap into the cognitive fear structures uninfluenced 
by intentional processes or conscious search. Furthermore, numerous promising IAT 
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applications in social and health psychology further support applying the IAT to assess 
memory-based cognitive structures referred to in schema theories of anxiety. 
 
1.3 IAT measures in psychopathology: Advantages, limitations, and open questions 
 
Following the above assumption that the associations assessed by the IAT share 
many of the qualities ascribed to schemata, the IAT seems to be quite promising for 
clinical orientated research. The experiments of this dissertation focused on one specific 
type of anxiety, namely fear of spiders. The following chapter gives an introduction to 
spider phobia and explains why it could be fruitful to assess fear associations in spider 
phobia using indirect measures. Then this paper will focus on previous research, its 
limitations and still open questions, which lead to the experiments of this dissertation.  
 
1.3.1 Spider Phobia 
 
What are the characteristics of spider phobia and why could it be a worthwhile 
approach to use indirect measures of associations in this domain? According to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994), spider phobia belongs to specific phobias, previously known as simple phobia in 
DSM-III. Specific phobias display a marked and persistent fear of clearly discernible, 
circumscribed objects or situations (Criterion A). Exposure to the phobic stimulus would 
invariably provoke an immediate anxiety response (Criterion B) which may take the form 
of a situationally bound panic attack. Adults describe their fear as excessive or 
unreasonable (Criterion C). In most cases the phobic stimulus is avoided, although it is 
sometimes endured with worry and dread (Criterion D). The diagnosis is appropriate only 
if the avoidance, fear or anxious anticipation of encountering the phobic stimulus interferes 
significantly with the person's daily routine, occupational functioning, social life or if the 
person is markedly distressed about having the phobia (Criterion E). Upon exposure to the 
feared stimulus, a severe anxiety response occurs, and individuals with specific phobia 
realize that their fear is irrational or excessive; but this does not help alleviate the fear. 
Individuals with phobias focus on anticipated harm from some aspects of the feared object. 
They may also show phobic concerns about losing control and panicking that might occur 
on exposed to the feared object. There are several subtypes of specific phobia, like blood-
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injection-injury, natural environment, or situational type. Spider phobia belongs to the 
animal type.  
Specific phobias are one of the most common anxiety disorders. Estimations of the 
life prevalence vary between 7-8% (Bland, Newman, & Orn, 1988; Wittchen, 1986), 15% 
(Robins, Helzer, Weissman, Orvaschel, Gruenerg, Burke, & Regier, 1984) und 20% 
(Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer & Wik, 1996). Specific phobias have the lowest comorbidity 
rates of all anxiety disorders (ca. 27%). In most cases they are combined with other anxiety 
disorders (23%), but seldom with affective disorders (2.2%; Becker, Tuerke, Neumer, 
Soeder & Margraf, 2000). Furthermore, animal phobias are among the most prevalent of 
specific phobias (Bourdon, Boyd, Rae, Burns, Thompson, & Locke, 1988; Curtis, Magee, 
Eaton, Wittchen, & Kessler, 1998), with an estimated life time prevalence of 5% in young 
women (Becker et al., 2000.). Females account for up to 70-90% of situational, animal or 
natural environmental type phobias. Blood-injection-injury type phobias are seen almost as 
frequently in males as females. Moreover, 80% of those who have animal phobias report 
that their age of onset was before they were ten (Öst, 1987). Because there is no specific 
diagnosis of spider phobia, its prevalence is difficult to estimate. Spider fear is, however, 
considered to be one of the most common animal fears. Not all spider-fearing individuals 
fulfill all criteria for diagnosis. Spiders can be easily avoided in normal life, which leads to 
less distress or impairment in a person’s social or occupational functioning. One can 
estimate that the prevalence of spider fear (without Criterion E) and spider phobia is about 
7-9 %.  
Although fear of spiders is reported to be one of the most common animal fears, 
particularly in Western culture, its etiology remains unclear (e.g., Davey, 1992; 
Merkelbach, Arntz, Arrindell, & de Jong, 1992). One can assume that there are various 
factors that influence the development of a phobia. In a very general way, genetic factors 
might determine a predisposition or vulnerability for the acquisition of a phobia. It seems 
unlikely, however, that a specific phobia is genetically transmitted (Barlow, 1988). More 
predictive importance for the etiology of phobias comes from behavioral approaches, 
which propose that symptoms of these anxiety disorders are reinforced or conditioned 
(e.g., Mowrer 1947; Miller, 1948). According to these models all stimuli could become 
phobic objects by being paired with a frightening experience. Nevertheless, traditional 
models of conditioning are not able to explain the specificity of phobic objects, for 
instance that humans develop phobias towards spiders, snakes, elevators, but not flowers, 
or dangerous electric cables or guns. Without doubt, conditioning processes play an 
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important aspect in phobia acquisition, but not all stimuli have the same potential to 
become relevant. With Seligman’s preparedness hypothesis (Seligman, 1971) an influential 
and important explanation was offered. According to Seligman, certain situations and 
objects (e.g., animals including spiders) at one time posed a threat to our species. As a 
consequence, we are born with a predisposition to fear whatever is related to sources of 
serious danger in the evolutionary past. Such a prepared stimulus has a high potential to 
become a phobic threat, when conditioned in an aversive context. Important for the 
etiology of specific phobias is the fact that phobias can be learned without a self 
experience of the threatening stimulus, but just by observation. Cook and Mineka (1990) 
were able to show that lab-reared monkeys acquired fear of snakes vicariously by 
observing other monkeys expressing fear of snakes. When non-fearful lab-reared monkeys 
were given the opportunity to observe a wild-reared model monkey displaying fear of live 
and toy snakes, they were rapidly conditioned to fear snakes. This fear was even learned 
when the fearful model was shown on videotape. In another experiment, lab-reared 
monkeys were shown a video with a monkey model that displayed fear in response to toy 
snakes and flowers, or to toy crocodiles and rabbits. The monkeys showed substantial 
conditioning to toy snakes and crocodiles, but not to flowers and rabbits. Because the 
monkeys had never seen any of these stimuli prior to this experience, the results provide a 
strong support for an evolutionary basis to the selective learning (Öhman & Mineka, 
2003).  
However, it also seems that the nature of preparedness goes beyond the stimulus 
itself. For example, we may be predisposed to fear some animals, including spiders, 
because of their sudden and speedy movement (Bennett-Levy & Marteau, 1984), or their 
particular visual characteristics (Merkelbach, Van Den Hout, & Van Der Molen, 1987).  
Because conditioning and preparedness does not adequately explain the development 
and especially the persistence of phobias, recently attention has been focused on the 
influence of cognitions (Beck et al., 1985, Chapter 1.1.2). Cognitive processes seem to 
play an important role as mediators between experience and response. It is believed that 
distorted processes in attention, memory, or interpretation are basic mechanisms involved 
in the etiology and maintenance of phobias. For example, individuals with phobias attend 
vigilantly to even fleeting signs of danger, especially when they are under stress (e.g., 
Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). At such times, the recognition of danger cues 
triggers a maladaptive, self-perpetuating cycle of cognitive processes than can quickly spin 
out of control.  
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Tomarken, Mineka, and Cook (1989) demonstrated cognitive misinterpretations in 
simple phobia in the following experiment. Participants with animal phobias were 
presented fear-relevant pictures (e.g., spider) or irrelevant pictures (e.g., flowers). After 
each picture, an aversive electrical shock, a neutral tone or no stimulus followed. 
Participants were instructed to estimate the frequencies of the pairing between each picture 
category and the subsequent stimulus. The frequencies were equal for each stimulus i.e., 
shock, tone and no subsequent stimulus, were uniformly distributed for each picture. 
Nevertheless, highly fearful participants overestimated the appearance of an aversive shock 
after the fear-relevant stimuli compared to non-fearful participants. Tomarken et al. (1989) 
concluded that there information processing is biased toward the fear relevant information.  
The assumption that humans have a natural predisposition to fear or averse spiders is 
one reason to choose individuals with spider phobia as an experimental group in this 
dissertation. It would be of great etiological interest, whether individuals without phobia 
show the same aversive and fear-related cognitive pattern when assessed with an indirect 
test such as the IAT, which promises to assess automatic associations uninfluenced by 
explicit intentions and control. 
Moreover, because spider phobia fits into the etiological concept of preparedness, the 
results of this study could be generalized over similar evolutionary-prepared phobias (e.g., 
social phobia). Since these phobias represent some of the most common and prevalent 
types of anxiety disorders and mental illnesses in general, the application of an 
experimental paradigm like the IAT in spider phobia is a useful and adequate approach for 
the understanding of cognitive characteristics and processes that underlie this type of 
disorder. 
In addition, indirect measures in spider phobia also refer to automatic and 
uncontrollable aspects of fear associations and concepts. Self reports, such as 
questionnaires or interviews, refer to immediate conscious experience in explicit memory. 
Individuals with spider phobia are able to express their fear of spiders, but most of them 
find it difficult to explain the special characteristics that make these animals become 
phobic objects, compared to more rational evolutionary threats like heights or water 
(Davey, 1992). Although these individuals explicitly view their attitude to spiders as 
irrational (Mayer, Merckelbach, and Muris, 2000), people do feel threatened by the 
harmless and defenseless spiders, which seem to 'trigger an evolved predator defense 
system in human beings (McNally, 2002, p.562). The crucial point is that people with 
spider phobia and those without significantly differ with respect to their experienced 
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intentional control over the reaction to spiders (Mayer et al., 2000). This little intentional 
control could relate to the connections between explicit - declarative memory structures 
(where people store information that spiders are harmless and can be found in the 
basement) and brain's primary motivational system (see chapter 1.1.2), which leads to a 
fast fear activation without necessarily including the information of the declarative 
memory. Therefore, it appears that automatic and uncontrollable expressions of fear 
associations (assessed by indirect measures like the IAT) represent important additional 
information about cognitive characteristics of spider phobia that might complement 
explicit reports when trying to predict fear-related behavior. 
 
1.3.2 Psychological disorders and IAT measures - Previous studies 
 
Although the IAT lead to numerous applications in social psychology, its 
applications in clinically oriented research is rather limited. There are a few very promising 
applications of the IAT, investigating implicit associations in patients recovered from 
depression (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001) and anxiety disorders (de Jong et a., 
2001; Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 2001; de Jong, 2002; Teachman & Woody, 2003; de 
Jong, van den Hout, Rietbroek, & Huijding, 2003). 
Gemar et al.(2001) used a mood induction paradigm to examine dysphoria-related 
changes of cognitive processing in individuals who had previously experienced depression. 
The patients who had been depressed (n = 23) and never-depressed controls (n = 27) 
performed the Implicit Association Test to measures a self-evaluative bias before and after 
a negative-mood induction. In the first combined task, negative words and self-items were 
assigned to one key and positive words and non-self-items were assigned to a second key. 
The assignment of the valence keys was changed in the second combined task. Results 
obtained by Gemar et al. suggested that after inducing a negative mood participants who 
had experienced depression had less positive attitudes about themselves (faster reactions 
when negative words and self-items share one key) than participants who were never 
diagnosed as having a depression. These findings suggest that even a mild negative mood 
in individuals who had been depressed can reinstate some of the cognitive features 
observed in depression itself.  
De Jong et al (2001) investigated whether an IAT can be used to assess dysfunctional 
beliefs in social phobia. Their IAT was designed to differentiate between individuals with 
high and low social anxiety. Social situations and neutral words were the targets (e.g., date 
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vs. hall), and positive and negative outcomes (e.g., compliment vs. rejection) the associated 
attributes. Women with high social anxiety (N=32) showed the predicted deterioration of 
task performance if the required responses switched from compatible to incompatible with 
the idea that social situations are related to negative outcomes and vice versa; whereas the 
opposite was true for women with low anxiety (N=32). In a later study, de Jong (2002) 
investigated the role of negative self-image in social phobia. Participants were 19 women 
with high and 19 with low social anxiety . The IAT was used to assess participants' self-
esteem as well as their general evaluation of others ('other-esteem'). Women with social 
anxiety displayed relatively low levels of self-esteem on self-report measures. At the 
implicit level, however, women with low and high anxiety did not differ from each other 
and were characterized by a similar, highly positive self-image, but both groups displayed 
a relatively low 'other-esteem'. Furthermore, this self-favoring effect was considerably 
weaker with high than in low anxiety . The results provided equivocal support for the idea 
that low self-esteem plays an important role in social anxiety. On the other hand, de Jong et 
al. (2001) argue that rather than by low self-esteem per se, socially anxious people are 
characterized by a small discrepancy between esteem of self and others, and it may be this 
reduced tendency to self-favoring that is pivotal to social anxiety. 
Most of the clinical studies using an IAT have focused on spider phobia. Similar to 
studies in social psychology, the IAT can be designed to measure the strength of 
associations between an attribute dimension (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant) and clinically 
relevant targets (e.g., spiders vs. butterflies) by comparing the reaction times of two 
successive categorization tasks. In the critical categorization tasks, participants would 
classify both target stimuli and attribute stimuli into two categories each. For instance, they 
might press a certain key on the computer keyboard in response to pictures of spiders and 
in response to pleasant words, and they press another key whenever a butterfly or an 
unpleasant word is shown. The key assignment of one concept (e.g., target pictures) 
changes between the two critical tasks, leading to the crucial question whether one 
response mapping is easier for the participants than the other. If strongly associated 
concepts share the same response in one task (e.g., spiders and unpleasant words on one 
key, butterflies and pleasant words on the other key) responses in this compatible task 
should be faster than in the incompatible task with the opposite assignment (e.g., spiders 
and pleasant words on one key, butterflies and unpleasant words on the other key). The 
differences in average response time between the compatible and the incompatible task 
indicates the strength of the associations between the paired categories. 
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In the first published study about IAT and spider phobia, Teachman et al. (2001) 
investigated fear-related automatic associations among individuals with snake (n = 30) and 
spider fear (n = 37), and found the IAT to discriminate between the two groups. Teachman 
et al. used spiders and snakes as targets pictures of and paired them in four separate IATs 
with attribute concepts of 'bad vs. good', 'afraid vs. unafraid', 'danger vs. safety', and 
'disgusting vs. appealing'. Different to the design introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998) 
their IAT consisted of two critical blocks with only 48 classification trials. Of these, the 
first 12 were practice trials, and the remaining 36 constituted the experimental data. 
Results indicated that individuals with spider and snake fear show automatic associations 
with pictorial stimuli of the feared animal. These implicit associations were robust across 
multiple semantic categorizations (valence evaluation, fear, danger, and disgust). 
Using the same paradigm, Teachman & Woody (2003) examined 31 individuals with 
spider phobia and 30 without before and after a group-based exposure treatment. Again 
participants categorized pictures of spiders and snakes along with semantic categorization 
(valence, fear, danger, and disgust). Spider phobic and non-phobic groups showed different 
fear-related implicit associations toward spiders. Over the course of treatment, these 
associations changed mostly in participants with high anxiety. Results supported the 
clinical applications for implicit fear associations, including prediction of phobic 
avoidance, and treatment sensitivity of fear- and disgust-specific automatic associations. 
De Jong et al. (2003) also explored the presence of implicit fear-related associations 
in participants who did and did not fear spiders . In contrast to the picture stimuli (spiders 
vs. snakes) used by Teachman et al. (2001, 2003), de Jong et al. (2003) used verbal spider 
cues versus neutral words as target stimuli, and negative fear-related versus positive words 
as attributes. As expected, both groups differed on the explicit level, with more negative 
attitudes towards spider cues in participants with high fear. Surprisingly, those with high 
and low fear both showed similar negative associations to spiders at the implicit level. De 
Jong et al. (2003) assumed that individuals may be similar with respect to a general 
implicit affective evaluation of spiders whether they have high fear or not. 
Previous studies using the IAT in the field of psychopathology showed very 
promising results. Based on the hypothesis about the meaning of the IAT, associatively 
matched pairings (e.g., spider pictures and fear words) are more quickly categorized 
because they involve concepts that are strongly elaborated or accessible within the same 
schema. Because these concepts are linked in memory and associations between them have 
been reinforced, it is easy for individuals to access this connected information and process 
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stimuli in a compatible task. On the other hand, mismatched pairings take longer for 
categorization, because individuals need to override these highly connected associations 
when performing the incompatible task. It seems that mismatched pairings are difficult to 
access because they contradict the established automatic association. Following the 
assumption that reaction time can be used to assess the ease of cognitive processing, the 
IAT reflects the extent that a concept or association is accessible in memory. Taking into 
the clinical domain, this approach offers a useful method to reflect accessibility of 
schematic fear associations.  
 
1.3.3 Limitations and open questions in the use of the IAT 
 
In research in clinical psychology, reporters often mention implicit fear associations 
or schemata, which are assessed by the IAT (e.g., de Jong et al., 2001; de Jong et al., 2003; 
Teachman & Woody, 2001; Teachman et al., 2003). Undoubtedly, many researchers 
transfer the concepts of implicit attitudes or stereotypes to clinical psychology. Where, 
however, is a theory of implicit associations found in clinical psychology? Does the IAT 
measure implicit associations or does it measure associations implicitly?  
In recent years, there was intense criticism of the IAT, coming from cognitive 
psychology. For example, Fiedler (2003) pointed out unresolved problems with the 'I', the 
'A' and the 'T' of the IAT, critisizing logical and psychometric properties of the Implicit 
Association Test. The following chapter will focus on these limitations, critiques and open 
questions which are the source of the experimental approaches in this dissertation.  
 
1. Implicit associations or implicit measurement? 
The main goal of this dissertation is to apply indirect measures like the IAT in a 
psychopathological context and to investigate implicit dysfunctional associations and 
cognitive fear-related structures in spider phobia. Although the constructs of implicit 
attitudes, stereotypes, and self-esteem are commonly used in cognitive social psychology 
(e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995),it is necessary to define the meaning of the term 'implicit' 
in relation to cognitive fear-related structures in memory (i.e., schemata). Talking about 
'implicit fear associations towards spiders' could confusingly imply the existence of two 
separate structures (explicit and implicit), with a lack of awareness and no introspective 
access into the implicit one. Many individuals with phobias are, however, surely able to 
express their associations towards spiders accurately, and they are more than aware of their 
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negative fear associations. It is rather uncertain which structures are assessed by the IAT. 
Because the task uses stimuli that need to be categorized regarding a given dimension, 
explicit and declarative knowledge is necessary. Nevertheless, in an investigation 
concerning fMRI-assessed activation of the amygdala, Phelps et al. (2000) found that the 
strength of amygdala activation to unfamiliar Black-versus-White faces was correlated 
with IAT measures of race evaluation, but not with the direct (conscious) expression of 
race attitudes. According to LeDoux and Phelps (2000) amygdala activation relates to the 
implicit emotional memory system. On the other hand, the IAT requires an evaluation of 
stimuli that are stored in memory. Literature on acquisition and activation of evaluative 
information in memory propose that evaluative information is stored in semantic memory 
(e.g., Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2003). To prevent speculations about activated 
structures it seems more helpful to focus on cognitive processes and responses activated by 
the IAT and clarify, whether the measure is implicit or explicit. 
There are serious reasons, however, to not consider the IAT an implicit measure 
(e.g., De Houwer, 2002; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Using the term 'implicit' as applied in 
cognitive psychology leads to some theoretical problems and major misunderstandings of 
the IAT. 
Firstly, one rather strict definition would state that the IAT is implicit if participants 
are not aware of what the test is measuring (similar to the definition of an implicit memory 
test, see: Graf & Schacter, 1985; Roediger, 1990). In the IAT, just because an individual 
has more difficulty associating a given target object with the category pleasant than with 
the category unpleasant does not mean that the individual is unaware that he or she views 
the object negatively. As long as the term implicit is to reflect unawareness, there is no 
justification for labeling this task as implicit. Moreover, the requirements for an implicit 
task are certainly not met because participants usually notice the purpose of the IAT they 
are performing (Motheith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001).  
Secondly, some researchers have argued that the IAT may be considered implicit 
because it is nearly impossible to fake its results. Although some evidence in favor of the 
IAT's resistance against faking attempts has been presented (Banse et al., 2001; Kim & 
Greenwald, 1998), it is by no means indisputable (e.g., Fiedler, 2003). It remains, however, 
unclear whether this criterion is sufficient to define implicitness. 
A third aspect is that the method provides estimates of individuals’ attitudes without 
our having to directly ask them for such information. Participants are not required to 
consciously think about what is being measured, they may be unaware that their attitudes 
Introduction  
 
25
are being assessed, but that does not mean that they are unaware that they possess those 
attitudes. 
Consequently, because the IAT is a performance-related task that does not ask 
directly for a verbal report about the construct of interest, it seems reasonable to call the 
IAT an 'indirect' measure (Fazio & Olson, 2003) based on automatic expressions of the 
constructs being tested (e.g., Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). As in earlier 
research on automaticity, it will become necessary to determine possible automatic features 
of the IAT (e.g., control, intention, efficiency, awareness) to find out whether they satisfy 
the definition of automaticity (see Bargh, 1994; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). For the IAT the 
emphasis is on controllability, compared to priming measures where the term automatic 
appears to have a different meaning (Fazio & Olson, 2003). As Dasgupta et al. (2001, p. 
317) stated: "IAT responses are considered automatic because they are expressed without 
intention or control, although perceivers may become aware of the attitude under scrutiny 
during the task". 
In this paper I use the term 'implicit associations' with respect to cognitive structures 
tested through the performance-based indirect approach. Then, the IAT provides a measure 
of associations between the representations of a target stimulus (e.g., spider) and more or 
less related representations of evaluation (affect, attitudes). The human cognitive system is 
endowed with a mechanism that automatically evaluates all incoming stimulus information 
as pleasant/unpleasant, fearful/nonfearful, etc.(LeDoux, 1993, 1995), and automatically 
leads to the activation of representations associated with it (e.g., Bower, 1981; Fazio et al., 
1986). This activation depends on the strength of the associations between the memory 
representations of the object (e.g., spider) and the evaluative tag. In return, the IAT 
measures the ease of performance on a given target-attribute association and reflects the 
extent that this association is accessible in the activated memory system.  
 
2. What does the IAT measure? 
To use the IAT in clinical research it needs to be certain that valid IAT measures are 
only influenced by the strength of the interested associations and not by other factors. 
There are some alternative explanations, however, which argue that IAT effects might 
reflect salience (Rothermund & Wentura, 2001) or that they can be attributed to differential 
costs for switching between task sets (Mierke & Klauer, 2001). 
According to the figure –ground- asymmetry model by Rothermund and Wentura 
(2001) participants do not classify the presented stimuli regarding the given dimensions 
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(e.g., spider vs. butterfly / unpleasant vs. pleasant), but select one YES category (i.e., 
figure category) and one NO category (i.e., background) for the given target and attribute 
concepts. The YES category tends to be the salient category, usually the more unfamiliar 
(e.g., nonwords) or negative category. Performing an IAT, participants only respond to a 
presented stimulus whether it does belong to the YES category. As a result IAT 
performance depends on whether target and attribute YES category are assigned to the 
same key, which would lead to a faster classification because the YES classification (due 
to its salience) leads to the same response for targets and attributes. Performance will be 
slowed down, when target and attribute YES categories are assigned to different keys. On 
the other hand, numerous experiments by Rothermund and Wentura only demonstrated that 
IAT effects can be produced by figure-ground processes, but do not proof that IAT effects 
are always due to such processes. Moreover, when IAT effects are based on figure-ground 
asymmetries that are mediated by salience, why do different groups of participants (e.g., 
those with and without spider phobia) show different IAT effects with regard to the 
measured target – attribute relation? In terms of the figure-ground model, the explanation 
would be that salience of certain concepts differs between the groups, but what are the 
underlying mechanisms that influence salience? 
Here, the figure-ground model offers no explanations and one can assume that this 
group’s effects relate to different associations tested by the IAT. Studies that demonstrate 
group differences in IAT performance (known group approach) support the validity of the 
IAT as a measure of associative strength. Nevertheless, figure-ground processes can 
influence IAT effects and therefore one should try to avoid highly salient concepts in IAT 
studies (like very unfamiliar concepts such as the concept 'nonword ') (De Houwer, 2002). 
Mierke and Klauer (2001) argue that IAT effects could also be due to the fact that 
participants use different strategies in the compatible and incompatible task. In the 
compatible task it is irrelevant whether target stimuli are classified according the target 
categories (e.g., flower vs. insect) or according the attribute dimension (e.g., positive vs. 
negative), because one target concept (flower) consists of positive exemplars (and thus can 
be categorized as positive) and the other (insects) consists of negative exemplars that can 
be categorized as negative. 
In the compatible task participants do not need to switch between the categorizing of 
targets and attributes, because classifying a flower name as flower will lead to the same 
response as classifying it as a positive word. Mierke and Klauer (2001) argue that 
responding on the basis of the attribute-related information is sufficient to lead to faster 
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performance in the compatible phase of the IAT. On the other hand, switching to the 
incompatible task makes this strategy impossible and leads to longer reaction times. It 
remains unclear, however, whether participants use these strategies during an IAT task or 
whether they categorize the presented stimuli according the given instruction. Moreover, 
the approach by Mierke and Klauer should refer to all participating individuals and would 
not be able to explain differences between groups, as observed in 'known group 
approaches'. 
Especially important is De Houwer's (2001) consideration of 'relevant' and 
'irrelevant' feature accounts and the question, whether IAT performance is sensitive to the 
valence of the category (e.g., flower) or to the valence of the single stimulus (e.g., tulip). 
This approach is related to the assumption that reaction time performance depends on the 
compatibility between presented stimuli and the required responses and/or the relation 
between features of the stimuli that are presented. Based on a classification by Kornblum 
(e.g., Kornblum & Lee, 1995) de Houwer's (2001) structural and process analysis discusses 
two possible response selection accounts of IAT effects (for a detailed overview, see: De 
Houwer, 2003a). The structurally relevant feature of any given target stimulus (e.g., tulip) 
in the IAT is its membership in one of the given categories (e.g., tulip is a flower – flower 
has positive valence). On the other hand, it is of great interest whether the IAT is sensitive 
to the irrelevant feature of the stimulus, the valence of the individual target stimuli (e.g., 
tulip itself is positive). Stimulus valence is an irrelevant feature of target stimuli because 
participants are instructed to respond on the basis of the semantic category and do not need 
to process the valence of the individual stimuli. De Houwer (2001) points out that in a 
typical IAT, there is a perfect confounding between the relevant and irrelevant feature of 
target concept stimuli. De Houwer (2001) empirically tested the two accounts conducting 
an experiment with British participants that involved the target categories 'British' and 
'foreign'. Importantly, half of the British and foreign names referred to positively valued 
names (e.g., Princess Diana, or Albert Einstein) and half of the names referred to 
negatively valenced names (e.g., Margaret Thatcher or Adolf Hitler). Results indicated that 
valence of individual names had no impact on the magnitude of the IAT effect and 
participants responded faster, when British names and positive attributes had the same key 
assignment. This leads to the conclusion that IAT effects reflect the associations involving 
target concepts rather than involving the exemplars that describe those concepts. 
Nevertheless, Steffens and Plewe (2001) suggested that valence of single exemplars has 
profound influence on IAT performance. In their IAT experiment female and male target 
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words (typical female and male names) were combined with positive and negative 
attributes. As predicted, female participants exhibited significantly faster responses, when 
female names and positive words had the same key assignment (and male names referred 
to the same key as negative words) as when the assignment was reversed. This effect, 
however, depended on the single attributes used in the study. It was twice as large when 
the individual words were positive stereotypical female adjectives (e.g., intuitive) and 
negative individual male-related stereotypes (e.g., brutal). The IAT effect decreased when 
the negative attributes displayed strongly negative female-related stereotypes (e.g., bitchy) 
compared to positive male-related stereotypes (e.g., independent). Contrary to De Houwer 
(2001) results by Steffens and Plewe (2001) indicate a strong influence of exemplar 
valence on IAT performance. For application in research it seems to be important to pay 
close attention to the selection of attribute stimuli, because particular selection of 
exemplars can have impact on IAT scores. 
 
3. IAT and relative strength of associations 
In the IAT four stimulus categories are needed. Two categories refer to the target 
concept (e.g., flower vs. insect), while the other two are attribute concepts (e.g., positive 
vs. negative). Because of their being always two target concepts in the same task, the IAT 
can only provide a measure of the relative strength of associations. Faster responses in the 
compatible task (flowers and positive words are assigned on one key vs. insects and 
negative words on the other key) compared to the incompatible task (flowers and negative 
words are assigned to one key vs. insects and positive words on the other key) informs 
about the evaluation of flowers relative to insects. Here, flowers show stronger associations 
with positive attributes than negative attributes in relation to the associations of the concept 
insect to positive and negative words. Hence, one cannot argue that insects are associated 
with negativity in absolute terms; one can only conclude that insects hold rather negative 
associations compared to flowers. For application of the IAT in clinical research this 
implies that one cannot measure one specific dysfunctional association in one specific 
disorder. Results will only provide information about the relative strength of associations.  
 
4. Malleability and the influence of context 
Talking about indirect measures for testing dysfunctional associations in clinically 
oriented research, aspects of validity (as pointed out under point 2 of this chapter) are most 
important to understand what the paradigms are measuring. For interpretation and 
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diagnostic use, however, it should be clear whether the effects measured by these new 
instruments are malleable and what might influence the test outcome. Recent evidence 
shows IAT effects have a good test-retest reliability. Across several studies, test-retest 
reliabilities of IAT measures have averaged above r = .60 (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & 
Pennebaker, 2000; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Banse et 
al. reported quite satisfactory internal consistencies of IAT measures (average r > .80), 
although they also mentioned that test-retest reliabilities were lower than anticipated. 
Nevertheless, there is also growing evidence that IAT effects are malleable (e.g., Lowery 
et al., 2001; Richeson & Ambdy, 2003; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2001; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001, 
Rudman & Lee, 2002; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; for an overview, see: Blair, 2002). 
Many studies examined the influence of additional context information on IAT 
performance. Wittenbrink et al. (2001, Study 1) conducted an IAT measuring racial 
stereotypes towards white and black people. Similar to the IAT used by Greenwald et al. 
(1998) participants categorized target words that consisted of first names stereotypic of 
Blacks and Whites (e.g., Rasaan, Andrew) as well as nouns (attribute dimension) with 
either strong positive or strong negative connotation. In two critical tasks both category 
judgments (Black vs. White for names and good vs. bad for nouns) had to be classified by 
using just two response keys (e.g., task one: Black/good vs. White/bad; task two: 
White/good vs. Black/bad). Faster responses should be observed for the combination that 
are compatible with the participants associations, whereas response times should slow 
down if the category combinations are incompatible with the participants associations. 
After the participants performed this IAT in the beginning of the experiment (baseline), 
half of the participants were shown a movie clip that depicted Black targets in a positive 
stereotypic situation (harmonious family barbecue), whereas the remaining participants 
saw a movie clip with negative stereotypic context (an argumentative gang-related 
incident). The question was how this manipulation would affect IAT effects in the second 
IAT following the video. Results indicated that stereotype exposure moderated IAT effects 
differently. Comparing the different context information, (white) participants who were 
exposed to the positive stereotype showed a significantly larger decrease in their 
spontaneous prejudice bias than did participants in the negative exposure condition. One 
can conclude that just by placing either positive or negative context information reliably 
changes participants' response on the IAT. 
Similar to the results by Wittenbrink et al. (2001), other studies clearly indicate the 
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malleability of IAT effects. IAT measures of racial prejudice were not only influenced by 
movie clips or exposure to violent rap music (Rudman & Lee, 2002), but also through 
social interactions during the experiment. Negativity towards Blacks was decreased in the 
presence of a Black experimenter, compared to the presence of a White experimenter 
(Lowery et al., 2001). Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) found less negativity toward 
elderly (measured by an IAT) after exposure of admired vs. disliked older individuals. 
Mitchell et al. (2003) reported an influence on IAT effects depending on the focus of 
attention. There was more positivism towards Blacks, when participants categorized 
pictures of Black athletes and White politicians according their occupation. The reversed 
pattern was observed, when participants had to focus on the race of the targets. Moreover, 
even mental imagery of a counter stereotypical concept influenced IAT effects (Blair et al., 
2001). In one of their IAT experiments (Blair et al., 2001, study 1 & 2) the strength of a 
stereotypic gender association was reduced following counter stereotypic mental imagery 
(e.g., imagine a strong woman), compared to a control condition. Overall it seems that 
salient positive information about a given category produces IAT scores indicating a more 
positive evaluation of the category.  
These findings have several implications for using the IAT and other indirect 
measures in clinically oriented research and raise important questions about the nature of 
the evaluative, fear-related representation. The degree of contextual dependence of an 
evaluation will determine the stability and retest-reliability of measurements across 
context. Just as there is sometimes low reliability in explicit measures of associations 
across time due to the underlying constructive nature, an automatic evaluation will be 
similarly bound by contextual factors (see: Ferguson & Bargh, 2003). It seems fruitful to 
explore the extent to which automatically activated fear-related associations are 
contextually dependent, and therefore to be considered as the result of a constructive 
process in a certain situation. Imagine a person with spider phobia who associates specific 
situations or objects with spiders and therefore with fear. If such fear-associated objects 
(e.g., the corner of a window) are stored in memory as one solitary (single tag) evaluative 
representation, this object should always activate fear-related responses and would not 
relate to neutral or more positive contents; however, this concept of one single affective tag 
seems very unlikely. The second possibility relates to the assumption that valence is based 
on various representations, including multiple categories that relate to the object in various 
ways (Ferguson & Bargh, 2003). With respect to phobias, these assumptions imply that 
automatically activated dysfunctional associations vary across time and context, depending 
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on the way the object is perceived and what has been recently activated with regard to this 
object. This would influence subsequent judgments, feelings, and behavior according to the 
activated context. Moreover, the assessment of automatic fear-related associations in 
different contextual situations would help to shed the light on the debate about the nature 
of dysfunctional beliefs and associations that underlie psychopathology (De Houer, 2002). 
Originally, these associations were believed to be context-independent and relatively stable 
over time (e.g., Beck, 1976). This would suggest that an automatic evaluation is based on a 
stable, preexisting representation of the phobic object. Nevertheless, traditional self- report 
measures of dysfunctional beliefs indicated to be rather context-dependent (e.g., Teasdale, 
1993). In this case, (automatic) associations measured by indirect tasks rather reflect a 
composite of multiple representations and in thus be flexible and sensitive to current 
contextual conditions and object relevant activations.  
 
1.4 The approaches of this dissertation 
 
The main goal of this dissertation is to apply indirect measures of associations like 
the Implicit Association Test and related paradigms in spider phobia. Based on the 
promising applications, as well on unsolved problems and open questions of previous IAT 
studies this dissertation will now focus on three major issues.  
On one hand the focus will be on clinically oriented questions about the usefulness of 
IAT measures to assess fear-relevant associations and schemata and to predict anxious 
behavior. It could be of great interest for clinically oriented research, when techniques like 
the IAT offer information about maladaptive schemata that relate to automatic evaluations 
of the feared stimuli, in addition to controlled cognitive and behavioral aspects measured 
through interviews and questionnaires. In this respect Study 1 applies a modified IAT to 
investigate cognitive structures in spider phobia. As a special methodological feature, the 
influence of different IAT designs (two vs. five tasks) on performance will be examined. 
Fear associations towards spiders are measured among participants with and without spider 
phobia. Moreover, in advantage to previous studies spider enthusiasts will be introduced as 
an experimental group. Study 1 will address the question, if individuals with and without 
phobia differ in fear-related 'implicit' associations as proposed by Teachman et al. (2003), 
or if the two groups do just differ on an explicit and behavioral level (e.g., de Jong et al., 
2003). Previous IAT research on spider phobia as well as this study suffers the limitations 
that the results can only be interpreted in terms of group comparisons and not in absolute 
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terms. Introducing spider enthusiasts as a third experimental group offers the innovative 
possibility to compare IAT effects of fearful and non-fearful participants in relation to a 
surely absolute no-fear baseline. 
The second part of IAT studies in this dissertation will focus on a methodological 
question regarding the IAT. As chapter 1.3.3 explains in point 2 it is of great interest 
whether the IAT is sensitive to the valence of the individual target/attribute stimuli, or if 
IAT effects are just driven by the valence of the concept category. In recent IAT 
experiments the relevant category dimensions are labeled explicitly. The special approach 
of Study 2, however, is to test the ability of the IAT to measure fear associations when the 
attribute dimension (pleasant vs. unpleasant) is masked by a neutral category dimension 
(e.g., capitalized letters vs. small letters). Through this masking process participants are 
forced to classify attribute words according a neutral (surface) dimension (no valence) and 
not according the irrelevant feature of stimulus valence. On the other hand, if IAT effects 
remain significant in such a masking condition, this would support the assumption that 
irrelevant stimulus features (valence) still influence IAT performance. Moreover, besides 
these theoretical implications, the results of Study 2 could provide new applications with 
practical relevance for the use of IAT experiments in clinical psychology. 
Study 3 examines the question of how different context conditions lead to differential 
activation of cognitive schemata in anxiety. In previous research specific fear-related 
associations with spiders are tested and compared between individuals with high and low 
fear, whereas the context was disregarded. There is, however, much evidence from social 
psychology that indirect associations are context dependent. As a first approach to this 
matter, Study 3 will investigate whether fear associations involving possible specific 
spider-related features and situations (e.g., to crawl, legs, basement, attic) depend on 
different context conditions. The IAT used in previous clinical experiments only measured 
the relative strength of associations in respect to two target concepts. The innovation of 
Study 3 is the application of an absolute indirect measure called Extrinsic Affective Simon 
Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003b) that is based on features of the IAT and the affective 
variant of the Simon Task (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998). This EAST will measure the extent 
in which the target words (i.e., features and situations) are associated with pleasant words 
and unpleasant, fear-related words. The question is whether these implicit associations 
depend on the activation of a 'spider' concept or a 'human' concept (concepts will be 
activated through the presentation of relating pictures before the experiment) and how this 
activation depends on the individual score of spider fear.  
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2. Study 1: Explicit and Implicit Associations in Spider Phobia 
 
The goal of Study 1 was to apply the IAT in a psychopathological context and to 
investigate 'implicit' dysfunctional associations and cognitive fear-related structures in a 
specific type of anxiety, namely fear of spiders. As discussed in chapter 1.3.3-1 I use the 
term 'implicit associations' with respect to the performance-based indirect approach of the 
IAT to fear associations.  
Study 1 examined implicit fear-related associations towards spiders, using modified 
versions of the Implicit Association Test in three experiments. I sought to find out how 
automatic expressions of fear associations (implicit fear associations) relate to explicit 
direct measures of fear (e.g., questionnaires, interviews) and how both relate to actual 
behavior. To justify the use of indirect methods in clinical psychology, it is important to 
know whether indirect measures improve the prediction of fear-related behavior, over and 
above explicit measures such as questionnaires. Furthermore, this study focused on some 
methodological problems and open questions of prior research in this field. 
The aim of the first experiment was to apply a version of the Implicit Association 
Test which would be able to detect individual differences in implicit spider associations. If 
negative implicit associations towards spiders play a critical role in spider phobia they 
should correlate with inter-individual differences in avoidance behavior and explicitly 
expressed fear, leading to differences in IAT performance between highly fearful and non-
fearful individuals. Comparing the conflicting IAT results of Teachman et al. (2003) and 
de Jong et al. (2003), it remains unclear, whether differences between high and low fearful 
individuals do not exist or whether differences in the IAT designs and target materials led 
to inconsistent findings (see, chapter 1.3.2).  
Given the promising results presented by Greenwald et al. (1998), the IAT design of 
Experiment 1 followed the original IAT, consisting of a complete sequence of five tasks (1. 
target discrimination, 2. attribute discrimination, 3. first combined task, 4. reversed target 
discrimination, and 5. reversed combined task), with an adequate number of practice trials 
and experimental trials presented during the combined tasks. This approach constitutes a 
major difference compared to the IAT designs used by Teachman et al. (2001, 2003), who 
employed only 36 data trials in their versions of the IAT 1.  
____________________ 
1 Teachman et al. (2001, 2003) used only two combined tasks with 12 practice trials and 36 experimental data trials each. 
De Jong et al. (2003) used four tasks (target and attribute discrimination, two combined tasks, no reversed target 
discrimination). Each combined task included 48 experimental trials and no practice trials. 
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I chose the original long version of the IAT because it is important to ensure that IAT 
performance is based on reaction times in a highly automatic task which is not influenced 
by insufficient practice or unaccustomed task features. As critical targets, ecologically 
relevant stimuli (pictures of spiders) were used. Visual confrontation with phobia-related 
pictures should lead to differential activation of spider-fear associations, differently from 
verbal cue words (cf. de Jong et al., 2003). 
The second target category was butterflies. Several pre-tests had demonstrated that 
butterfly pictures are not associated with fear or negative valence. In order to estimate and 
classify indirect fear associations towards spiders, butterflies are a useful second target 
category because they also represent a class of 'insect-related' small animals, but without 
an automatic negative schema. Teachman et al. (2003) used snakes as the second target 
class, which makes drawing conclusions about the direction of automatic fear associations 
towards spiders more difficult. Snakes generally seem to be strongly and automatically 
associated with fear in humans (Öhman & Mineka, 2003). Using two fear-related animal 
classes to investigate automatic associations toward one class – that is, spiders - might 
distort the results on such indirect tasks. On the other hand, neutral stimuli as the second 
IAT target class (i.e., de Jong et al., 2003) are indeed completely unrelated to spiders, but it 
remains unclear whether neutral stimuli offer a true 'neutral' baseline (De Houwer, 2002). 
Moreover, there is converging evidence suggesting that affectively valenced stimuli 
(positive and negative) are generally processed more easily and more quickly than neutral 
stimuli (see Ferre, 2003). To avoid unpredictable effects of neutral stimuli on IAT 
performance, it seems reasonable to use two affectively valenced target classes. In pretests, 
butterflies were indeed evaluated as clearly positive, accompanied by very little variance 
between individuals. Therefore, butterfly pictures make it easier to attribute significantly 
different IAT effects between phobic individuals and controls to different attitudes towards 
spiders 2. As in all IAT applications, mean reaction times in the two combined tasks are 
compared to each other. If a target concept such as spiders is highly associated with a 
specific attribute such as fear-related words, the categorization task of the IAT should be 
easier when the associated concepts share the same response (the compatible task) as when 
they require different responses (the incompatible task).  
_____________________ 
2 To assure that group differences in IAT performance have its origin in different attitudes towards spiders, evaluation of 
the second target category (butterfly) must not vary between participants. In this study, the material was rated by all 
participants after the experiment. As pre-tests had already indicated, butterflies were generally evaluated as pleasant, with 
no threatening or disgusting potential. 
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The second experiment investigated how a reduction of the IAT from five tasks to 
only two critical tasks affects IAT performance. As mentioned before, some studies 
applied short versions of the IAT, reducing the procedure to the two combined tasks (e.g., 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Teachman et al., 2001, 2003). A successfully reduced IAT 
would be a much more practical tool for applied research in psychopathology because it 
would be shorter and less exhausting for the participants; however, it has not been shown 
yet whether a reduced IAT yields results comparable to the original long version. 
Therefore, in order to allow a direct comparison, Experiment 1 and 2 only differed in the 
number of IAT tasks and not in any other methodological feature. The main question in 
Experiment 2 was whether spider fearful participants' IAT performance differs from that of 
explicitly non-fearful controls, and how implicit associations correlate with behavior and 
questionnaire scores. 
The third experiment focused on the results of de Jong et al. (2003). In this study, 
both spider fearful and non-fearful participants exhibited significant IAT effects, 
interpreted as negative implicit spider stereotypes. Consequently, de Jong et al. (2003) 
assumed that their findings reflect a disassociation in non-phobic individuals between 
explicit associations (no fear in questionnaires) and implicit associations (better 
performance when spiders and anxiety related words share the same response). 
Significantly different IAT effects between phobic individuals and controls may certainly 
be due to different attitudes towards spiders if evaluations of the second target are 
comparable in both groups. Beyond this group comparison, however, interpretation of IAT 
effects is more problematic because the IAT only measures the relative strength of 
associations (see De Houwer, 2002). There are always two target concepts (e.g., spiders 
cues vs. neutral words) which are related to the two types of attribute concepts (see chapter 
1.3.3-3). Studies like the one by de Jong et al. (2003) only show that (1) fear associations 
are stronger with spider words than with neutral words, or (2) pleasant associations are 
stronger with neutral words than with spider words, or (3) both of the above. There is no 
information, however, to tell whether non-phobic controls show implicit fear associations 
with spiders on an absolute level. Indeed, in order to characterize implicit associations 
towards spiders, it is important to know if implicit fear associations towards spiders are a 
general phenomenon, only varying in degree between phobics and non-phobics. If so, non-
fearful individuals would show simultaneous possession of contradictory implicit and 
explicit associations towards spiders (known as 'dual attitudes'; see Wilson, Lindslay, & 
Schooler, 2000). To examine the assumption of an implicit-explicit dissociation in non-
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phobic individuals, a third experimental group becomes necessary: spider enthusiasts or 
spider lovers. Spider enthusiasts should not differ from extremely non-fearful controls in 
scores of fear questionnaires or in clinical diagnostics. They do differ in their habit to keep 
spiders as a domestic animal with surely no negative stereotypes or fear associations 
towards (harmless) spiders. Therefore, in Experiment 3 spider enthusiasts served as the 
critical experimental population, providing the control condition for a more satisfactory 
classification and interpretation of IAT effects in the non-fearful groups. Assuming that 
neither spiders nor butterflies are associated with fear in spider enthusiasm, there should 
not be any advantage for one of the combined tasks (compatible or incompatible). If spider 
lovers do not show IAT effects, or even negative effects, the hypothesis of a dissociation 
between implicit and explicit measures in non-phobic controls would be supported. 
Besides the above stated there is a second advantage of using spider enthusiasts in 
this study. According to the figure-ground model by Rothermund and Wentura (2001), 
participants may not classify the presented stimuli regarding the given dimensions (e.g., 
spider vs. butterfly / unpleasant vs. pleasant), but select one figure category and one 
background category for the given target and attribute concepts (see chapter 1.3.3-2). 
According to this model salience and familiarity drive the IAT effect, and one could argue 
that figure-ground selection varies between phobics and nonphobics, because spiders are 
more salient or familiar to phobics. Now, spider lovers serve as a useful control for this 
explanation because spiders should be as salient for them as they are for spider phobics. 
 
2.1 Experiment 1: IAT performance and spider fear 
 
Method 
Participants and Questionnaires. About 750 undergraduate students of Dresden 
University of Technology were pre-screened using a short screening questionnaire (Spider 
Anxiety Screening - SAS, Rinck, Bundschuh, Engler, Müller, Wissmann, Ellwart, & 
Becker, 2002), estimating fear and avoidance of spiders as well as possible distress (See 
Appendix G for details). Two groups of students were selected, namely 24 individuals with 
high fear of spiders and 24 individuals with no fear at all, who were invited and 
participated in Experiment 1. Spider anxious participants fulfilled DSM-IV criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for specific phobia (animal type/spiders). The 
only exception from DSM-IV diagnostic criteria concerned criterion E (spider interferes 
significantly with person's daily routine, occupational functioning, or social life, or the 
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person is markedly distressed about having the phobia). Because spiders can be easily 
avoided in Western life, relevant restrictions and strain are very rare in fear of spiders. For 
this reason, criterion E did not have to be fulfilled. The terms 'spider anxiety' and 'spider 
phobia' are used synonymously in this paper. To diagnose spider phobia, a trained clinical 
psychologist interviewed participants using the 'Mini-Dips' (Margraf, 1994). To assess the 
degree of spider fear, all participants completed the Spider Fear Questionnaire (FAS, Rinck 
et al., 2002; see Appendix H for details), a German version of the 'Fear of Spiders 
Questionnaire' (Szymanski & O'Donohue, 1995), and once more the SAS (Rinck et al., 
2002). Furthermore, a similar screening questionnaire scored possible fear of butterflies 
(BAS). All participants were free of any major mental or medical illness or any associated 
disorder (drug abuse, alcoholism, personality disorder, mental deterioration). All 
participants were paid a modest fee for their participation. 
IAT. Each IAT consisted of a complete sequence of five tasks: (a) target 
discrimination, (b) attribute discrimination, (c) first combined task, (d) reversed target 
discrimination and (e) reversed combined task. Each task started with instructions 
describing the category discrimination and the assignments of response keys (left vs. 
right). During each trial, reminder labels (appropriate category names positioned to the left 
or right) remained on the screen. The procedure started with (a) the target discrimination 
task, in which participants had to distinguish single pictures of spiders from pictures of 
butterflies by pressing one of two colored keys (the letter 'Y' on the keyboard) in response 
to one type of animal and the other key (the '-' key) in response to the other animal. The 
second task was (b) the attribute dimension. Participants had to categorize single words 
according to emotional valence (pleasant vs. unpleasant). The same two keys as in the 
preceding target discrimination task were used by assigning the left key to one word type 
and the right key to the other word type. Each task consisted of 80 trials (each of the 40 
pictures appeared twice, each of the 20 words appeared 4 times), divided into a practice 
block of 40 trials followed by 40 experimental trials that were analyzed. The following 
critical first combined task (c) was a combination of target and attribute discrimination in 
which targets and attributes appeared on alternating trials. During the reversed target 
discrimination task (d) the participants learned a reversal of the response assignment for 
targets (spiders and butterflies), consisting of 120 trials (each of the pictures appeared 3 
times), including 80 practice and 40 experimental trials. The final reversed combined task 
(e) combined the attribute discrimination (not changed in its assignment) with the reversed 
target discrimination. Analogous to the first combined task (c) 240 items were presented 
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(each of the 40 pictures appeared 3 times, each of the 20 words appeared 6 times), divided 
into 80 practice trials and 160 critical trials which were analyzed. Performance in a 
combined task should be faster, if a target concept (e.g., spiders) is highly associated with 
an attribute concept (e.g., unpleasant), and both require responding with the same key 
(called the compatible task). Performance should slow down in the combined task (called 
incompatible task), when unassociated targets (e.g., spider) and attributes (e.g., 
pleasantness) require the same response. 
All Stimuli (black lettered words and colored pictures) were presented vertically and 
horizontally centered against a light gray screen background. During each trial, reminder 
labels (appropriate category names positioned in the top left and top right corner of the 
screen) remained visible. Stimuli appeared in the same fixed random order for each 
participant. Each stimulus was preceded by a fixation cross presented for 500 ms. The 
stimulus was shown until a response was made. After an incorrect response, a black 'X' 
appeared in the center of the screen for one second. The experiment was programmed in 
RSVP (Williams & Tarr, no date) and implemented on a Macintosh Performa 5100. 
Word materials. For the experiment, a list of unpleasant German words, which were 
also anxiety-related, and a list of positive words were created. First, a large pool of words 
specifically related to anxiety was created by a literature search and by contributions of 
clinical experts. To the resulting words, relevant synonyms were added, taken from 
Mueller (1972). Valence of the words (from very unpleasant to very pleasant) and relation 
to anxiety were determined in pre-tests. In addition, lists of pleasant words were created. 
These words came from the categories 'vacation' and 'relaxation'. A total of 10 
unpleasant/anxiety-related and 10 pleasant words were selected from these lists. The final 
20 experimental words were unambiguously classifiable ('pleasant' vs. 'unpleasant') by 
members of the participant population. Words of the two categories did not differ with 
regard to word frequency or word length. English translations of the words are given in the 
Appendix. 
Picture materials. 20 pictures of spiders and 20 pictures of butterflies were used in 
the IAT as target stimuli. As a pre-selection, a pool of 56 spider and 54 butterfly pictures 
were gathered from different media (books, Internet) and standardized as 16 bit color 
pictures in a 5 x 4 cm format. In pilot tests ease of identification and emotional valence of 
each single picture were assessed. Participants of the pilot tests did not participate in the 
main experiment and were free of spider phobia. From this pool, 10 spider pictures and 10 
butterfly pictures were selected according to the results of the pilot tests (see Figure 2-1). 
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Each of the resulting pictures was duplicated by creating its mirror image, resulting in 20 
experimental pictures in each category. 
 
Figure 2-1. Pictures used for the IAT-Experiments of Study 1 and 2 
 
 
 
Behavioral avoidance test (BAT). To measure fear and avoidance of spiders, 
participants were asked to take a behavioral test. In front of a closed, separate room, the 
participants were asked to open the door and approach a spider as quickly and closely as 
possible. The spider was a 7 cm long harmless tarantula (Aphonopelma Pallidum) 
positioned about 5 meters away from the door in a closed terrarium. When participants 
indicated that they wanted to stop the approach, distance between the participant and the 
spider as well as the duration of the approach attempt were registered. Because participants 
could avoid the spider either by a approaching slowly (affecting time) or by refraining 
from approaching (affecting distance), the approach speed was calculated, taking both 
time and distance into account. Directly after the BAT, participants gave four retrospective 
ratings of their emotional state during the test. The ratings included nervousness, tension, 
and anxiety while approaching the spider, and how much they would have liked to leave 
the situation (avoidance). Ratings were given on scales ranging from one (labeled 'not at 
all') to five (labeled 'extremely'). 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually and were informed that they would 
be completing a classification task including words and pictures. Before the experiment, 
participants completed the FAS (Spider Fear Questionnaire), SAS (Spider Anxiety 
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Screening), and BAS (Butterfly Anxiety Screening), followed by a diagnostic interview. ). 
Afterwards, participants completed the IAT. To control for possible task order effects, the 
sequence of the combined discrimination tasks (c) and (e) was counterbalanced across 
participants, such that half of them started with the compatible task and the others started 
with the incompatible task ('task sequence'). Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible during the task. The experimental session closed with 
the behavioral avoidance test, a questionnaire concerning the emotional state during 
confrontation with the spider, and a valence rating of all presented word stimuli. 
Additionally, state anxiety and trait anxiety was assessed using the German version of the 
State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (STAI-T and STAI-S; Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & 
Spielberger, 1981; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lusthene, 1970). State anxiety was measured 
at the beginning and at the end of the experimental session. Trait anxiety was assessed 
once at the beginning. 
Design. The main dependent variable (the IAT effect) is calculated for each 
participant as the average latency of the incompatible task minus the average latency of the 
compatible task. Positive IAT effects occur when mean reaction times are larger in the 
incompatible condition (when spiders are paired with positive attributes) than in the 
compatible condition (spiders paired with anxiety-related attributes). IAT effects were 
analyzed with an ANOVA including the between-subjects factor 'group' (spider anxious 
vs. non-anxious) and 'task sequence' (compatible task before incompatible or vice versa). I 
hypothesize that pictures may be categorized on a perceptual level, whereas words have to 
be categorized on a semantic level, therefore I expected differences in the processing of 
targets and attributes. Thus, besides the general IAT effects averaged across all materials, 
separate IAT effects for targets (pictures) and attributes (words) were computed, yielding 
the within-subjects factor 'IAT Type' (IAT targets, IAT attributes). Effect sizes were 
computed as eta squares, and are given below. 
 
Results 
Participants characteristics. As Table 2-1 indicates, spider phobic and non-phobic 
participants markedly differed on explicit measures of spider fear (FAS, SAS). The spider 
phobic group had a significantly higher fear score in the Spider Fear Questionnaire (FAS, 
Rinck et al., 2002) (t(46) = 19.1, p < .001) and in the Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS, 
Rinck et al., 2002) (t(46) = 24.7, p < .001). Among the spider phobic group, 6 out of 24 
participants fulfilled all DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for 
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specific phobia (animal type/spiders), the remaining 18 spider anxious participants did not 
meet the criteria concerning distress and interference with usual routines. The phobic 
group and controls reported no fear, avoidance or distress regarding butterflies and did not 
differ in their BAS (butterfly fear screening) scores from each other(t(46) = .61, n.s.). 
Scores of state anxiety did not differ between both groups before the experiment (t(46) = 
1.92, n.s.), but were different at the end of the experiment (t(46) = 4.27, p < .001). During 
the course of the experiment, state anxiety in the phobic group increased, in contrast to 
constant STAI-S scores of non-phobic controls. This pattern was substantiated by a 
significant group by measurement time interaction (F(1,46) = 14.6, p < .001, eta2 = .24).  
 
Table 2-1. Participants’ characteristics and valance ratings of word material  in 
Experiment 1 to 3 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2  Experiment 3 
  Sp. Phobic Control  Sp. Phobic Control  Sp. Lover Control 
Participants          
n  24 24  24 24  9 9 
Sex ratio (F/M)  22/02 20/04  22/02 23/01  04/05 04/05 
Age  23.4 (2.36) 23.2 (2.73)  22.17 (4.46) 22.42 (2.50)  25.78 (6.57) 27.11 (4.88) 
FAS  62.4 (15.47) 1.4 (2.16)  65.88 (15.25) 1.71 (2.53)  .00 (.00) .44 (.73) 
SAS Spider  19.2 (2.87) 1.7 (1.94)  16.33 (1.90) 1.67 (1.58)  .00 (.00) 3.67 (2.06) 
BAS Butterfly  .67 (1.31) .46 (.1.06)  .46 (.93) .13 (.34)  - - 
STAI-S (1)  34.8 (8.1) 31.1 (4.7)  39.1 (7.1) 32.1 (6.1)  - - 
STAI-S (2)  42.3 (11.1) 32.0 (4.0)  44.3 (12.1) 31.4 (3.94)  - - 
STAI-T  39.8 (8.5) 36.4 (9.7)  40.2 (9.7) 37.7 (25.5)  - - 
Ratings of word stimuli a        
pleasant words  1.61 (.24) 1.53 (.28)  1.46 (.28) 1.48 (.28)  1.52 (.36) 1.58 (.41) 
unpleasant words  -1.67 (.24) -1.65 (.26)  -1.66 (.24) -1.61 (.21)  -1.52 (.12) -1.40 (.01) 
 
FAS: (Spider Fear Questionnaire); SAS Spider: (Spider Fear Screening); BAS Butterfly: (Butterfly Fear Screening) 
STAI-Stait (1): (Stait Anxiety Inventory / pre test); STAI-Stait (2): (Stait Anxiety Inventory / post test);   
STAI-Trait: (Trait Anxiety Inventory) 
a Range of scale: -2 = 'very unpleasant', -1='unpleasant', 0=neutral, 1= 'pleasant', 2= 'very pleasant' 
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Thus, confrontation with phobia-related materials (spider pictures) increased state 
anxiety in phobic participants, even before encountering a real spider in the BAT. Phobic 
and non-phobic participants did not differ regarding trait anxiety (STAI-T) (t(46) = 1.27, 
n.s.), age (t(46) = .23, n.s.) or sex ratio (Chi2 = .19, n.s.). All participant characteristics are 
displayed in Table 2-1. 
IAT effects. Data for each task included response latencies (in milliseconds) and 
error rates. Prior to the planned analyses, distributions of error rates were examined. Error 
rates were uniformly low, averaging just under 5% on critical IAT blocks. Therefore, 
latencies data of correctly answered trials were averaged for each critical task, yielding 
median latencies for each participant. IAT effects were computed by subtracting the 
median latency of the compatible task from that of the incompatible task 3. 
Table 2-2 displays IAT effects for both groups (phobic and controls), separately for 
attributes and targets. Generally, a significant IAT effect indicates faster processing of the 
compatible task (reflecting associations between spiders and anxiety-related words vs. 
butterflies and positive words) compared to the incompatible task (reflecting associations 
between butterflies and anxiety-related words vs. spiders and positive words). An overall 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the between-subjects factors Group and Task 
Sequence, and the within-subjects factor IAT type (IAT pictures vs. IAT words) indicated 
no influence of task sequence on IAT performance (F(1,44) = .35, n.s.).  
 
____________________ 
3 The analysis strategy I use for IAT experiments differs from the strategy introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998). 
Greenwald et al. eliminated outliers by counting response latencies less than 300 ms or greater than 3,000 ms as errors 
and recoded these responses as 300 or 3,000 ms. This seems an unusual outlier elimination, because it leads to increasing 
frequencies at both ends of the distribution. Aggregating response latencies via median score represents a useful strategy 
to eliminate the influence of extreme outliers, a typical phenomenon of the IAT.  
There is a confusingly large number of techniques used in IAT data reduction so far. As reported, Greenwald et al. (1998) 
recoded outliers below 300 ms and above 3000 ms and log transforms the response times. Teachman et al. (2001) used 
the same outlier elimination, but reciprocally transforms trial latency data (1,000/latency), whereas Teachman & Woody 
(2003) used no further transformation. De Jong et al. (2003) computed IAT indices just for one target category (i.e., 
spiders) by subtracting mean RTs on trials during which the target words shared the response with negative adjectives 
from the mean RTs on trials during which the target shared the response key of positive adjectives. Grennwald, Nosek, 
and Banaji (2003) report in their paper various possible scoring algorithms of IAT measures: (1) median aggregation of 
each combined block, (2) mean aggregation of each combined block, (3) log transformation and mean aggregation, (4) 
reciprocal of latencies are mean aggregated, (5) D measure D (divides the difference between combined block means by 
the standard deviation of all the latencies in the two test blocks). Performances of the five IAT measures (D, mean, 
median, log, and reciprocal) was examined and evaluated under numerous conditions of data reduction in terms of each 
measure’s correlation (a) with its parallel explicit measure for the entire sample (high values are desired) and (b) with 
average latency for the subsample of self-characterized strong supporters for each target (Bush or Gore -values near zero 
are desired, indicating lack of contamination of the measure by slowness of responding). Results indicated that 
correlations between the IAT and the two criteria depend on differential effects of latency exclusions based on the rates 
of excluded and included percent of fast responses, error rates, or practice trials. Grennwald et al. (2003) now recommend 
the D measure as favorite IAT score computed out of all combined response latencies (including practice trial latencies 
and replaced error latencies (replaced with block mean + 600ms)). 
I will refer to the median score because of its proven ability to eliminate outliers without having chosen an elimination 
and transformation strategy which suits my predicted results best.  
Empirical Studies  
 
43
A significant main effect of Group (F(1,44) = 6.79, p < .01, eta2 = .13), however, 
indicated different IAT effects in phobics and controls. Both spider phobic participants and 
non-phobic controls showed significant IAT effects (phobic: mean 90.3 , SD 72.; t(23) = 
6.07, p < .001; control: mean 47.4 , SD 50.1; t(23) = 4.50, p < .001), but the effect was 
significantly larger in the phobic group. A significant main effect of IAT type (F(1,44) = 
14.9, p < .001, eta2 = .25) indicated different IAT effects for target pictures and attribute 
words; although all effects were significantly larger than zero, IAT effects were much 
larger for words than for pictures. A significant interaction between Group and IAT type 
(F(1,44) = 4.67, p < .05, eta2 = .10) revealed that IAT effects for both groups differed for 
attribute words (t(46) = 2.49, p < .05), but not for target pictures (t(46) = 1.08, n.s.). No 
other effects approached significance. 
 
Table 2-2.  Mean reaction times in ms for compatible and incompatible task and IAT 
Effects in ms (with Standard Deviations) for all stimuli (pictures and 
words), and separately for words (attributes) and pictures (targets) in 
Experiment 1 to 3 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2  Experiment 3 
  Sp. Phobic Control  Sp. Phobic Control  Sp. Lover Control 
Compatible  571 (50) 557 (41)  614 (73) 609 (70)  772 (192) 619 (68) 
Incompatible  661 (93) 604 (48)  761 (164) 731 (117)  752 (147) 753 (109) 
IAT Effect  90** (73) 47** (50)  147** (121) 123** (98)  -20.0 (75) 134** (86) 
IAT attributes  130** (122) 59** (66)  203** (174) 162** (134)  -25 (69) 152** (110) 
IAT targets  51** (51) 36** (45)  91** (91) 83** (81)  -16 (92) 116** (79) 
 
IAT effects are computed as the mean latency difference between the compatible and the incompatible task. IAT Effects 
marked with '*' are significantly different from zero with p < .05, marked with '**' with p< .01. 
 
Behavioral avoidance test (BAT). As expected, the two groups' behavior differed 
significantly in the behavioral assessment task (BAT) for mean approximation time, 
distance, and speed (see Table 2-3). Compared to non-phobic controls, spider fearful 
participants were significantly slower in approaching the spider (Speed (t(46) = 10.3, p < 
.001); Time (t(46) = 6.57, p < .001)), and they avoided standing close to the animal (t(46) 
= 3.1, p < .01). Emotional state during the test (measured by four retrospective ratings) 
showed high levels of nervousness (t(46) = 8.43, p < .001), tension (t(46) = 8.15, p < .001), 
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anxiety (t(46) = 15.3, p < .001), and wish to avoid in the phobic group (t(46) = 8.27, p < 
.001), but not the control group. 
 
Table 2-3. Results of Behavior Assessment Test (BAT) in Experiment 1 and 2 
 
  Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
  Sp. Phobic Control  Sp. Phobic Control 
Behavior Assessment Test (BAT)     
Distance (cm)  104.8** (148.0) 11.3 (4.5)  171.5** (184.4) 10.8 (2.8) 
Time (sec)  23.6** (11.1) 8.3 (2.4)  17.9** (8.3) 7.6 (2.5) 
Speed (cm/sec)  29.7** (14.1) 88.9 (24.2)  36.0** (22.4) 101.0 (31.5) 
Emotional Valence Rating a     
Nervousness  3.42** (.93) 1.46 (.66)  3.17** (.94) 1.54 (.78) 
Tension  3.13** (1.12) 1.13 (.45)  3.13** (1.01) 1.04 (.20) 
Anxiety  4.04** (.69) 1.29 (.55)  4.04** (.82) 1.04 (.20) 
Avoidance  3.00** (1.14) 1.04 (.20)  2.70** (1.02) 1.00 (.00) 
 
a Range of emotional rating scale from: 1 ('not at all') to 5 ('extremely'). 
All scores marked with '*' are significantly different with p < .05 from control group score ('**' p< .01). 
 
Relations among fear measures. Table 2-4 displays relations between IAT scores, 
behavioral fear measures, and self-reported fear scores. The overall pattern indicates 
moderate correlations of the IAT scores with behavioral measures of fear (e.g., speed) as 
well as correlations with self-reported fear scores (Spider Questionnaires, emotional 
ratings). As expected, participants with large IAT effects approached the spider more 
slowly. Most importantly, the correlation between the IAT effect and behavior (speed) 
remained significant (r = -.29; p < .05), even after the correlation between questionnaire 
scores (FAS) and behavior was partialed out.  
Materials Ratings. Participants rated all word stimuli regarding their fit with the 
predefined categories used in the IAT. Appendix A shows that the attributes were 
evaluated consistently with the predefined categories (unpleasant anxiety-related words as 
rather unpleasant, positive words as rather pleasant). All pictures were rated in terms of 
emotional valence, magnitude of disgust, and threatening potential. Not surprisingly, spider 
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phobic participants rated spider pictures as significantly more unpleasant than to non-
phobic controls who evaluated spiders as rather neutral (t(24) = 6.7, p < .001). Both spider 
phobics and controls evaluated the butterfly pictures as pleasant. Similar results were 
obtained regarding disgust and threatening potential of the target pictures; the two groups 
showed different judgments regarding disgust and threat of spiders, but not for butterflies. 
Controls explicitly judged spiders as non-threatening nor disgusting, whereas phobics 
expressed the opposite pattern, labeling spiders as disgusting with a high threat potential. 
Mean ratings of both groups and levels of significance are displayed in Appendix B. 
 
Table 2-4. Correlations between fear measures in Experiment 1 
 
Fear Measure IAT 
word 
IAT 
picture 
BAT 
time 
BAT 
distance 
BAT 
speed 
Mean 
Rating 
FAS SAS BAS 
          
IAT .94** .70** .39** -.04 -.40** .31* .29* .34* .23 
IAT word - .42** .43** -.02 -.40** .31* .31* 35* .24 
IAT picture  - .12 -.09 -.21 .17 .13 .19 .11 
BAT time   - .07 -.78** .62** .66** .65** .09 
BAT distance    - -.43** .58** .54** 45** -.07 
BAT speed     - -.79** -.81** -.82** .03 
Rating      - .91** .90** .01 
FAS       - 96** .10 
SAS        - .08 
 
IAT: (mean overall IAT effect); IAT word: (mean IAT effect for words); IAT picture: (mean IAT effect for pictures); 
BAT time: (time to approach the spider); BAT distance: (final distance from spider); BAT speed: (speed approaching the 
spider); Rating: (mean of 4 emotional ratings - nervousness - tension - anxiety - avoidance); FAS: (Spider Fear 
Questionnaire); SAS: (Spider Fear Screening); BAS: (Butterfly Fear Screening) 
Correlations marked with '*' are significantl on a .05 level, marked '**' on a .01 level. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1indicate that this modified version of the IAT is a useful 
method to assess automatic (implicit) expressions of fear associations, providing additional 
information to traditional explicit questionnaire measures. Participants with high scores of 
spider fear had significantly higher IAT effects compared to non-fearful participants 
indicating much stronger fear relevant, implicit associations to spiders. Moreover, IAT 
performance correlated with behavior during confrontation and questionnaire scores. The 
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predictive potential of the IAT is underlined by significant correlations between this 
indirect measure and behavior, even when the influence of questionnaires was eliminated. 
From a methodological viewpoint, the results show that it is useful to analyze and 
report IAT effects separately for pictures and word stimuli. IAT effects with verbal 
attribute stimuli differentiated between spider fearing and control participants, whereas 
target pictures did not. The reason for this lack of group differences in target pictures may 
be seen in a floor effect, caused by fast and privileged access of pictures to semantic 
memory for categories (Glaser, 1992; Seifert, 1997). All reported IAT effects yielded 
significance, however, implying that both groups were faster performing the compatible 
task (spider-unpleasant) than the incompatible task (spider-pleasant). 
 
2.2 Experiment 2: An IAT short-version and spider fear 
 
Experiment 2 investigated how a reduction of the IAT from five tasks to only two 
critical tasks affects IAT performance. As in Experiment 1, a group of highly spider-fearful 
participants and a group of control participants performed an IAT, which only differed in 
the number of IAT tasks and not in any other methodological feature. The main question 
was whether IAT effects of the short version and their correlations with questionnaire 
scores and behavior are comparable to those observed in Experiment 1. 
 
Method 
This experiment was very similar to the first one, therefore only the differences will 
be explained in detail. 
Participants and questionnaires. About 750 undergraduate students of Dresden 
University of Technology were prescreened with the SAS (Rinck et al., 2002). Of these, 24 
spider anxious students and 24 non-anxious students participated in Experiment 2. The 
diagnostic criteria for participation equaled those of Experiment 1. Spider anxious 
participants fulfilled DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) for 
specific phobia (animal type/spiders), except criteria E (phobia interferes with daily 
routines). All participants were interviewed by a clinical psychologist for the diagnosis. 
Again, questionnaires addressed spider fear (FAS and SAS, Rinck et al., 2002), fear of 
butterflies (BAS), state anxiety (STAI-S), and trait anxiety (STAI-T). All participants were 
free of any major mental or medical illness or any associated disorder (drug abuse, 
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alcoholism, personality disorder, mental deterioration). The participants did not report fear 
of butterflies, and they had not participated in Experiment 1. 
Short IAT. The only difference to the IAT procedure of Experiment 1 was the 
reduction from five to two tasks: (a) first combined task and (b) reversed combined task 
(either 'compatible' or 'incompatible'). As before, in the compatible task, spiders and 
unpleasant words required the same response, as did butterflies and pleasant words. In the 
incompatible task, the allocation of pictures to response keys was switched, such that 
spiders and pleasant words now required the same response, as did butterflies and 
unpleasant words. Each task consisted of 80 practice trials followed by 160 experimental 
trials (each of the 40 pictures appeared 3 times, each of the 20 words appeared 6 times). 
The words and pictures were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
Procedure and design. As before, participants completed the spider fear 
questionnaires FAS and SAS, the BAS, a diagnostic interview and the IAT, which 
consisted only of two combined tasks. The sequence of the combined discrimination tasks 
(a) and (b) was counterbalanced across participants. After the IAT, participants took the 
BAT, and gave the four retrospective ratings of their emotional state during the BAT. 
Again, state anxiety and trait anxiety was assessed using the German version of the State-
Trait-Anxiety-Inventory (state anxiety was measured at the beginning and at the end of the 
experimental session, trait anxiety was assessed once at the beginning). The experimental 
design was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
Participants characteristics. As Table 2-1 indicates, spider phobics showed 
significantly higher fear scores in both the FAS (t(46) = 20.34, p < .001) and the SAS 
(t(46) = 29.05 p < .001) (Rinck et al., 2002). Of the 24 participants in the spider phobic 
group, 10 fulfilled all DSM-IV criteria for specific phobia (animal type/spiders). 
Importantly, spider phobic individuals and controls reported no fear, avoidance, or distress 
regarding butterflies and did not differ in their BAS scores. Scores of state anxiety differed 
between groups, with higher scores for fearful participants (main effect Group (F(1,46) = 
28.45, p < .001, eta2 = .38). As before, spider phobics' but not controls' state anxiety 
increased during the course of the experiment, yielding a significant interaction of group 
and measurement time (F(1,46) = 5.07, p < .05, eta2 = .01). Trait anxiety (STAI-T) was 
comparable in both groups. Means and levels of significance are shown in Table 2-1. 
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IAT Effects. Response latencies, error rates, and IAT effects were computed and 
analyzed as in the first experiment. IAT effects observed in this experiment are displayed 
in Table 2-2. A 2x2 analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the between-subjects factors 
Group and Task Sequence and the within-subjects factor IAT Type revealed no influence 
of Task Sequence (F(1,44) = .07, n.s.). As in Experiment 1, there was a significant main 
effect of IAT type (F(1,44) = 31.74, p < .001, eta2 = .42), indicating smaller IAT effects for 
pictures than for words across all participants. Both spider phobics and non-phobic 
controls showed significant IAT effects (phobics: mean 146.8, SD 121.2, t(23) = 5.93, p < 
.001; controls: mean 122.5, SD 98.3, t(23) = 6.11, p < .001), but these effects did not differ 
from each other in magnitude (F(1,44) = .53, n.s.). In addition, separate analyses of IAT 
effects for words and pictures did not differentiate between the experimental groups either 
(IAT words: t(46) = .92, n.s.; IAT targets: t(46) = .31, n.s.). No other effect approached 
significance. 
Behavioral measures (BAT). Table 2-3 displays results of the behavioral avoidance 
test (approaching a real spider). The two groups significantly differed in their behavior, 
with spider fearful participants being significantly slower in approaching the spider (Speed 
(t(42) = 7.69, p < .001); Time (t(42) = 5.76, p < .001); Distance (t(45) = 4.49, p < .001)). In 
addition, the spider phobic group showed high levels of nervousness (t(45) = 6.51, p < 
.001), tension (t(45) = 9.89, p < .001), anxiety (t(45) = 17.30, p < .001), and wish for 
avoidance during the test (t(45) = 8.15, p < .001), compared to lower scores for controls 
(Table 2-3). 
Relations among Fear Measures. Table 2-5 displays relations between IAT scores, 
behavioral fear measures and self-reported fear scores. The overall pattern indicates that 
IAT scores did not predict behavioral measures of fear (speed - approaching a spider) or 
self -reported fear scores (Spider Questionnaires, emotional ratings) very well. Only IAT 
scores for attributes correlated significantly with approach speed (r = -.32, p < .05), such 
that participants with large IAT effects approached the spider more slowly. 
Material Ratings. As in Experiment 1, participants rated words and pictures after the 
experiment. As expected, valence of word stimuli matched the predefined categories of the 
IAT experiment very well. See Appendix C for detailed mean ratings. As before, spider 
phobic participants evaluated spider pictures as very unpleasant, highly disgusting, and 
threatening. They differed significantly from non-phobic controls, who found spiders more 
neutral in valence (t(46) = -5.58, p < .001), less disgusting (t(46) = 18.54, p < .001) and 
less threatening (t(46) = 19.75, p < .001). Both spider phobics and control participants 
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evaluated butterflies in a comparable manner as pleasant (t(46) = -.83, n.s.) , with a very 
low level of disgust (t(46) = 1.72, n.s.) and threat (t(46) = 1.62, n.s.). Mean ratings of both 
groups are displayed in Appendix D. 
 
Table 2-5. Correlations between fear measures in Experiment 2 
 
Fear Measure IAT word 
IAT 
picture 
BAT 
time 
BAT 
distance 
BAT 
speed 
Mean 
Rating FAS SAS BAS 
          
IAT .95** .84** .01 .21 -.23 .25 .13 .11 .08 
IAT word - .64** .13 .26 -.32* .27 .17 .11 .04 
IAT picture  - -.20 .06 -.02 .14 .04 .10 .13 
BAT time   - 46** -.80** .51** .67** .65** .04 
BAT distance    - -.61** .72** .57** .55** .00 
BAT speed     - -.75** -.77** -.74** -.13 
Rating      - .89** .86** .28 
FAS       - .93** .31* 
SAS        - .30* 
 
IAT: (mean overall IAT effect); IAT word: (mean IAT effect for words); IAT picture: (mean IAT effect for pictures); 
BAT time: (time to approach the spider); BAT distance: (final distance from spider); BAT speed: (speed approaching the 
spider); Rating: (mean of 4 emotional ratings - nervousness - tension - anxiety - avoidance); FAS: (Spider Fear 
Questionnaire); SAS: (Spider Fear Screening); BAS: (Butterfly Fear Screening) 
Correlations marked with '*' are significantl on a .05 level, marked '**' on a .01 level. 
 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, highly spider fearful and non-fearful participants displayed 
significant IAT effects, due to faster responses in the compatible task. Nevertheless, 
dissonant to the results of Experiment 1, differences in IAT performance between the 
groups did not reach significance, probably because of the large variance in reaction times. 
Subsequently, correlations between IAT scores and questionnaires or behavior failed to 
appear. One has to conclude that practice tasks have a relevant influence on IAT 
performance, a feature which needs attention in further research. 
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2.3 Experiment 3: IAT performance and spider enthusiasm 
 
Experiment 3 was conducted to classify and interpret IAT results of non-phobic 
controls in more absolute terms. Therefore, spider enthusiasts served as another control 
group that associates neither spiders nor butterflies with fear. The idea of dissociation 
between implicit and explicit measures in non-phobic controls would be supported, if 
spider lovers do not show IAT effects, or even negative effects. 
 
Method 
Participants and Questionnaires. Spider enthusiasts were recruited through 
newspaper and radio advertisements. Interested individuals were invited to participate if 
they owned at least one spider as a domestic animal at home. Finally, 9 spider enthusiasts 
participated in Experiment 3. Matched in age, sex, and educational level, 9 yoked control 
participants were also recruited and invited to the study. Controls reported no fear of 
spiders. All participants were free of any major mental or medical illness or any associated 
disorder. None of them reported increased fear of butterflies, and no one had participated 
in the previous experiments. 
Short IAT, words, pictures, and design. The short IAT of Experiment 2 was used, 
consisting of two critical combined tasks. In the compatible task, spiders and unpleasant 
words required the same response (as did butterflies and pleasant words), whereas the 
allocation of pictures to response keys was switched in the incompatible task (spiders and 
pleasant words vs. butterflies and unpleasant words). For ease of comprehension, the labels 
'compatible task' and 'incompatible task' are used in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 
2. One should keep in mind, however, that these compatibility labels may correspond only 
to the associations of spider phobics and non-phobic controls, but not to the associations of 
spider lovers. The experimental design mirrored that of Experiment 2. 
Procedure. All Participants were tested individually. Before application of the IAT, a 
'warm-up' interview addressed the topic of spider enthusiasm as well as possible mental 
and medical illnesses. Then participants completed the FAS, the SAS, and the IAT. Again, 
the sequence of the combined discrimination tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. After completing the IAT, word stimuli were rated regarding emotional 
valence, and pictures were rated regarding emotional valence, magnitude of disgust and 
threatening potential. 
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Results 
Participants’ characteristics. The two groups did not differ from each other in regard 
to education, gender distribution (4 females and 5 males in each group), or age (spider 
lovers: mean 25.78, SD 6.57; controls: mean 27.11, SD 4.88; t(16) = .49, n.s.). In the FAS 
and the SAS, enthusiasts scored uniformly zero. Non-fearful controls did not differ from 
spider enthusiasts in the FAS (mean .44, SD .73; t(16) = 1.84, n.s.). In the SAS, their 
scores were significantly higher (mean 3.67, SD 2.06, t(16) = 5.34, p < .001), although this 
difference is without practical relevance; the mean score of 3.67 indicates no fear of 
spiders, and it is very similar to the scores of non-fearful participants in Experiments 1 and 
2. (see Table 2-1). 
IAT Effects. Response latencies, error rates, and IAT effects were computed and 
analyzed as before. The IAT effects observed in this experiment are displayed in Table 2-2. 
The 2x2x2 ANOVA with the between-subjects variables Group and Task Sequence, and 
the within-subjects variable IAT Type did not yield a significant main effect of Task 
Sequence (F(1,14) = .09, n.s.). Again, it did not matter whether participants performed the 
compatible task before the incompatible one or vice versa. Importantly, there was a 
significant main effect of Group (F(1,14) = 17.66, p<.001, eta2 = .40). As expected, non-
phobic controls showed significant IAT effects (mean 134.1, SD 86.1, t(8) = 4.67, p < .01), 
comparable to the effects observed in Experiment 2. These significant positive IAT effects 
reflect stronger associations between spiders and anxiety-related words compared to 
spiders and positive words. In contrast, spider lovers did not show positive IAT effects 
(mean: -20.0, SD 74.8). Negative IAT effects display faster performance in the 
incompatible task, which indicates stronger associations between spiders and positive 
words. IAT effects of spider lovers were not significantly different from zero, however, 
(t(8) = .80, n.s.), yielding no advantages for the compatible or the incompatible task. Spider 
lovers and non-phobic controls significantly differed in IAT performance regarding both 
attributes (t(16) = 4.08, p < .001) and targets (t(16) = 3.26, p<.01). 
Relations between IAT and Questionnaires. Because there was only minimal 
variance in explicit measures of fear, high correlations of the questionnaires with the IAT 
effects may not be expected. Nevertheless, the correlation between IAT effects and SAS 
scores was significant (r = .50, p < .05).  
Materials Ratings. The ratings of attributes and targets given by the participants are 
listed in Appendix E. In contrast to all the other participants tested so far, spider lovers 
evaluated spider pictures as rather pleasant, with low disgust and low threatening potential. 
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For all of the three ratings, they differed significantly from non-anxious controls, who 
evaluated spiders as rather neutral in valence, with low magnitudes of disgust and 
threatening potential. The two groups rated butterflies in similar ways: pleasant, with very 
low potential of disgust and threat. Mean ratings and levels of significance are displayed in 
Appendix F. 
 
Discussion 
IAT effects of spider enthusiasts indicated similar reaction times for the compatible 
(spider-fear) and the incompatible (spider-pleasure) IAT task. With butterflies as the 
second target, there was no advantage for one of the combined tasks, suggesting that 
spiders and butterflies share similarly positive associations in the spider lover group. The 
results of Experiment 3 support the hypothesis that even non-fearful controls associate 
spiders with negative, fear relevant attributes in a performance based automatic task. This 
clearly stands in contrast to their explicitly expressed attitudes and their behavior towards 
spiders. Moreover, although all participants of Experiment 3 were explicitly non-fearful, 
the difference between controls and spider lovers indicates that spiders are not generally 
and automatically linked to negative fear relevant schemata. 
 
2.4. General Discussion Study 1 
 
Experiment 1 and 2 were designed to investigate the relations between explicit and 
implicit associations towards phobic stimuli (spiders) in fearful and non-fearful 
participants. As expected, spider anxious individuals explicitly expressed their fear and 
negative evaluation of spiders in interviews and questionnaires. Non-fearful individuals 
expressed rather neutral evaluations of spiders. Regarding implicit associations, however, 
both spider phobic participants and non-phobic controls displayed negative implicit 
attitudes towards spiders. Both groups associated spiders with negative, anxiety-related 
attributes, leading to faster responses in compatible tasks, when spiders and negative 
adjectives shared the same response key. In contrast to the study by de Jong et al. (2003), 
the experimental paradigm used in Experiment 1 was sensitive to inter-individual 
differences in the strength of the affective associations. Non-fearful and fearful participants 
differed significantly in their strength of negative implicit associations towards spiders, 
with more negative associations for spider fearful individuals. Moreover, correlations 
between IAT effects, questionnaire scores, and behavioral tests in Experiment 1 point to 
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the usefulness of IAT data. Significant partial correlations between the IAT scores and 
relevant behavior - controlling for the influence of questionnaire scores - support the claim 
that indirect measures such as the IAT are able to predict behavior beyond the predictions 
of direct measures such as questionnaires. 
The results of Experiment 1 yield evidence that phobic and non-phobic individuals 
exhibit different implicit fear associations, as assessed by the performance based approach 
of the IAT. These results are compatible with Teachman et al. (2001) who detected group 
differences as well. The experimental paradigm used by de Jong et al. (2003) was not able 
to assess group differences in IAT performance. It was more sensitive to categorical 
differences (e.g., spiders are negative), than to individual variations. One reason could be 
that the target stimuli used by de Jong et al. (2003) consisted of verbal spider cues like 
'web' and 'hairy' vs. neutral cues such as 'door' and 'key'. In contrast, the present study as 
well as the ones by Teachman and her colleagues (2001, 2003) used ecologically more 
valid stimuli (pictures of spiders) to assess implicit associations between spiders and 
negative, anxiety-related attributes. Visual confrontation with phobia-related picture 
stimuli might indeed lead to differential activation of spider-fear associations, other than 
words would do. 
In Experiment 2 a short version of the IAT was applied to find out whether 
comparable IAT performance may be observed when separate practice tasks for targets and 
attributes are deleted. Although the IAT effects were again larger in the spider phobic 
group, statistical analyses did not yield a significant difference in IAT performance, 
dissonant to the group differences found by Teachman et al. (2003), who also employed a 
short version of the IAT. One obvious reason for this discrepancy may be the large 
variance in reaction times, due to the lack of practice trials. With this discrepancy it 
becomes more difficult to find significant group differences, especially when IAT effects 
in different groups do not differ in absolute direction (both groups exhibited negative, 
anxiety-related implicit associations towards spiders), but only slightly in their degree. 
Concluding from the differences between Experiments 1 and 2, further research 
needs to clarify the methodological properties of the IAT. Special attention should be paid 
to the influences of practice tasks (five tasks IAT vs. two tasks IAT), to the number of data 
trials during each critical combined task and to the impact of the stimulus materials (words 
vs. picture stimuli) on IAT processing. 
Despite these differences, both Experiments 1 and 2 yielded significant IAT effects 
in spider phobic and explicitly non-phobic participants, indicating that the IAT 
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categorization task was easier when spiders and unpleasant words required the same 
response versus when spiders were combined with pleasant words. Interpreting the IAT 
performance of non-phobic controls as evidence for implicit fear-related associations (e.g., 
de Jong et al., 2003) seems problematic, however, because the IAT only reflects 
associations towards spiders relative to butterflies. Therefore, Experiment 3 attempted to 
provide an interpretation of IAT effects in the non-fearful group beyond the relative 
estimation by introducing a third experimental group, namely spider enthusiasts. These 
participants served as an experimental baseline group, assuming that they lack all negative 
fear-related associations towards spiders. Indeed, the results of Experiment 3 replicated the 
significant IAT effect in non-fearful controls, while spider enthusiasts displayed a balanced 
performance in the compatible and incompatible tasks (no IAT effect), expressing 
comparable implicit associations towards spiders and butterflies. These results indicate that 
non-fearful controls, who explicitly negate fear associations towards spiders, seem to 
possess implicit negative associations toward spiders. Without doubt, non-fearful controls 
did not dissimulate a negative attitude towards spiders. Moreover, spiders are associated 
with aversion on a more automatic, performance-based manner. De Jong et al. (2003) 
suggested that non-fearful controls can override or control an automatic negative 
stereotype, compared to highly fearful individuals who do not have this ability. This 
suggestion is consistent with results by Mayer et al. (2000), who assessed the extent to 
which spider phobic and non-phobic participants experience fear reactions to spiders as 
automatic. Compared to controls, phobic participants perceived their responses to spiders 
more often as automatic, and not under intentional control. 
Given that the possible range of implicit spider associations varies from fear to 
pleasure, it is worthwhile to think about the possible implications for therapy of spider 
phobia. Teachman et al. (2003) were able to demonstrate changes of implicit fear 
associations in spider phobia with successful exposure therapy, down to the baseline level 
of control participants. Nevertheless, the results observed with spider enthusiasts suggest 
that it might even be possible to eliminate fear-related implicit associations altogether. If 
therapeutic techniques were able to change automatic spider associations in such 
fundamental ways, consequential risk of relapse after successful CBT might be greatly 
reduced. 
Despite the promising results of IAT applications in psychopathological research, 
some problems and open questions require attention in future research. First, the relative 
nature of the IAT is also one of its major limits. In the study reported here, it was 
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overcome by using a between-groups design (e.g., spider fearfuls and non-fearfuls) 
together with one target that was evaluated comparably by both groups (e.g., butterflies). 
Consequently, group differences in IAT performance may be attributed to different 
attitudes towards the second target (e.g., spiders), when equality of attitudes towards the 
first target is guaranteed. Moreover, the relative approach of the IAT is not obstructive 
when changes of implicit associations over the course of therapy are measured, as long as 
the results are compared to a baseline sample (see Teachman et al., 2003). In studies 
examining cognitive structures and schemata on anxiety disorders, however, the absolute 
degree of fear associations is certainly more important than the relative strength of 
alternative associations. Therefore, 'new' methods, which are able to assess the strength of 
associations in more absolute terms, represent promising alternatives, such as the 'Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Task' (EAST) by De Houwer (2003), the Single Target IAT (STIAT) by 
Wigboldus, van Knippenberg, & Holland (2001), or the 'Go/No-Go Association Task' by 
Nosek and Banaji (2001). For further explanations see chapter 5.2. 
Second, before indirect measures such as the IAT may be used as reliable 
instruments for individual diagnostics in psychopathology, more needs to be known about 
the nature of implicit associations assessed by these tasks. Therefore, it will be important to 
investigate whether dysfunctional implicit associations are relatively stable, or whether 
they are malleable, and what their malleability depends on. As reported in chapter 1.3.3-4, 
there is evidence from social psychology research that spontaneous evaluations tested 
through performance-based indirect measures are influenced by context (e.g., Dasgupta et 
al., 2001; Wittenbrink et al., 2001; Mitchell; Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). If implicit 
associations and their activation are easily affected by external context situations, retest 
reliability will suffer. Therefore, further research should determine whether the 
associations of interest represent a state or trait construct, and how qualities of these 
associations such as activation level could change during tests.  
Third, referring to the debate about the influence of stimulus vs. category valence 
(e.g., De Houwer, 2001; Steffens & Plewe, 2001; see chapter 1.3.3-2) it remains unclear 
whether IAT effects found in this study are driven by valence and content of each attribute 
word (e.g., panic, fear vs. easygoing, happy) or the general valence of the category to 
which each word refers (pleasant vs. unpleasant). In Study 1 this question relates only to 
attribute words, because each single spider and butterfly (pictures) is perfectly confounded 
with the category concept (i.e., spiders vs. butterflies). Regarding attribute classification, 
participants categorize these words according to valence (pleasant vs. unpleasant). Material 
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ratings in study 1 clearly indicate that all attribute words were categorized according to the 
given dimension indicating a perfect fitting of attributes in its category. However, because 
all negative attributes are related to fear as well as to unpleasantness, one can not assume 
that IAT effects are solely driven by the fear-related valence of each unpleasant attribute, 
but also by the valence of the category (for a detailed discussion, see Study 2). On the 
other hand, results by Steffens and Plewe (2001) clearly demonstrate that IAT effects 
depend heavily on the attribute exemplar that one selects, which supports the suggestion 
that fear-related contents of the attribute words influenced the above results. To prevent 
these problems in future studies it would be helpful to develop indirect measure that are 
based on the impact of each attribute’s valence and less on the category name.  
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3. Study 2: Category valence or stimulus valence: What drives the IAT 
effect? 
 
The Implicit Association Test promises to be an indirect measure of the strength of 
associations between concepts stored in memory. Recently, however, several aspects of the 
IAT have been doubted and criticized (see chapter 1.3.3). It is claimed that an IAT account 
based on the compatibility and incompatibility between response assignments and existing 
associations alone is not sufficient to explain the effect (e.g., Mierke & Klauer, 2001; 
Rothermund & Wentura, 2001). Therefore, the following chapter will focus on three 
critical aspects about the IAT. First, De Houwer (2001) claimed that IAT effects reflect 
attitudes toward the given target concept rather than attitudes toward the individual 
exemplar. Second, Mierke and Klauer (2001) propose an alternative IAT explanation, 
which attributes IAT effects to differential costs for switching between the two combined 
tasks. Third, I argue that explicitly labeled category dimensions used in most IAT 
experiments (e.g., flower vs. insect; positive vs. negative) represent one reason for the two 
problems mentioned above. This could be prevented by masking the relevant dimensions. 
Although most IAT researchers focus on questions about the predictive potential of 
IAT responses, it is also necessary to address methodological concerns along the way. In 
the following part I will introduce the three critical aspects in a greater detail, which will 
lead to the experiments of Study 2. It will become apparent that this methodological focus 
is helpful in a theoretical as well in a practical respect.  
 
1. Category Concepts vs. Individual Stimuli 
In a typical IAT task, participants classify target stimuli into two categories (e.g., 
substantives into the category of flowers vs. insects). Simultaneously, they also classify 
attribute stimuli into two categories (e.g., words into pleasant vs. unpleasant ones). If a 
target concept such as insect is highly associated with a specific attribute such as 
unpleasantness, the categorization task of the IAT should be easier when the associated 
concepts share the same response (compatible task) than when they require different 
responses (incompatible task; e.g., flowers and unpleasant words require the same 
response). But what are the features that drive the IAT when stimuli are categorized during 
IAT performance? De Houwer (2001) introduced a useful analysis of IAT performance 
focusing on relevant and irrelevant features of the stimuli. When classifying targets and 
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attributes by pressing a right or a left key, the semantic category of the stimulus (flower vs. 
insect, or pleasant vs. unpleasant) is the relevant stimulus feature (see De Houwer, 2001; 
2003a; chapter 1.3.3-2). In the compatible task, positive valence becomes associated with 
one response (e.g., press left key), because the concepts of flowers and pleasant have a 
positive valence. The same could be assumed for the concepts insect and unpleasant, 
which are of negative valence, becoming associated with the right key. When the word 
'Tulip' is presented in the IAT, participants have to focus on the relevant feature (i.e., 
flower) to give the correct response. At this point the concept flower has positive valence 
that is associated with the left response key and positive valence. Response selection and 
performance will be facilitated in the compatible task because pleasant attribute words and 
flowers require the same response associated with positive valence. It seems rather 
irrelevant, however, whether the tulip itself is considered to have a positive valence. The 
crucial question remains: Does the individual valence of a target stimuli (e.g., tulip) also 
mediate IAT performance, or do the effects solely depend on the valence of the concept 
category? This question is less important, as long the valence of target stimuli and its 
category are perfectly confounded (the concept flower and all presented stimuli (tulip, 
roses, etc.) have a positive valence). But what happens when target stimuli of the same 
category vary in their valence? De Houwer (2001) investigated this question in an 
experiment (see chapter 1.3.3-2) and found that valence of individual target stimuli 
(irrelevant feature) had little or no impact on performance. Only valence of the relevant 
target categories (e.g., 'British' vs. 'Foreign') mattered. Therefore, De Houwer (2001) 
suggested that IAT effects are not located at the level of individual exemplars, but rather at 
the level of the global target categories. But is this also true for attribute words? Steffens 
and Plewe (2001) found that IAT effects depend on single attribute words indicating a 
strong influence of exemplar valence on IAT performance (see chapter 1.3.3-2). This 
influence could be due to the fact that during attribute concept trials, participants need to 
process the valence of the individual stimuli (relevant feature) in order to select the correct 
response. During target trials valence is not a relevant feature. It seems that more weight 
will automatically be given to the dimension that is linked with the correct response and its 
valence, compared to the individual stimulus valence (irrelevant feature), which is assumed 
to be activated during performance.  
Either the influence of individual stimulus valence or the concept valence should 
lead to comparable IAT effects because in most IATs there is a perfect confound between 
the relevant and the irrelevant feature of target and attribute stimuli (individual stimuli of 
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one category should have the same valence as the analogical concept category). On the 
other hand, it would be of great theoretical and practical interest, whether single stimuli or 
categories mediate IAT effects. The IAT in Study 1 of this dissertation used negative 
attributes that are related to fear as well as to the category dimension of unpleasantness. As 
a consequence the effects could solely be driven by the fear-related valence of each 
unpleasant attribute, or by the valence of the category. Moreover, to prevent these 
problems in the future, it would be helpful to apply indirect measures that are based on the 
impact of each attribute’s valence and less on the category name. Such tasks could be used 
in situations when it is difficult to label the attribute dimension of interest, because 
participants vary in their evaluative judgments. 
 
2. The Task-Switch-Neglect Model 
Mierke and Klauer (2001) argue that IAT effects do not solely relate to the 
associative strength between target and attribute concepts, but depend 'on executive control 
processes responsible for task-set organization or the passive dissipation of residual task-
set activation during the incompatible task' (Mierke & Klauer, 2001, p. 117). In an IAT 
participants have to switch between two tasks. If a target stimuli appears, they have to 
decide according to the target categories (e.g., flower vs. insect); if an attribute stimuli 
appears, participants have to switch to the valence-related classification (e.g., pleasant vs. 
unpleasant). Mierke and Klauer (2001) suggested that in the compatible task of the IAT 
fast and accurate responses are possible, because participants neglect the instruction to 
switch between task sets (targets vs. attribute). They argue that just the attribute-related 
information becomes available upon processing a stimulus from the attribute as well from 
the target category, because only one dimension, namely emotional valence, is necessary 
for correct categorization [e.g., everything pleasant (positive attributes and flowers) 
requires one response, everything unpleasant (negative attributes and insects) requires the 
other response]. Therefore, it is not necessary to switch between the tasks, avoiding 
switching costs. In contrast, this is not possible in the incompatible task. Here, two 
alternative dimensions must be used: attributes may still be categorized according to 
emotional valence, but targets have to be categorized according its type. Emotional valence 
cannot be used easily for classification of the targets because the pleasant targets (flowers) 
require the same response as the unpleasant attributes, and vice versa, creating strong 
interference. Therefore, during the incompatible task, participants have to monitor two 
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different dimensions and switch back and forth between them, making the incompatible 
task more difficult than the compatible one.  
Mierke and Klauer (2001) showed that task-switching [i.e., performance in task-
switch trials, where an evaluative decision (attribute classification) is followed by a flower-
insect discrimination or vice versa] leads to longer reaction times (higher costs) in the 
incompatible than in the compatible IAT condition. The authors propose that these results 
are based on the assumption of participants neglecting the IAT instruction (this does not 
need to be intentional) by using attribute-related information while processing a stimulus 
from the target category; however, it must be stated that there is no evidence to the extent 
to which participants actually use such strategies. Even when the task-switch costs are 
responsible for some of the differences between incompatible and compatible tasks, this 
factor should affect all participants in a similar way and would not explain the group 
differences as in Study 1. Moreover, differential use of the task-switch strategy in high and 
low fearful participants is very unlikely, because IAT differences between the two groups 
comes from different performance in the incompatible task, in which the task-switching 
strategy has no beneficial effect. 
 
3. Explicit Category Labels 
In the standard IAT task, target categories and attribute categories are explicitly 
labeled with names of the dimensions of interest (e.g., spiders vs. butterflies and pleasant 
words vs. unpleasant words). Thus, the associations meant to be measured are completely 
explicit to the participants. They are made even more obvious by the way the category 
labels are shown on the screen to remind participants of the current assignment of 
categories to keys. In a compatible task, for instance, the word 'spider' would be located on 
one side of the screen, together with the word 'unpleasant', while the words 'butterfly and 
'pleasant' would be located on the other side. 
These explicit category labels are one argument against the implicitness of the IAT in 
the way that participants are not aware of what is being measured (see also chapter 1.3.3-
1). Moreover, presenting explicit labels on the upper screen (e.g., 'spider-pleasant' vs. 
'butterfly-unpleasant') participants easily recognize the intents of the experiment. 
The influence of category labels becomes apparent in an IAT experiment by Mitchell 
et al. (2003). Participants had to categorize pictures of Black athletes and White politicians. 
In two experimental conditions the same pictures were used, but with different category 
labels for the target concepts. In one condition targets had to be classified according race 
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(Black vs. White), in the second condition according their occupation (Athlete vs. 
Politician). The IAT effects depended on the labels of the target categories. There was 
more positivism towards Blacks, when participants categorized pictures of Black athletes 
and White politicians according their occupation. The reversed pattern was observed, when 
participants had to focus on the race of the targets. This is in line with De Houwer (2001) 
claiming that the IAT measures associations between concept categories rather than 
associations between individual stimuli. When labels explicitly relate and activate the 
relevant categories (e.g., Athlete vs. Politicians) responses will be mainly guided by this 
feature because it is most relevant to the participants within context. While focusing on the 
category features, irrelevant individual stimulus features will be ignored. This seems to be 
the case for target stimuli, but is it also true for the attribute dimension? Steffens and Plewe 
(2001) were able to show the influence of individual attribute stimuli on IAT performance, 
a result that can be due to the fact that valence is the relevant feature during attribute 
discrimination. 
But what would happen if valence would be an irrelevant feature in the attribute 
discrimination trials? One could mask the IAT attribute dimension (e.g., pleasant vs. 
unpleasant) with a rather neutral unrelated feature (CAPITALIZED LETTERS vs. small 
letters), presenting all negative attributes in capitalized letters and all positive attributes in 
small letters (or vice versa)? The aim of the present study was to investigate the influence 
of masked category labels on IAT effects because of three important theoretical points. 1. 
Masked category labels would not make the association intended to be measured visual. 2. 
When masking the attribute dimension with an unrelated feature (e.g., letter type), the 
relevant feature would be the size of the letters and the irrelevant feature would be the 
valence of the individual stimuli. Assuming that the size of letters is unrelated with the 
target categories (e.g., spider vs. butterfly), possible IAT effects would relate to the 
emotional valence of the individual attribute words. 3. In a masked IAT, the influences of 
task-switching should be comparable in the two combined tasks. Because the valence 
information of attribute words is masked participants would be unable to ignore the 
instruction in the 'compatible task' using just one valence-related dimension to categorize 
targets and attributes. 
Because of these objections, Experiment 4 tested the ability of the IAT to measure 
associations between targets and attributes without referring explicitly to the attribute 
dimension of interest. In Experiment 4, participants received an IAT that was identical to 
the IAT used in Experiment 2 and 3 of this dissertation using pictures of spiders and 
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butterflies as target stimuli. In the compatible task, spiders and unpleasant words required 
the same response, as did butterflies and pleasant words. In the incompatible task, the 
allocation of pictures to response keys was switched, such that spiders and pleasant words 
now required the same response, as did butterflies and unpleasant words One group of 
participants, however, categorized pleasant and unpleasant words explicitly according to 
their valence (exactly like in Experiment 2 and 3). For the other participants, the attribute 
categories were masked instead of being explicitly mentioned. As a result, the pleasant and 
unpleasant words were categorized according to a surface feature (words in upper case 
letters vs. words in lower case letters) by one group of participants. Another group 
categorized the same words according to language (German words vs. English words). 
This language condition was introduced because classifying stimuli according this feature 
requires more semantic processing then in the surface condition. The critical question was 
whether valence of individual attribute words (irrelevant feature) would affect IAT 
performance even when participants are not instructed to pay attention to valence (they 
could safely ignore valence while categorizing the words according to language and 
surface). If this were the case, it would support the assumption that the emotional valence 
of individual stimuli is indeed processed automatically. Nevertheless, I also have the 
hypothesis that IAT effects will decrease in the masked conditions, because explicit 
valence labels lead to a stronger activation of the relevant concepts in memory. On the 
other hand, if participants process the material solely in terms of the explicitly instructed 
category (letter size and language) without an automatically activation the individual 
stimulus valence, mean reaction times of the compatible task and the incompatible task 
should not differ in the new masked IAT versions. 
 
3.1 Experiment 4: Masked category labels and IAT performance 
 
Method 
Participants. Sixty undergraduate psychology students of Dresden University of 
Technology participated. Equal numbers of participants were randomly allocated to the 
three tasks described below. None of the participants showed increased spider fear in a 
screening questionnaire (SAS, Rinck, Bundschuh, Engler, Müller, Wissmann, Ellwart, & 
Becker, 2002). 
Implicit Association Tests. Three IATs where designed similar to the IATs used in 
Experiment 2 and 3. They differed only with regard to the categorization task for the 
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attribute materials. In the Original IAT, 20 participants categorized target pictures into 
spiders and butterflies (20 individual spider pictures and 20 individual butterfly pictures 
were used). Simultaneously, they categorized 10 fear-related, unpleasant words (e.g., fear, 
panic) and 10 relaxation-related, pleasant words (e.g., holiday, paradise) into the categories 
'pleasant' vs. 'unpleasant'. This original task served as a control condition because it has 
shown reliable IAT effects within non-fearful control groups of Study 1. In the Language 
IAT, another 20 participants categorized the same pictures in the same way. The words 
were categorized according to language, however all pleasant words were translated into 
well known, positive English synonyms (e.g., fun, happy). Sufficient familiarity with the 
English words was confirmed by pre-tests. The unpleasant German words remained 
unchanged. No reference was made to the fact that there was a 'confound' of language and 
valence. The 20 participants of the Surface IAT categorized the same pictures in the same 
way as well. They categorized the words according to letter type, however the pleasant 
German words were presented completely in upper case letters, and the unpleasant German 
words completely in lower case letters. Again, no reference was made to the emotional 
valence of the words. 
Procedure. Each IAT consisted of a 'compatible task' and an 'incompatible task'. In 
the compatible one, spiders and unpleasant words required the same response, as did 
butterflies and pleasant words. In the incompatible task, the allocation of pictures to 
response keys was switched, such that spiders and pleasant words now required the same 
response, as did butterflies and unpleasant words. Each task consisted of 80 practice trials 
followed by 240 experimental trials. Of the latter, 60 trials each consisted of spider 
pictures, butterfly pictures, pleasant words, and unpleasant words in random order. All 
participants received the compatible task before the incompatible one. 
 
Results 
Data for each IAT included response latencies for the compatible and incompatible 
task (in milliseconds) and error rates. Prior to the planned analyses, distributions of error 
rates were examined. Error rates were uniformly low, averaging just under 5% on critical 
IAT blocks. Therefore, latencies data of correctly answered trials were averaged for each 
critical task, yielding median latencies for each participant. IAT effects were computed by 
subtracting the median latency of the compatible task from that of the incompatible task.  
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Mean reaction times (RTs) in the compatible and incompatible tasks of the three 
different IATs are shown in Figure 3-1. The ANOVA of these RTs yielded a significant 
interaction of IAT version and compatibility (F(2,57) = 4.38, p < .05, eta2 = .13). Separate 
analyses of the three IAT versions indicated that the incompatible task yielded significantly 
longer RTs than the compatible task in the original IAT (t(19) = 5.67, p < .0001) and in the 
Surface IAT (t(19) = 4.22, p < .0001), whereas the difference was only marginally 
significant in the Language IAT (t(19) = 1.78, p = .09). These results suggest that - at least 
in the Original IAT and the Surface IAT - the emotional valence of the attribute words was 
activated, causing longer RTs in the incompatible task. Further analyses, however, 
indicated that it is important to treat the IAT effects separately for pictures and words. 
 
Figure 3-1. Mean reaction times in ms in the compatible and incompatible tasks of the 
Original IAT, the Language IAT, and the Surface IAT in Experiment 4 
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By definition, IAT effects are computed by subtracting the mean RT of the 
compatible task from that of the incompatible task. For further analyses, these IAT effects 
were used, yielding a significant interaction of IAT version and material type (words, 
pictures) in a two-way ANOVA (F(2, 57) = 3.98, p < .05, eta2 = .12). In the Original IAT, 
the IAT effects were large both for words (mean 119 ms, s.d.116) and pictures (mean 102 
ms, SD 83); they were significantly different from zero (both t(19) > 4.58, p < .0001), but 
they did not differ from each other (t(19) < 1). In the Language IAT, however, the IAT 
effect was significantly larger for pictures than for words (t(19) = 2.99, p < .01); there was 
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no IAT effect for words (mean 18 ms, SD 93), t(19) < 1), but a significant effect for 
pictures (mean 68 ms, SD 131), t(19) = 2.30, p < .05). In the Surface IAT, the IAT effects 
were significant both for words (mean 31 ms, SD 44), t(19) = 3.09, p < .01) and pictures 
(mean 53 ms, SD 50), t(19) = 4.74, p < .001), and the effect for pictures was significantly 
larger (t(19) = 3.05, p < .01). IAT Effects for attributes and targets for all three IATs are 
displayed in Figure 3-2. 
 
Discussion 
These results suggest that masking the attribute dimension leads to significant IAT 
effects, but only for the Surface condition. For the Language IAT there is a strong reason 
to suspect that there are serious problems matching word familiarity or processing speed, 
which led to the extremely large differences within the group. 
 
Figure 3-2. Mean IAT Effects in ms for attributes (words) and targets (pictures) in the 
Original IAT, the Language IAT, and the Surface IAT in Experiment 4 
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Even though the English words used in the experiment are often used in 
conversation, television and advertisements, one has to assume that they are rather 
unfamiliar in German and not useful for masking the IAT attribute dimension. IAT effects 
of the Original IAT revealed similar results as shown by control participants in Experiment 
2 and 3 of Study 1. As expected, non-fearful participants associate spiders with negative, 
fear relevant contents, compared to butterflies. Moreover, IAT effects in the Surface 
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condition remained significant indicating a faster performance in the compatible than in the 
incompatible condition. As hypothesized, compared to the Original IAT the effects 
decreased in the surface condition. Smaller IAT effects in this condition indicate a strong 
influence of explicit category labels on IAT performance (e.g., De Houwer, 2001). The 
relevant attribute feature (letter type) is easy to categorize, which leads to quick responses 
that do not interfere with the activated target concepts of spiders and butterflies. Because 
the masked attribute dimension does not refer to valence at all, individual stimulus valance 
drives the IAT effects in the surface condition. On the other hand, the impact of this 
actually irrelevant stimulus feature is less influential, compared to the condition, when it is 
explicitly activated. 
Unfortunately, Experiment 4 had several methodological artifacts questioning its 
empirical and theoretical relevance. In Experiment 4 valence is perfectly confounded with 
the other dimensions (language, letter type), not only in the way that was necessary to 
mask the attribute dimension, but also in a more mundane way. In the language condition, 
pleasant words were always in English and of positive valence? Unpleasant words were 
always in German. Counterbalancing which language was associated with positive words 
(as a between-subjects manipulation) was not done, mainly because it was not possible to 
find unpleasant English words that are familiar and well known for Germans. For the 
Surface condition it seems unlikely that people differ in the favorability of their response to 
upper case versus lower case words. Therefore, confounds with valence across participants 
condition seems much less worrisome. Nevertheless, a serious problem remains in the 
fixed order of the combined tasks, presenting the compatible task before the incompatible 
one. Even though previous studies (Experiments 1 - 3) showed no influence of task order, 
it is important to counterbalance the order in which participants complete the combined 
tasks of the IAT. In the absence of such counterbalancing it is impossible to tell whether 
the results are simply due to practice or some pre-existing mental associations. 
Participants of the Surface IAT and the Language IAT were explicitly instructed to 
categorize the words according to some dimension other than emotional valence, and they 
could ignore valence while categorizing the words according to language or letter type. 
This leads to the assumption that the amount of task-switching costs was equal in the 
compatible and incompatible IAT task because in the compatible task participants are not 
able to classify target and attribute stimuli just regarding one emotional dimension. I 
cannot exclude the possibility, however, that at least some participants of these IAT 
versions did not ignore the words' valence, and categorized the words according to valence 
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instead of language or letter type, which makes a task-switching explanation again 
possible. Experiment 5 was designed to address this problem, focusing on the Surface IAT. 
 
3.2 Experiment 5: The Surface IAT 
 
Method 
Participants. Thirty undergraduate psychology students of Dresden University of 
Technology participated. None of them had participated in the previous experiment. 
Implicit Association Test. All participants received the Surface IAT described above. 
However, in addition to the words used before, they also categorized meaningless letter 
strings of similar length (e.g., erdranda , KREMSOLLE) presented at random serial 
positions. Each of the 8 strings was presented three times in upper case letters and three 
times in lower case. Obviously, these strings may not be categorized according to 
emotional valence. They should also discourage the participants from categorizing the 
words according to emotional valence because of the costs caused by switching back and 
forth between two different categorization dimensions. Moreover, these letter strings make 
it even more difficult to detect the aim of the IAT to investigate the associations between 
the target stimuli and a valence. As before, no reference was made to the emotional 
valence of the words. After the experiment, however, participants were questioned whether 
they had noticed an attribute dimension in addition to letter type, and whether they had 
used any other dimension to categorize the words instead of the categorization by letter 
type. 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 4, except that for each task (compatible 
and incompatible), the practice phase consisted of 60 trials (20 pictures, 20 words, 20 letter 
strings), and the experimental trials comprised 120 pictures (60 spiders and 60 butterflies), 
120 words (60 pleasant words in upper case letters and 60 unpleasant words in lower case 
letters), and 48 letter strings (24 in upper case letters and 24 in lower case letters). 
Moreover, the order of the compatible and incompatible task was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
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Results and Discussion 
The overall analysis of RTs of the compatible and the incompatible task yielded 
results similar to the first experiment (see Figure 3-3). The IAT effects were significant 
overall (mean 26 ms, SD 42), t(29) = 3.3, p < .01), for pictures (mean 35 ms, SD 53), t(29) 
= 3.6, p < .001), and marginally significant for words (mean 17 ms (46), t(29) = 2.0, p < 
.06). Furthermore, there was no interaction of task order (compatible - incompatible vs. 
incompatible - compatible) and IAT effects (F(1,28) = .57, n.s.). 
 
Figure 3-3. Mean reaction times in ms for the compatible and incompatible IAT-tasks, 
and separately for pictures (targets) and words (attributes) in Experiment 5 
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Upon being questioned after the experiment, none of the participants indicated that 
they had used emotional valence to categorize the words. Further analyses were carried out 
to substantiate these subjective responses. First, if participants had used emotional valence 
to categorize the words, error rates for the non-words should correlate positively with the 
IAT effects. This should be the case because emotional valence cannot be used to 
categorize the non-words, creating confusion and errors when they are presented. On the 
other hand, this was not the case; error rates for non-words did not correlate positively with 
the IAT effects (r = -.37, p < .05). Second, there should be an effect of compatibility on 
reaction times of the non-words. Instead, practice effects revealed: RTs of nonwords 
decreased from the first to the second task, no matter whether this was a compatible or an 
incompatible one (F(1,28) = 17.1, p < .001). Results are shown in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. Mean reaction times in ms and error rates of non-words (with Standard 
Deviations) broken down by compatibility and task position in 
 Experiment 5 
 
 Position 1 Position 2 Significance 
RTs Incompatible 607 (102) Compatible 537 (71) p<.01 
 Compatible 609 (76) Incompatible 579 (54) p<.05 
 Significance n.s.  n.s.  
Error Rates Incompatible 2.4 (1.8) Compatible 2.5 (2.3) n.s. 
 Compatible 1.3 (1.4) Incompatible 1.9 (1.7) n.s. 
 Significance n.s.  n.s.  
 
After the experiment participants were asked what attribute dimension they had 
recognized additionally (other than the given one). Sixteen participants correctly indicated 
pleasant and unpleasant words. This group will be called 'explicit group' group, because 
they showed correct explicit knowledge about the categorization dimensions. The 
remaining 14 participants did not recognize the valence dimension ('implicit group'). 
Comparing IAT performance of the two groups (between factor) a major difference 
occurred (Figure 3-4).  
 
Figure 3-4. Mean IAT Effects in ms for pictures (targets) and words (attributes) broken 
down by Group (explicit knowledge, no explicit knowledge) in 
 Experiment 5 
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A two way ANOVA yielded a significant interaction of Group (explicit, implicit) and 
material type (words, pictures) (F(1, 28) = 6.79, p < .01, eta2 = .20). The IAT effects for 
words did not differ between the groups and were not different from zero in both groups 
(explicit group: mean 14 ms, SD 49), t(15) = 1.17, n.s.; implicit group: mean 20 ms, SD 
44), t(13) = 1.65, n.s.)., The IAT effects for pictures, however were significantly larger for 
the explicit group than for the implicit group (t(28) = 2.24, p < .05); there was a significant 
IAT effect for the explicit group (mean 54 ms, SD 55), t(15) = 3.86, p < .01), but no IAT 
effect for the implicit group (mean 13 ms, SD 42), t(13) = 1.13, n.s.). The overall IAT 
effect for the explicit group was significantly different from zero (mean 34 ms, SD 47), 
t(15) = 2.90, p <.01), but not for the implicit group (mean 16 ms, SD 36), t(13) = 1.68, 
n.s.). These results indicate that significant IAT effects depend on the fact that participants 
somehow recognize and activate the valence dimension introduced by the attribute words. 
Although all attributes were categorized according to the surface feature, performance in 
target trials slowed down when spiders and pleasant upper case letters were assigned onto 
one key, compared to the opposite key assignment. This result supports the hypothesis that 
the valence of individual attribute stimuli is activated and interferes with the valence of 
target stimuli; however, the effects disappears when the valence of the attributes remains 
undiscovered. 
 
3.3 General Discussion 
 
As expected, participants of the Original IAT associated 'spiders' more strongly with 
'unpleasant', fear-related words, and 'butterflies' more strongly with 'pleasant', relaxation-
related words than vice versa. This pattern of associations yielded fairly large IAT effects 
both for the targets (pictures) and the explicit attributes (words). For the new masked 
versions of the IAT in Experiment 4, a more complex pattern of results was found: For 
words, there was only a weak IAT effect (Surface IAT) or no effect at all (Language IAT), 
but a significant IAT effect for pictures. Nevertheless, emotional valence of the words did 
affect task performance, interfering with picture categorization in the incompatible task. 
This interference effect is reminiscent of the classical Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). The 
fact that the IAT effect for words was reduced almost to zero indicates that participants of 
the Language IAT and the Surface IAT did indeed categorize the words according to 
language and letter type, respectively. Interestingly, emotional valence of the words was 
activated nevertheless, creating significant IAT effects for pictures in both the Language 
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IAT and the Surface IAT. In hindsight, one might have expected this for the Language 
IAT. For the Surface IAT, however, it is most notable because the simple categorization 
according to letter type does not require semantic processing at all. Experiment 5 
demonstrated that emotional valence of single exemplars (the attribute words) is activated 
in a task in which participants are effectively discouraged from using valence as a criterion 
for their decisions. Instead, the results indicate that they used the neutral and perceptual 
categorization dimension for categorizing attribute words.  
What are the conclusions for the initial questions and problems raised?  
Category Concepts vs. Individual Stimuli. Study 2 investigated the question whether 
the IAT is driven by valence of the given concept category or by the presented stimulus. 
De Houwer (2001) found that valence of individual target stimuli had little or no impact on 
performance; rather, only valence of the target categories (e.g., 'British' vs. 'Foreign') 
mattered. Therefore, de Houwer (2001) suggested that IAT effects are not located at the 
level of individual target exemplars, but rather at the level of the global target categories. 
For attribute stimuli Steffens and Plewe (2001) report a strong influence of exemplar 
valence on IAT performance. The results of Experiment 4 and 5 support both predictions. 
In the masked IAT conditions of Experiment 4 and 5 the 'confound' of attribute 
categorization task and emotional valence was introduced on purpose, revealing that the 
associations of spiders with fear and of butterflies with pleasure affected decisions even 
when the attributes were categorized according to completely different dimensions. At first 
glance this stands in contrast to results reported by de Houwer (2001). Experiment 4 and 5 
found that emotional valence of individual stimuli affected performance of target stimuli, 
congruent to the results by Steffens and Plewe (2001). The size of the IAT effects, 
however, depended on the explicitness of the valence dimension. Although the effects 
remained significant when valence was masked, IAT effects were significantly smaller in 
the masked conditions. One can assume that explicit valence labels additionally activate 
the relevant valence concepts in memory leading to a stronger interference with 
incompatible target concepts. Moreover, when the valence dimensions remain 
undiscovered by the participants, IAT effects will disappear. The data of Study 2 suggests 
that to a large extent IAT effects are induced by the valence of the relevant feature of the 
presented stimuli (De Houwer, 2001). On the other hand, irrelevant features of attribute 
stimuli affect IAT performance (Steffens and Plewe, 2001), even when the attribute 
dimensions are masked by neutral, non-relevant concepts.  
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Task-Switch-Neglect Model. Secondly, Mierke and Klauer (2001) discuss an 
alternative IAT explanation and propose a model that attributes IAT effects to different 
costs related to task-set switching. According to this model reaction times in the 
compatible IAT task decrease, because participants may categorize all items according to 
only one dimension or task set, namely emotional valence. In compatible tasks, neglecting 
the instruction to focus on the two given concept dimensions is possible because 
participants can use knowledge about these concepts, especially when target and attribute 
categories are explicitly labeled with names of the dimensions of interest (e.g., spider vs. 
butterfly; pleasant words vs. unpleasant words). For the Original IAT used in Experiment 4 
the compatible IAT task is easy because participants may categorize all items according to 
only one dimension, namely emotional valence: everything pleasant (words and butterflies) 
requires one response, everything unpleasant (words and spiders) requires the other. In 
contrast, in the incompatible task, two alternative dimensions must be used; words may 
still be categorized according to emotional valence, but pictures have to be categorized 
according to type of animal. Emotional valence cannot be used easily for classification of 
the pictures because the pleasant pictures require the same response as the unpleasant 
words, and vice versa, creating strong interference. Therefore, during the incompatible 
task, participants have to monitor two different dimensions and switch back and forth 
between them, making the incompatible task more difficult than the compatible one. 
Nevertheless, the present IAT results and statements of the participants speak against this 
alternative explanation of IAT effects. Results of Experiment 5 suggest that this 
explanation is at least incomplete as an explanation of IAT effects because Experiment 5 
revealed IAT effects, even though the participants used two different dimensions in both 
the compatible and the incompatible task; however, the observed effect was considerably 
smaller than the one observed in the Original IAT of Experiment 4. I would suggest that 
this is more due to the lack of explicitly valenced category labels than to neglecting of the 
task-switch instruction. On the other hand, one can not exclude that the task-switching 
explanation may indeed explain part of the effects found in the Original IAT. 
Explicit Category Labels. In the original IAT the associations meant to be measured 
are completely explicit to the participants. They are made even more obvious by the way 
the category labels are shown on the screen to remind participants of the current category-
key assignments. As reported above, explicit labels of valence lead to a stronger activation 
of the relevant associations and larger IAT effects, but results also indicate that the effects 
do not solely depend on the category concept. Nevertheless, in a typical IAT there is a 
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perfect confound between the relevant and the irrelevant feature of target and attribute 
stimuli (e.g., individual spider and the spider concept should not vary in their valence). On 
the other hand, when stimulus and target concept valence are confounded as in the Original 
IAT, participants may adopt a different strategy in the compatible task than that which is 
adopted in the incompatible response assignment [c.f. Task-Switch-Neglect Model, Mierke 
& Klauer (2001)]. The masking of concept categories represents an alternative to prevent 
strategic factors that might underlie IAT effects and introduces a possibility to assess 
associations induced by the individual stimuli. 
 In addition to these theoretical conclusions, the present results also suggest some 
useful practical implications. First, I suggest that researchers routinely analyze and report 
IAT effects separately for targets and attributes. Otherwise, important differences might be 
obscured by reporting only IAT effects averaged across all materials. Second, masked IAT 
versions like the ones presented here may be very helpful when it is difficult to use the 
attribute dimension of interest. To give just one example, one might be interested in 
measuring how strongly socially phobic patients associate angry versus smiling faces with 
social threat versus social acceptance. In this case, the attribute materials might consist of 
threat-related words versus positive words. It would be difficult to ask participants to 
categorize the words according to the threat-acceptance dimension because they might lack 
the necessary knowledge, and words like 'audience', 'speech', or 'heartbeat' might not be 
threatening to healthy control participants. For the same reason, the standard classification 
into pleasant versus unpleasant words might not work well with these words and control 
participants. With a masked IAT version, however, it is possible to use just about any 
group of words for any participant because the categorization dimension may be perfectly 
unequivocal. For this purpose, I suggest using a task similar to the letter type 
categorization presented here. It uses a surface dimension completely unrelated to the 
dimension of interest, and it may be applied to any type of verbal material, with any group 
of participants. Moreover, a similar approach might be taken with pictorial stimuli. Instead 
of judging their emotional valence, participants might categorize them according to another 
feature such as grayscale vs. color, animate vs. inanimate, animal vs. human, or male vs. 
female. A categorization according to the color of the presented stimuli was already 
successfully applied in another indirect paradigm, the 'Extrinsic Affective Simon Task' 
(EAST) introduced by Jan De Houwer (2003). Nevertheless, it has to be tested in future 
experiments if the masking of both target and attribute dimensions will yield sufficient IAT 
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effects, since an absolute masking of all relevant dimensions could extinguish the influence 
of the single stimulus valence. 
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4. Study 3: Malleability of fear associations: The influence of context 
 
As pointed out in the introduction of this dissertation, an increasingly large number 
of empirical studies investigated the relationship between cognitive processes and anxiety 
disorders (see chapter 1.1 and 1.2). Most psychological models of anxiety disorders 
(Barlow, 1988; Beck, et al., 1985; Eysenck, 1992; Foa & Kozak, 1985) postulate that 
cognitive processes are important for the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. General 
predictions about cognitive processing in emotional disorders may be derived from 
theories such as the ones proposed by Bower (1981, 1987), and Beck (Beck, 1976; Beck et 
al., 1985). According to these theories, cognitive processing is guided by schemata, an 
underlying cognitive structure which selectively influences perceptions, interpretations, 
and memories. In anxiety, the important schemata are distorted towards danger and 
vulnerability. The schema models proposed by Beck, Bower and others led to a 
tremendous amount of research designed to find out how emotions interact with cognitive 
processes (see chapter 1.2.1; Williams, et al., 1997). Integrating psychophysiological 
aspects and response behavior into the cognitive fear network, Lang's  bio-informational 
theory (Lang, 1977, 1978; Lang et al.,1998) offers another useful and far more specific 
model to describe cognitive representations in anxiety. To test the elements of a fear 
network, traditional cognitive paradigms are circumspect because they investigate how 
cognitive structures affect information processing (e.g., memory and attention). Self-
reports and other introspective methods are also very limited alternatives to measure 
cognitive representations because relevant cognitions might be unavailable to introspection 
and verbal descriptions (e.g., de Jong, et al., 2001; Dovidio and Fazio, 1992), and are 
influenced by deception and self-presentation strategies. An alternative approach would be 
the assessment of cognitive structures and states of specific fear associations through 
indirect, performance- based tasks. 
Indirect experimental paradigms, like the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 
1998) may be a helpful additional tool in the research of anxiety disorders, because they 
promise to assess the structure and state of specific fear associations. Results of Study 1 in 
this dissertation clearly indicate the usefulness of this tool for examining associative 
structures in spider phobia. In Experiment 1 and 2, both spider phobic participants and 
non-phobic controls displayed negative implicit attitudes towards spiders. Both groups 
associated spiders with negative, anxiety-related attributes, leading to faster responses in 
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compatible tasks of the IAT, when spiders and negative adjectives shared the same 
response key. Moreover, correlations between IAT effects, questionnaire scores, and 
behavioral tests in Experiment 1 are further positive arguments for IAT use. Significant 
partial correlations between the IAT scores and relevant behavior - controlling for the 
influence of questionnaire scores - support the claim that indirect measures such as the IAT 
are able to predict behavior beyond the predictions of direct measures such as 
questionnaires. There are further promising applications of the IAT, investigating implicit 
associations in recovered depressed patients (Gemar, et al., 2001) and anxiety disorders (de 
Jong et a., 2001; Teachman, et al., 2001; de Jong, 2002; Teachman & Woody, 2003; de 
Jong, et al., 2003). 
Little is known, however, about the nature of implicit associations in clinical 
research and their degree of contextual dependence. Looking at studies in social 
psychology it becomes obvious that the associations measured by the IAT can be 
influenced by context information (e.g., Lowery et al., 2001; Blair, et al., 2001; Dasgupta 
& Greenwald, 2001; Wittenbrink, et al., 2001, Rudman & Lee, 2002; Mitchell, et al., 2003; 
for an overview, see chapter 1.3.3-4; Blair, 2002). 
For the clinical application of indirect measures these findings raise the important 
question: Will fear-related representation will be similarly bound by contextual factors due 
to its underlying constructive nature? It seems fruitful to explore the extent to which 
automatically activated fear-related associations are contextually dependent, and therefore 
to be considered as the result of a constructive process in a certain situation. When objects 
or situation are associated with fear (e.g., basement rooms in spider phobia) are stored in 
memory as one solitary evaluative representation, this situation should always activate 
fear-related responses and would not relate to neutral or more positive contents. On the 
other hand, this concept of one single affective tag seems very unlikely because different 
contextual conditions should lead to different evaluations (e.g., a basement room could be 
associated with more positive valence when it solves a storage problem). One can rather 
assume that associations toward an object depend on various representations, including 
multiple categories that relate to the object in various ways (see Ferguson & Bargh, 2003). 
These assumptions imply that automatically activated dysfunctional associations vary 
across time and context, depending on the just activated representations, which then would 
influence subsequent judgments, feelings, and behavior. The assessment of automatic fear-
related associations in different contextual situations would help to shed the light on the 
debate about the nature of dysfunctional beliefs and associations that underlie 
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psychopathology (De Houwer, 2002). Originally, these associations were believed to be 
contextually independent and relatively stable over time (e.g., Beck, 1976). However, 
traditional self- report measures of dysfunctional beliefs indicated to be rather contextually 
dependent (e.g., Teasdale, 1993). The aim of the present study is to investigate the 
influences of context on dysfunctional fear-related association using an indirect measure of 
associations. Before explaining the questions and goals of Study 3 I want to explain the 
reasons for not using an IAT as in the previous experiments.  
In Study 1 and 2 the Implicit Association Test was successfully applied to measure 
fear relevant association; however, despite the advantages and positive results of the IAT, 
several aspects have been criticized (see chapter 1.3.3; Fazio & Olson 2003). The 
following two aspects led to the decision not to use an IAT in Study 3. First, the relative 
nature of the IAT drastically limits the use of this method. The goal of this study is to 
investigate associations between certain objects/ situations and an evaluative dimension in 
absolute terms. With the IAT this is not possible, because always two target concepts are 
related to two attribute concepts providing an estimate of the relative strength of 
associations. Secondly, testing how specific targets (i.e., situations or objects) are 
associated with fear-related attributes, it is difficult to find precisely definable category 
labels for the target categories. Therefore, it would be useful to apply a method where 
target stimuli are classified according a neutral and unrelated feature (relevant feature), but 
that which is driven by the impact of each individual target valence (irrelevant feature).  
One method that would fulfill the above criteria is a modified version of the IAT, 
called the 'Extrinsic Affective Simon Task' (EAST), which was developed by Jan De 
Houwer (2003). This paradigm provides solutions for several problems associated with the 
classical IAT. Most importantly, the EAST measures associations in a single task. De 
Houwer (2003) successfully applied the EAST as an absolute measure of attitudes toward 
various target stimuli (flower vs. insects) and as a measure to assess self- and other esteem. 
In the EAST, responses are extrinsically related to a valence dimension (e.g., 'pleasant' vs. 
'unpleasant') as a result of task instructions. First, participants are instructed to press a left 
versus a right key in response to pleasant and unpleasant words, respectively. These 
attribute words are presented in black color (called 'uncolored' words). The words appear 
separately on the computer screen until the response is made. By means of many practice 
trials, responses become extrinsically associated with positive or negative valence, creating 
what might be called a 'pleasant key' and an 'unpleasant key'. In the critical EAST phase, 
participants also categorize colored target words (e.g., red and blue words) according to 
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their color by pressing the 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' key (e.g., red color - pleasant key vs. 
blue color - unpleasant key). The colored words are those target stimuli, whose association 
with the extrinsic valence dimension are to be measured. As an example, one could 
introduce as targets words of flowers (e.g., tulip, rose, etc.) and insects (e.g., mosquito, 
cockroach, etc.). Each of the words is presented both in red and blue color several times. 
The participants are instructed to press the left or right key in response to the emotional 
valence of black (uncolored) words, and in response to the print color of colored words. In 
effect, performance should be superior (i.e., reactions should be faster) on trials in which 
participants need to press the extrinsically pleasant key in response to a positively 
associated word (i.e., flower words), and the extrinsically unpleasant key in response to a 
negatively associated word (i.e., insect words). There should not be any difference in 
performance if target words are associated neither with pleasantness nor with 
unpleasantness. One advantage of color as a relevant feature is that it may be used with any 
kind of verbal stimulus, and that every target word may be presented both in red and blue 
color, thereby serving as its own control item.  
The study reported here used the EAST paradigm to investigate cognitive structures 
or schemata in spider fear. The aim of the experiment was to measure how ambiguous, 
neutral stimuli may or may not be associated with threat when different emotional concepts 
(humans vs. spiders) are activated. If anxiety is related to distortions of important schemata 
towards danger and vulnerability, spider fearful participants should associate the 
ambiguous stimuli with threat when the spider concept is activated, compared to non-
fearful participants without such an elaborated fear schemata. Furthermore, the results of 
this experiment should provide useful empirical evidence regarding the question whether 
dysfunctional threat associations in memory are context-independent, or whether they 
depend on the specific context activated in the situation. Third, as a tool to investigate the 
structure of fear networks, the EAST might be a useful research tool in clinical 
psychology. 
The study focused on particular target words (e.g., 'to crawl', 'hair'), which may be 
related to a 'human' concept (mainly activated by pictures of babies and adults), but might 
also be related to a 'spider' concept (activated by spider pictures). There were two 
categories of ambiguous target stimuli. One set described features (e.g., legs, hair, to 
crawl); the other set described different situations where spiders may occur (e.g., corner, 
walls, cellar). The critical quality of these target words is their ambiguity; they may be 
related to humans (e.g., human legs, a fishnet) or to spiders (e.g., legs of spiders, a 
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cobweb). The distinction between features and situations seems useful accordingly to Lang 
et al. (1998). He claims that fear is represented as a network in memory that includes three 
kinds of information: a) information about the feared stimulus situation, b) information 
about verbal, physiological, and overt behavioral responses c) interpretive information 
about the meaning of the stimulus. 
Based on these aspects of Lang's bio-informational theory of fear, Foa and Kozak 
(1986) outlined an emotional processing account of fear reduction as a part of treatment. 
Besides the assumption about different kinds of information within the cognitive fear 
structure (e.g., stimulus, response, meaning) they also claim that the fear structure must be 
activated by providing information that matches part of the network. In order to 
disintegrate various conceptual relations between fear-related elements in memory, 
incompatible information with elements of the fear structure must be made available and 
cognitively processed (e.g., the experience of physiological habituation as a result of 
exposure will lower the perception and association of harm from the stimulus). Moreover, 
there is empirical evidence for different types of fear representations from memory 
experiments on panic disorder. For instance, Becker, Roth, Andrich and Margraf (1999) 
found that information about the feared situations is processed differently in memory from 
stimuli referring to physiological arousal.  
 
4.1 Experiment 6: Context activation and EAST performance 
 
To study the associations between ambiguous, 'neutral' stimuli and pleasant vs. 
unpleasant threatening words, a modified version of the 'Extrinsic Affective Simon Task’ 
(EAST) was employed in this experiment. To assess the effect of context information on 
associations, the EAST was conducted twice. In the first EAST, a rather pleasant 'human' 
concept was activated directly before performing the EAST, whereas a 'spider' concept was 
activated directly before the second EAST. The first critical question addressed here is 
whether it is possible to selectively activate these different concepts, such that neutral 
ambiguous stimuli (words) are associated with fear when related to spiders, but not when 
related to humans. The second question is whether these differential association strengths 
may be measured by an implicit test of associations. 
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Method 
Participants and Questionnaires. Fifty-two undergraduate psychology students of 
Dresden University of Technology participated in this study in exchange for course credit. 
Materials. For selective activation of 'human' concepts and 'spider' concepts, pictures 
of both categories were collected and evaluated. The pictures needed to fit to the 
ambiguous feature words and situation words used in the experiment. For example, in the 
'human' priming condition, pictures of adults and babies were shown, relating to feature 
words like 'legs' or 'to crawl'. In contrast, in the 'spider' priming condition, spider pictures 
were shown, relating to the very same words in a different sense (spider legs or crawling 
spider). After pre-testing the pictures regarding their fit and ease of identification, nine 
pictures were selected for the human concept (four adult pictures, two baby pictures, one 
indoor house scene, one outdoor house scene, one fishing net) and nine pictures were 
selected for the spider concept (nine pictures of various spiders and their surroundings). 
The pictures size was 9,5 x 15 cm (3,74 x 5,91 inch). Figure 4-1 displays the pictures that 
were used for activating the 'human' and the 'spider' concepts.  
For the valence categorization trials, eight positive and eight negative, fear-related 
words (see Appendix J) were presented in black color. In the color practice phase, red and 
blue 'XXXX'-strings were presented. The ambiguous words of the color categorization 
trials consisted of six words characterizing features or qualities (legs, to crawl, net, to 
weave, filament, hair) and six words characterizing situations (attic, walls, cellar, foliage, 
window, corner). In pre-tests, the emotional valence of these words was rated as neutral by 
random student participants. All pictures and words were presented on a white background. 
A letter was 8 mm high and 6 mm wide. The experiment was programmed in RSVP 
(Williams & Tarr, no date) and implemented on an Apple Power Macintosh 7600/132.  
Procedure. The experiment consisted of two EAST experiments, the first one 
preceded by a human priming phase and the second one by a spider priming phase. All 
participants started with priming of the 'human' concept presented to the participants as an 
independent picture rating task (the relation between the pictures and the following EAST 
was not mentioned). Each of the nine pictures from this category were presented in the 
middle of the screen below a five point scale reaching from 'very unpleasant' (-2) to 'very 
pleasant' (+2). Participants were asked to rate the emotional valence of each picture by 
responding according to this rating scale. 
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Figure 4-1. Pictures used for priming the 'human' and the 'spider' concept in  
 Experiment 6 
 
 
 
The following 'human' EAST experiment started with the valence categorization 
task. Participants were informed that words would be presented in the middle of the screen. 
Their task was to classify these words according to their emotional valence by pressing a 
key of the computer keyboard denoted 'pleasant' or a key denoted 'unpleasant' (extrinsic 
valence). Each of the eight pleasant and eight unpleasant words was presented twice in a 
fixed random order; afterwards, the color categorization task was introduced. Equal 
numbers of participants were randomly allocated to the following sets: half of the 
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participants were instructed to press the 'pleasant key' in response to blue words and the 
'unpleasant key' in response to red words (Set 1). The other participants received the 
opposite assignment (Set 2). For practicing of the color categorization task, ten blue 
'XXXX'-strings and ten red 'XXXX'-strings were presented in a fixed random order. 
In the final critical phase, all ambiguous words (features and situations) were 
presented in red or blue color, and the pleasant and unpleasant words were presented in 
black ('not colored'). Participants were instructed to press the 'pleasant' or 'unpleasant' key 
depending on the emotional valence or the color of the word. If the word was not colored 
(black), valence was critical, as practiced before. If the word was colored, they had to 
respond on the basis of color, as practiced before. The critical phase consisted of two 
identical test blocks, each of which started with four practice trials (two pleasant and two 
unpleasant black words). Following, each of the 12 ambiguous words (six features, six 
situations) were presented once in red color and once in blue color, and each of the 16 
valence words were presented once in black color (eight pleasant and eight unpleasant 
words), resulting in 40 trials per block. There was a short break between the two test 
blocks. During this break, the nine human pictures appeared on the screen for two seconds 
each, with the objective of further concept priming. Again, the relation between the 
pictures and the EAST was not mentioned. Afterwards, the task continued with the second 
test block. All stimuli appeared in the same fixed random order for each participant. Each 
stimulus was signalized by a fixation cross for 500 ms; then the stimulus was shown until a 
response was made. If the participants made an incorrect response, the message 'WRONG 
KEY' appeared for one second. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. The participants 
needed approximately 10 minutes to complete the first EAST experiment. 
After the EAST, all participants conducted on an unrelated text reading experiment 
for about 50 minutes. After this experiment, the 'spider' EAST was introduced 4. This 
second EAST experiment was perfectly identical to the first, except for the picture 
materials used in the priming task. Instead of the human pictures, nine pictures of spiders 
were presented to the participants who rated them according to their emotional valence 
before the first phase of the EAST.  
 
____________________ 
4 One critical point of this design could arise from the lack of counterbalancing the 'human' concept and the 'spider' 
concept condition; however, activating fear associations in the spider priming condition before the human priming 
condition, one has to assume that this would influence later performance in the latter condition. 
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Again, there was a break between the two critical blocks, and the nine spider pictures 
were presented to reactivate priming of the spider concept. In all other respects, the 'spider' 
EAST was identical to the 'human' EAST. After the experiment, the participants completed 
a spider fear screening questionnaire (SAS, Rinck, Bundschuh, Engler, Müller, Wissmann, 
Ellwart, & Becker, 2002) to assess their degree of spider fear (see Appendix G). In a final 
task all participants rated the words presented in the experiment regarding their emotional 
valence on a five point scale reaching from 'very unpleasant' (-2) to 'very pleasant' (+2). 
 
Results 
Human Priming EAST. For further analyses, error rates of the colored test trials were 
evaluated. The error rates were uniformly low (mean 3.1%), so no further analyses were 
calculated for errors.  
From the reaction times (RTs) for all ambiguous (colored) words, median RTs were 
computed, separately for trials on which an extrinsically positive response was required 
(pleasant key for positive black words) and for trials on which an extrinsically negative 
response was required (unpleasant key for negative black words). Analysis was computed 
to compare the reaction times of ambiguous words in relation to extrinsic positive and 
negative valence and to control for a possible effect of the counterbalanced assignment of 
the extrinsic valence keys to the colored keys (positive and blue key vs. negative and red 
key for Set 1; positive and red key versus negative and blue key for Set2). A 2x2 ANOVA 
with the between-subjects variable Key Assignment (Set 1 vs. Set 2) and the within-
subjects variable Extrinsic Response Valence (positive vs. negative) did not yield a 
significant interaction between key assignments and valence (F(1,50) = 2.75, n.s.). More 
importantly, there was no main effect of extrinsic response valence (F(1,50) = 1.05, n.s.), 
showing that participants were not generally faster to give responses that were associated 
with either negative or positive valence. Separate analyses for reaction times of ambiguous 
situation words and feature words showed similar results (situations: t (51) < 1; features: t 
(51) = 1.28, n.s.). Table 4-1 shows reaction times of the ambiguous words regarding their 
assignment to extrinsically positive and negative keys. 
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Table 4-1. Human Priming: Mean reaction times in ms of ambiguous words regarding 
their assignment to extrinsically positive and negative keys (and Standard 
Deviations) in Experiment 6 
 
words negative key positive key 
significance of 
negative-positive 
difference 
all words 648 (83) 658 (104) n.s. 
feature words 638 (94) 656 (112) n.s. 
situation words 658 (97) 660 (115) n.s. 
 
For further analyses, a performance index was generated for each participant by 
subtracting the mean reaction time of the extrinsically positive key from the mean reaction 
time of the extrinsically negative key. Thus, index scores below zero indicate faster 
responses associated with negative valence, and scores above zero indicate faster responses 
associated with positive valence. To examine the influence of spider fear on task 
performance in the human EAST, individual spider questionnaire scores were correlated 
with the performance index of all colored words (RT of extrinsically negative key minus 
RT of extrinsically positive key). However, there was no significant correlation between all 
colored words (features and situations) and fear scores (r = .03, n.s.), between feature 
words and fear scores (r = -,006, n.s.), or situation words and fear scores (r = ,05, n.s.). 
This indicates that participants with high spider-fear scores did not associate ambiguous 
target words with negative valence (negative index) in the human priming condition. 
Moreover, for further examinations two groups were created according to the participants' 
spider fear questionnaire scores (SAS, Rinck et al., 2002). Scores ranged from 0 (absolute 
no spider fear) to 24 (high spider phobic) with a mean of 9.44 (SD 7.27). Participants were 
divided into high versus low spider fear groups according to whether their scores were 
above or below the median of 9.0, leaving 26 participants in each group. A 2x2 ANOVA 
with the between-subjects variable Group (low fear vs. high fear) and the within-subjects 
variable Target Type (features vs. situations) did not yield a significant main effect Group 
(F(1,50) = .10, n.s.) indicating that high and low fearful participants did not differ in their 
EAST performance. Comparing the indices for feature and situation words there was no 
significant main effect Target Type (F(1,50) = .70, n.s.) and no significant interaction 
(F(1,50) = .50, n.s.). Separate analysis indicated no differences between the two groups 
regarding their associations between ambiguous feature or situation (situations: t(50) < 1, 
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n.s.); features: t(50) < 1, n.s.). Mean reaction times of the two groups are displayed in 
Table 4-2. None of the indices was different from zero, indicating equally fast responses 
associated with negative and positive valence. 
 
Table 4-2. Human Priming: Mean reaction time indices in ms (and Standard 
Deviations) of ambiguous words broken down by high vs. low spider fear in 
Experiment 6 
 
index low spider fear high spider fear significance of low-high difference 
all words -12.8 (76) -6.7 (64) n.s. 
feature words -27.5 (87) -8.0 (112) n.s. 
situation words 1.81 (94) -5.4 (97) n.s. 
 
Negative indices indicate stronger association with the negative key; positive indices indicate stronger association with 
the positive key. Indices marked with '*' are significantly different from zero with p < .05. 
 
Spider Priming EAST. As in the first EAST experiment, RTs of the colored test trials 
were analyzed. Again, the error rates were uniformly low (mean 3.2%), and no further 
analyses were calculated for errors. As before, RTs for all ambiguous (colored) words were 
aggregated separately for trials in which an extrinsically positive response was required 
and for trials on which an extrinsically negative response was required. 
Again, the 2x2 ANOVA with the between-subjects variable Key Assignment (Set 1 
vs. Set 2) and the within-subjects variable Extrinsic Response Valence (positive vs. 
negative) did not yield a significant interaction between key assignment and valence 
(F(1,50) = 2.02, n.s.). For the colored words in general, there was no main effect of 
extrinsic response valence (F(1,50) < 1, n.s.), indicating that participants were not faster to 
give responses associated with negative or positive valence. A separate analysis of RTs for 
ambiguous situation words showed similar results (t(51) = 1.24, n.s.); however, there was a 
marginally significant difference for the feature words (t(51) = 1.72, p < .09), indicating 
marginally faster responses to feature words when they were associated with negative 
valence (see Table 4-3). 
 
 
 
 
Empirical Studies  
 
86
Table 4-3. Spider Priming: Mean reaction times in ms of ambiguous words regarding 
their assignment to extrinsically positive and negative keys (and Standard 
Deviations) in Experiment 6 
 
 
words 
 
negative key 
 
positive key 
significance of 
negative-positive 
difference 
all words 621 (139) 627 (167) n.s. 
feature words 609 (153) 635 (219) p < .09 
situation words 633 (135) 620 (126) n.s. 
 
To examine the influence of spider fear on task performance in the spider EAST, 
individual spider questionnaire scores were correlated with the performance index of all 
colored words (RT of extrinsically negative key minus RT of extrinsically positive key). 
The result was a significant correlation of r = -35 (p < .01), indicating that participants with 
high spider fear associated the ambiguous target words with negative valence. Separate 
correlations between fear scores and performance scores for feature words versus situation 
words yielded a significant correlation for feature words (r = - .31, p < .05), but not for 
situation words (r = - 21, n.s.). Comparing the mean indices of the high and low spider 
fearful group (questionnaire scores above or below the median of 9.0), a 2x2 ANOVA with 
the between-subjects variable Group (low fear vs. high fear) and the within-subjects 
variable Target Type (features vs. situations) yielded a significant main effect Group 
(F(1,50) = 7.29, p<.01, eta2 = .13) indicating that highly fearful participants responded 
faster with the negative key on ambiguous words (compared to low fearful participants). 
Generally, there was a more negative association for feature words displayed by a 
significant main effect Target Type (F(1,50) = 5.29, p<.05, eta2 = .10). No interaction 
approached significance. Analyzing feature and situation words separately, there was a 
significant difference between high and low fearful participants for the feature words (t(50) 
= 2.23, p < .05), and a marginal difference for situation words (t(50) = 1.73, p < .09) . 
Moreover, the indices of highly fearful participants were significantly different from zero, 
indicating faster extrinsically negative responses, especially to feature words. Indices and 
significance levels are displayed in Table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4. Spider Priming: Mean reaction time indices in ms (and Standard Deviations) 
of ambiguous words broken down by high vs. low Spider Fear in 
Experiment 6 
 
index low spider fear high spider fear significance of low-high difference 
all words 18.9 (57) -31.8 * (77) p < .01 
feature words 6.5 (70) -58.8 * (132) p < .05 
situation words 31.3 * (77) -4.9 (73) p < .09 
 
Negative indices indicate stronger association with the negative key; positive indices indicate stronger association with 
the positive key. Indices marked with '*' are significantly different from zero with p < .05. 
 
To analyze the differential influence of the two priming conditions on task 
performance of high vs. low spider fear groups, a 2x2 ANOVA was calculated with the 
between-subjects factor group (high vs. low spider fear), the within-subjects factor priming 
condition (human vs. spider priming), and performance indices as the dependent variable. 
This ANOVA yielded a significant interaction of priming condition and group (F(1,50) = 
6.31, p < .015, eta2 = .11), indicating that participants with high fear scores associated 
ambiguous target words with fear-related, negative valence if the spider concept was 
activated. Participants without fear of spiders showed no association of the ambiguous 
words with either positive or fear-related words.  
 
Figure 4-2. Interaction between priming condition and fear of spiders for feature words 
in Experiment 6 
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This interaction was also significant for feature words alone (F(1,50) = 7.01, p < 
.011, eta2 = .12), but not for situation words (F(1,50) = 1.15, n.s.). The interaction between 
group and priming condition for feature words is displayed in Figure 4-2. 
Concept Priming: Picture Ratings. For priming of the human concept, 9 pictures of 
the human category were rated by the participants before the EAST experiment. The mean 
ratings of high vs. low spider fearful participants indicated that these pictures were 
perceived as rather pleasant (mean: 0.84, SD: .44). For priming of the spider concept, nine 
spider pictures were rated by the participants. The mean ratings of both groups shown in 
Figure 4-3 indicated that these pictures were indeed perceived as rather unpleasant (mean: 
-1.03, SD: .68). Comparing high vs. low spider fearful participants, both groups evaluated 
spiders as rather unpleasant, but with a significant difference between the groups (t(50) = 
5.99, p < .001). For participants with high fear scores, spider pictures were more 
unpleasant (mean: -1.5, SD: .40) than for participants with low fear scores (mean: -0.59, 
SD: .63) 
 
Figure 4-3. Mean Ratings of human vs. spider pictures broken down by high vs. low 
spider fear in Experiment 6 
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Valence Ratings: -2 = 'very unpleasant', -1='unpleasant', 0=neutral, 1= 'pleasant', 2= 'very pleasant' 
 
Word Ratings. All participants rated the presented word materials regarding their 
emotional valence. High and low spider fearful participants did not differ regarding their 
ratings of pleasant and unpleasant words. Surprisingly, the valence of situation and feature 
words was rated as rather 'neutral' by both groups after the experiment (see Table 4-5). 
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Table 4-5. Word Ratings: Mean valence ratings of word materials (and Standard 
Deviations) by high vs. low spider fearful participants in Experiment 6 
 
 low spider fear high spider fear significance of low-high difference 
pleasant words 1.71 (.39) 1.75 (.73) n.s. 
unpleasant words - 1.61 (.40) - 1.58 (.73) n.s. 
situation words 0.17 * (.37) - 0.08 (.50) p < .05 
feature words 0.07 (.27) - 0.17 (61) n.s. 
 
Ratings were given on a 5-point scale reaching from 'very unpleasant' (-2) to 'very pleasant' (+2). Indices marked with '*' 
are significantly different from zero with p < .05.  
 
Discussion 
The activation of different concepts (human vs. spider) before each EAST led to 
different associations between ambiguous stimuli and threat. Before the first EAST, a 
'human' concept was activated, and results of the EAST indicated comparable performance 
for the extrinsically pleasant and unpleasant keys. Additionally, there were no differences 
between high spider fearful participants and low spider fearful participants. In this 
situation, the ambiguous target stimuli seemed to be rather neutral to all participants, and 
not associated with threat or fear. Before the second EAST, a 'spider' concept was 
activated, causing differences in the performance of high vs. low fearful participants. 
Participants with high scores in a spider fear questionnaire showed faster responses when 
the ambiguous stimuli were associated with the extrinsically unpleasant key, particularly 
when feature words were used. In contrast, no such difference was found for participants 
who did not fear spiders. Interestingly, all ambiguous words were evaluated as rather 
'neutral' by both groups immediately after the experiment (word ratings, following the 
spider priming EAST). These results indicate that different context conditions may lead to 
differential activation of cognitive schemata in anxiety. In light of these findings, implicit 
threat associations towards special features of the feared object seem to be available only 
in a certain activated context. With regard to the 'neutral' explicit valence rating at the end 
of the experiments, one can assume that there is difference between automatic and indirect 
processes of evaluation tested through the EAST, and rather explicit and direct evaluations. 
This would relate to results by Mayer et al. (2000), who assessed the extent to which spider 
phobic and non-phobic participants experience fear reactions to spiders as automatic. 
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Compared to controls, phobic participants perceived their responses to spiders more often 
as automatic, and not under intentional control. 
Employing the EAST, it was possible to assess associations between ambiguous 
target words and valence. Especially for cognitive structures that are not entirely available 
to consciousness and self-report, the indirect procedure of the EAST offers an alternative 
way of measurement. Like the IAT introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998), the EAST 
measures the strength of associations between a valence dimension (e.g., threatening vs. 
positive) and particular targets (e.g., feared stimuli, situations, physiological responses). 
Moreover, the EAST offers some important practical and methodological advantages. One 
limitation of the classical IAT is that it only offers measures of relative strength. The 
EAST, however, allows an absolute estimate of the association between a particular class 
of target stimuli and the valence dimension. 
An additional benefit of the EAST is in the number of target concepts assessable in a 
single experiment. IATs compare two target concepts with regard to certain attributes. In 
contrast, the EAST allows an absolute assessment of associations with a single target 
concept, but also with two or even more concepts simultaneously (De Houwer, 2003). This 
feature offers promising applications for research on cognitive structures in emotional 
disorders. Since fear seems to be represented in memory in a multidimensional way, 
containing information diverse concepts such as situations, responses, and meaning (Lang, 
1977, 1979; Lang et al., 1998), activation of these concepts may be tested in a single task. 
The present experiment differentiated between two target concepts (features vs. situations) 
and found strong fear--related associations for feature words in high spider fearfuls, but 
only when a spider concept was active. 
Another useful application of the EAST is related to the categorization dimensions of 
target stimuli. For an IAT it is necessary that the classified stimuli accurately fit into one of 
the predetermined dimensions (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant). For the EAST, this is 
unnecessary because the relevant feature of the categorization task is color instead of 
valence. Thus, it is possible to use just about any group of target words for any participant, 
because the categorization dimension 'color' is unequivocal. This would be very useful for 
experiments in which it is otherwise impossible to create accurate classification 
dimensions for all participants. For instance, suppose that one wants to examine 
associations between angry versus smiling faces and threat versus acceptance in social 
phobia. In this case, the target materials might consist of social threat-related words versus 
positive words. It would be difficult to categorize the words according to the threat-
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acceptance dimension or the pleasant-unpleasant dimension because some words related to 
social phobia (e.g., heartbeat, audience, speech, observed) might be threatening to social 
phobics, but not to non-anxious controls. Using the EAST, however, it is possible to use 
about any disorder-related word because valence is not the relevant classification 
dimension in the task. 
As mentioned above, results of the present experiment indicate that high anxious 
participants performed differently under activation of the 'human' concept compared to the 
'spider' concept, although all participants conducted exactly the same EAST twice within 
one hour. With regard to the goals of this experiment, the results are very encouraging, 
indicating the crucial influence of context information as well as high sensibility of the 
EAST to measure changes in the activation of associative structures. These results also 
raise critical questions regarding the retest reliability of implicit measures and the debate 
whether they assess state or trait characteristics. If the measured implicit associations and 
their activation are easily affected by external information, retest reliability will suffer. 
Therefore, in each case, it should be made clear whether the interesting associations 
represent a state or trait construct, and how qualities of these associations such as 
activation level could change during tests. Association tests meant to tap traits must show 
stability over time, assuming that the associations to be measured are fairly constant. 
The results of this experiment also have implications regarding clinical-therapeutic 
questions. Various clinical studies of treatment outcome have found that phobic patients 
profited most from exposure therapy (systematic desensitization, flooding) when 
physiological responses and reports of fear occur, indicating activation of a relevant 
cognitive structure (e.g., Borkovec & Sides, 1979; Watson & Marks, 1971). Foa and 
Kozak (1986) conclude that activated fear structures and incorporated incompatible 
information (incompatible with the pathological elements) are the two conditions required 
to reduce pathological fear. The context-dependent EAST performance of high and low 
fearful participants observed in this study provides empirical evidence for the assumption 
that fear relevant associations are not always activated, but that its activation depends on 
context information. Therefore, fear-relevant activation of cognitive structures seems to be 
necessary to access significant pathological elements in cognition. Moreover, differences 
in the fear network structures of high and low anxious participants emphasize the 
importance of cognitive changes in therapy. One goal of therapy is the disintegration of 
various conceptual relations between fear-related elements in memory (Foa & Kozak, 
1986). As an example, response elements (e.g., 'to strike dead' or 'shock') and meaning 
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elements (e.g., 'threatening', 'dangerous') should become disassociated from stimulus 
elements (e.g., 'to crawl' or 'cellar'). Changes in cognitive structures should lead to 
representations of lower harm and decreased negative valence towards the feared object in 
memory. Indeed, in this experiment low fearful participants did not show the threat 
associations, in contrast to participants with high fear scores. The present results indicate 
that the EAST introduced by De Houwer (2003) can be used as an experimental paradigm, 
suitable for the assessment of fear associations and their current activation level. 
Additional research will have to address the psychometric properties and fundamental 
processes of the EAST, showing if the EAST is a reliable and valid instrument. If future 
research validates the EAST, it could provide a useful method to investigate changes of the 
cognitive fear structure induced by therapy. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this dissertation was the adoption and application of an indirect measure 
of associations in clinical psychology, particular in spider phobia. The main focus was on 
the Implicit Association Test introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998) a paradigm that 
originates from social psychology and promises to tap into cognitive structures by 
measuring the strength of associations between certain concepts, without having to ask for 
a verbal report. With regard to this indirect performance-based approach I used the term of 
'implicit associations' (which does not necessarily mean unconscious or unaware 
associations), clarifying the difference to traditional explicit measures like questionnaires 
or interviews. 
In the following chapter I want to briefly summarize the results of the three studies 
reported in this dissertation, first Study 1 and 3 with a rather clinical perspective, secondly 
Study 2 that focused on methodological properties of the IAT. I want to complete this 
dissertation with conclusions that focus on theoretical and methodological aspects of the 
introduced measures, as well on advantages and limitations for clinical applications.  
 
Investigating the usefulness and predictive potential of the IAT in spider phobia, 
Study 1 applied an IAT to assess implicit fear relevant associations and schemata and to 
predict anxious behavior. The question was, does the IAT offer information about 
maladaptive schemata that relate to automatic evaluations of the feared stimuli, in addition 
to controlled cognitive and behavioral aspects measured through interviews and 
questionnaires. Study 1 used a modified version of the IAT, which tested the strength of 
associations between spider targets and an attribute dimension consisting of fear-related 
and positive attributes. The IAT procedure assesses the strength of the association between 
the target concepts (spider vs. butterfly) and the attribute dimension by considering the 
latency with which participants can employ two response keys, when each has been 
assigned a dual meaning. If spiders and aversive words are highly associated, the IAT’s 
sorting tasks will be easier when the two concepts share the same response than when they 
require different responses. Besides the spider targets the IAT needs a second target 
dimension, testing spider associations relative to the evaluations of butterflies. However, 
because attitudes toward butterflies did not vary between participants with high and low 
scores of spider fear, differences in IAT performance have its origin in different attitudes 
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towards spiders. In Study 1, participants with high scores of spider fear had significantly 
higher IAT effects compared to non-fearful participants indicating much stronger fear 
relevant, implicit associations to spiders. Above these group differences, the IAT 
correlated with behavior during confrontation or questionnaire scores, and predicted 
avoidance behavior beyond the predictions of explicit direct measures. Interestingly, 
despite these group differences, non-fearful controls, who explicitly negate fear 
associations towards spiders, seem to possess implicit negative associations toward spiders. 
This was examined, comparing nonfearful participants with spider enthusiasts. Because 
spider enthusiasts assumingly lack all negative fear-related associations towards spiders, 
these participants served as an experimental baseline group and displayed a balanced 
performance in the compatible and incompatible IAT tasks (no IAT effect), expressing 
comparable implicit associations towards spiders and butterflies. This leads to the 
assumption that even non-fearful participants aversively associate spiders on an automatic, 
performance-based manner, as conceptual approaches of independent and automatic fear 
reaction would predict (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000; Mayer et al., 2000).  
A further clinical perspective was examined in Study 3. Here the question was, how 
do different context conditions lead to differential activation of cognitive schemata in 
anxiety? Because the IAT measures the relative strength of associations in respect to two 
target concepts (e.g., spiders vs. butterflies), Study 3 applied the Extrinsic Affective Simon 
Task (EAST) a method that measures the strength of associations between a valence 
dimension (e.g., threatening vs. positive) and particular targets (e.g., feared stimuli, 
situations, physiological responses) in absolute terms (compared to the relative nature of 
the IAT). Different from Study 1, the question of interest did not concern spider - fear 
associations, but whether it is possible to selectively activate different context conditions, 
such that ambiguous stimuli are associated with fear when related to spiders, but not when 
related to humans. The ambiguous stimuli represented features and situations that would fit 
into a hypothetical fear network, as well into a network representing concepts of humans. 
To assess the effect of context information on associations, the EAST was conducted 
twice. In the first EAST, a rather pleasant 'human' concept was activated directly before 
performing the EAST, whereas a 'spider' concept was activated directly before the second 
EAST. Assessing these associations with an EAST paradigm, results indicated that 
activation of different concepts (human vs. spider) before each EAST lead to different 
associations between ambiguous stimuli and threat. In an activated 'human' concept EAST 
performance of all participants displayed no associations of threat or fear in relation to the 
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ambiguous target stimuli (feature and situation words). However, an activated 'spider' 
concept caused differences in the performance of high vs. low fearful participants. 
Participants with high scores in a spider fear questionnaire showed stronger associations 
between the feature and situational stimuli and unpleasant, fear-related words. In contrast, 
this was not found for participants who did not fear spiders. The context-dependent EAST 
performance of high and low fearful participants observed in this Study 3 provides 
empirical evidence for the assumption that fear relevant associations are not always 
activated, but that implicit threat associations towards special features of the feared object 
seem to be available only in a certain activated context. Therefore, fear-relevant activation 
of cognitive structures seems to be necessary to access significant pathological elements in 
cognition. 
The methodological focus in this dissertation concerned some of the mechanisms that 
underlie and drive the IAT. In this respect the influence of explicit category labels on IAT 
performance was investigated. In the original IAT, the associations to be measured are 
completely explicit to the participants, because they are presented as category labels as a 
part of the instruction. Therefore, the explicit attribute dimension of the IAT (e.g., pleasant 
vs. unpleasant) was masked by a rather neutral, non-related dimension of language 
(English words vs. German words) and letter type (lower case words vs. upper case 
words). Nevertheless, emotional valence of the words did affect task performance, 
interfering with picture categorization in the incompatible task. Emotional valence of the 
words was activated, creating significant IAT effects for pictures in both the Language IAT 
and the Surface IAT. For the Surface IAT, however, it is most notable because the simple 
categorization according to letter type does not require semantic processing at all. 
Experiment 5 demonstrated that emotional valence of single exemplars (the attributes 
words) is activated in a task in which participants are effectively discouraged from using 
valence as a criterion for their decisions. Instead, the results indicate that they used the 
neutral and perceptual categorization dimension for categorizing attribute words.  
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5.1 Clinical Conclusions 
 
Looking at the wide range of results introduced in this dissertation one can ask the 
question about benefits, advantages and conclusions arising for the use of IAT and EAST 
measures in the field of clinical psychology. 
 
Indirect measures and the prediction of behavior 
I want to start with an frequent question regarding the usefulness of IAT and EAST 
measures: 'What can these paradigms detect that we can't measure with traditional 
instruments like questionnaires and interviews?' It was often stated that the results of the 
IAT in Study 1 just mirror the pattern one could find using a questionnaire. Moreover, in 
the prediction of behavior (e.g., avoidance, etc.) questionnaires do a much better job than 
the IAT would do This is indicated, for example, by the high correlations between 
questionnaire fear scores and behavior in Experiment 1 (r = .82) compared to the much 
smaller correlation between IAT scores and behavior (r = .40). So why should one use 
indirect measures in psychopathology or other fields and what are the criterions to mark 
tasks like the IAT as useful for clinical applications? I have selected a tough criterion: 
Indirect measures have to predict behavior that cannot be predicted by other measures. Is 
this true for the IAT and EAST in clinical psychology? 
 Research using indirect measures in clinical psychology stems from its beginning, 
That is clearly shown by less than ten studies using IAT and IAT-related measures in a 
clinical context (e.g., Gemar, et al., 2001; de Jong et a., 2001; Teachman, et al., 2001; de 
Jong, 2002; Teachman & Woody, 2003; de Jong, et al., 2003; Ellwart, Becker, & Rinck, 
2003; Ellwart, Rinck, & Becker, 2003). Thus it is premature to pass final judgement about 
the benefits and advantages of these measures. However, one has to ask the question about 
the behavior IAT researchers want to predict? Looking at Study 1 the critical behavior was 
avoidance of spiders assessed by the time and spatial distance when approaching a spider. 
But this is exactly the behavior questionnaires ask about (e.g., 'When I would see a spider 
in this room, I would leave the place immediately.'). It is no surprise that questionnaires are 
highly correlated with behavior they explicitly ask for, compared to the moderate 
correlations with indirect IAT scores. However, the attempt of Study 1 to validate IAT 
measures with real observable behavior is a reasonable path, which is not often used in 
IAT studies so far. Most studies validate their scores on questionnaires or just take them as 
granted. Nevertheless, these quite promising correlations with clinically relevant behavior 
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should lead the focus to different aspects of fear-related behavior that are hardly 
predictable by questionnaires and interviews. 
First, as pointed out in chapter 1.2.2 it appears as if automatic and uncontrollable 
expressions of fear associations represent important additional information about cognitive 
characteristics of phobia. For example, there seems to be a partial dissociation between 
rational and automatic cognitive processes in people suffering simple phobias (Williams et 
al., 1997). People with phobias often believe that there is no reason to be frightened of 
their phobic object like spiders and consequently feel that their phobia is stupid and 
irrational. Nevertheless, in the presence of phobic objects they automatically become 
frightened and experience little intentional control over the reaction to spiders. This makes 
clear that behavioral self -reports will not be able to evaluate all cognitive components of 
anxiety. 
Second, from social psychology comes theoretical and empirical evidence that the 
discrimination between spontaneous/automatic aspects and controlled aspects of behavior 
is useful. As an example, the MODE model of attitude-behavior relations (Fazio, 1990, 
Fazio & Towles-Swenn, 1999) postulates that implicitly measured attitudes predict 
spontaneous or highly automatized behavior better than controlled behavior, whereas 
explicitly measured attitudes predict controlled better than spontaneous or automatized 
behavior. Empirical evidence comes from a study by Asendorpf, et al. (2002). They 
applied an IAT to predict shy behavior using explicit self-ratings and implicit IAT scores. 
Results indicate that the IAT correlated moderately with the explicit self-ratings and 
uniquely predicted spontaneous (but not controlled) shy behavior, whereas the explicit 
ratings uniquely predicted controlled (but not spontaneous) shy behavior (double 
dissociation). Following these indications, future clinical research should also focus on 
those kinds of spontaneous or automatic behavior (e.g., physiological arousal, 
uncontrollable stressful behavior) that is not predictable by self reports, because relevant 
cognitions might be unavailable to introspection and verbal descriptions (e.g., de Jong, et 
al., 2001; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992). 
Besides the prediction of automatic and uncontrollable behavior, indirect measures 
could represent additional information about cognitive characteristics in anxiety that might 
complement explicit reports when trying to predict fear-related behavior. In this respect, 
research on indirect measures in clinical psychology should not exclude traditional tasks 
such as questionnaires or interviews from the diagnostic process. The attempt should rather 
be to investigate whether implicit and explicit measures each explain unique variance in 
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phobic behavior, or if implicit fear associations uniquely predict relevant behavior beyond 
standard questionnaires and diagnosis. Moreover, implicit associations could be of great 
interest when the clinical question involves aspects that are susceptible to deception and 
self-presentation strategies, or if it is difficult to verbalize mental processes without the risk 
of demands, distortions, and attributional biases. 
 
Implicit association and cognitive representations in anxiety 
Using IATs and EAST paradigms that reflected simple associations in spider phobia, 
this study represents one potential strategy for assessing fear schemata or cognitive 
structures. In chapter 1.1 of the introduction I described important influences of cognitive 
representations for the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Beck et al., 
1985; Lang et al., 1998). Using implicit association measures like IAT and EAST I argued 
that these measures help to analyze and evaluate maladaptive schemata with regard to 
automatic and uncontrollable expressions of fear associations. I recognize, however, that it 
is not possible to conclude with certainty that IAT and EAST capture those cognitive 
structures or schematic functioning. Nevertheless, I feel confident that the paradigms 
reflect basic fear associations in memory and thus correspond to many of the critical 
features ascribed to schemata. Although it is claimed that indirect measures like IAT and 
EAST directly tap into cognitive structures by measuring the strength of associations 
between certain concepts, it remains unclear whether these implicit associations should be 
labeled schemata or whether they simply refer to an automatic processing bias. This issue 
might be of theoretically interest, but it should be of minor importance, because the results 
support the value of cognitive processing in explaining clinical phenomena. Clinical 
research should focus on the usefulness of indirect measures to gain information about the 
cognitive characteristics in anxiety and other disorders, to apply these methods for 
diagnostics, or even for therapeutic questions.  
 
Indirect measures in psychotherapy 
Given that the possible range of implicit spider associations varies from fear to 
pleasure, it is worthwhile to think about the possible implications for therapy of spider 
phobia. Following the prediction of cognitive models of anxiety disorders that cognitive 
schemata should change over the course of treatment, indirect measures could offer one 
possibility to monitor such changes. Teachman and Woody (2003) were able to 
demonstrate changes of implicit fear associations in spider phobia with successful 
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exposure therapy, down to the baseline level of control participants indicating that implicit 
associations are sensitive to treatment. One can hypothesize that individuals who do not 
show reduced implicit fear associations following treatment (but do show changes in other 
measures, such as self report) will be at risk for return or relapse Their automatic fear 
association could render them more vulnerable to anxiety and avoidance when 
unexpectedly faced with the stimulus (Teachman & Woody, 2003). However, the results 
indicate that it seems possible to change important aspects of schemata over the course 
therapy involving gradual in vivo exposure and elements of cognitive restructuring. 
Moreover, IAT results observed with spider enthusiasts in Study 1 suggest that it might 
even be possible to eliminate fear-related implicit associations altogether. If therapeutic 
techniques were able to change automatic spider associations in such fundamental ways, 
consequential risk of relapse after successful CBT might be greatly reduced. 
 
Indirect measures and the influence of context 
As indicated by the results of Study 3 and several IAT studies in social psychology, 
implicit associations are malleable through contextual variations (for an overview, see 
chapter 1.3.3-4; Blair, 2002). In Study 3 ambiguous verbal stimuli were associated with 
fear depending on participants fear scores and the information (fear-related pictures or 
positive pictures) presented before the indirect measurement. In light of these findings, 
implicit threat associations towards special features of the feared object seem to be 
available only in a certain activated context. These results have implications regarding 
clinical-therapeutic and methodological questions. 
As studies of treatment outcome have found, phobic patients profited most from 
exposure therapy (systematic desensitization, flooding) when physiological responses and 
reports of fear occur, indicating activation of a relevant cognitive structure (e.g., Borkovec 
& Sides, 1979; Watson & Marks, 1971). In this respect Foa and Kozak (1986) conclude 
that activated fear structures and incorporated incompatible information (incompatible with 
the pathological elements) are the two conditions required to reduce pathological fear. The 
different performance of participants with high and low fear observed in Study 3 provides 
empirical evidence for the assumption that fear-relevant associations are not always 
activated, but that their activation depends on context information. One can conclude that 
the activation of fear-relevant structures may not only be important in the case of treatment 
and cognitive restructuring, but also for a successful assessment of significant pathological 
elements in cognition. 
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The activation of specific disorder-relevant context information may also be 
important for researchers wanting to investigate implicit associations or maladaptive 
schemata in various types of disorders like social phobia, generalized anxiety disorders, or 
depression. Depending on the experimental question, one has to decide which target and 
attributes are suitable for the investigation. In assessing fear associations in spider phobia, 
it was obvious to take spider pictures as target stimuli (Study 1). First, these pictures are 
ecologically relevant for those with spider phobia and second, pictures have privileged 
access to semantic memory for categories (Glaser, 1992; Seifert, 1997). Both aspects 
benefit a fast and easy activation of the specific fear concept. However, visual 
confrontation with disorder-related pictures may not always be possible. Additionally, the 
selection of targets depends on the questions asked. This could lead to an insufficient 
activation of the cognitive structures of interest with unintended effects on indirect 
measures and finally incorrect interpretations of the results. I want to point out that verbal 
target stimuli surely are eminently suitable for IAT and EAST research. Nonetheless, using 
verbal or picture stimuli, one has to be sure that the relevant concept is activated before 
conducting an IAT or EAST experiment.  
Moreover, the degree of contextual dependence of an evaluation will determine the 
stability and retest-reliability of measurements across context. Just as there is sometimes 
low reliability in explicit measures of associations across time due to its underlying 
constructive nature, an automatic evaluation will be similarly bound by contextual factors. 
This could be important for successive measurements, for example to demonstrate changes 
of implicit fear associations in therapy. To compare indirect measurements before and after 
therapy one has to ensure that both tests are conducted under equal contextual conditions. 
Neglecting the influence of context information could lead to misinterpretations about 
treatment effects and the success of therapy. 
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5.2 Methodological Conclusions 
 
In all experiments of this dissertation I have referred to methodological aspects that 
are of great interest for the use and understanding of IAT and EAST in psychological 
research. In the following chapter I want to point out several issues and problems to pay 
attention to when planning to use IAT and IAT-related instruments. 
 
Explicit or masked category labels 
Study 2 investigated the influence of explicit category labels on IAT performance. 
Results indicated that IAT effects will increase when the dimension of interest is explicitly 
labeled as a part of the instruction. In such a design, the categories relevant for 
categorization (e.g., left key = pleasant words and spider vs. right key = unpleasant words 
and butterflies) mirror the associations the IAT is interested in. Alternatively it is possible, 
to mask one of these dimension (e.g., attributes) by a neutral and not relevant category 
(e.g., letter type, color). IAT effects in such a design will decrease because the irrelevant 
feature of the individual stimuli (e.g., valence of the single word) has to influence task 
performance. In this dissertation Study 2 applied a masked IAT to investigate whether 
single stimulus valence still influences IAT effects. The EAST used in Study 3 based on a 
similar principle. Here, target stimuli are presented in two different colors, one color 
referring to a positive valence key, the second color to the negative key. In both 
experiments individual target valence was the irrelevant feature and lead to facilitated 
performance when the key assignment was congruent with individual associations. 
However, performance differences between incongruent and congruent conditions (IAT or 
EAST effects) are less stable and significant for the masked IAT and the EAST. This could 
be one of the reasons why there is almost no published literature about successful 
applications of these measures. Moreover, several experiments in our lab support the 
conclusion that masking of relevant IAT dimensions (target and attribute dimension) will 
lead to an insufficient activation and influence of individual stimulus valence and hence 
reduce the IAT effects. Finally, when both target and attribute dimensions are masked by a 
surface feature like letter type, no response time differences will occur between the 
compatible and incompatible task. It seems that activation of the irrelevant feature 
(valence) also depends on the degree of masking.  
As pointed out in the discussion of Study 2 a perfect confounding between category 
concept and stimulus valence (as in all unmasked IATs) may lead to the adoption of a 
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different strategy in the compatible task, then in the incompatible one (see Task-Switch-
Neglect Model, Mierke & Klauer (2001)). Masking the concept categories represents an 
alternative to prevent strategic factors that might underlie IAT effects and introduces a 
possibility to assess associations induced by the individual stimuli. 
Nonetheless, when researchers look for the effects of individual stimulus valence 
masked IAT versions may be very helpful. I would also recommend a masked IAT or an 
EAST when it is difficult to use the attribute dimension of interest.  
At times, associations between stimuli can not be classified according to an 
unambiguous valence dimension  (for example, for some participants the stimulus indicates 
something threatening, but this is not true for all participants) EAST and masked IAT, 
however, make it possible to use just about any group of words for any participant because 
the categorization dimension may be perfectly unequivocal.  
Whenever it is desirable to label valence dimensions explicitly, researchers should 
focus on the relevant and wanted semantic category and use this category as label. Threat-
relevant words of the attribute dimension in Study 1 were categorized according their 
pleasant and unpleasant valence. Although results by Steffens and Plewe (2001) clearly 
demonstrate that IAT effects depend heavily on the valence of the attribute exemplar, one 
can not assume that IAT effects are solely driven by the fear-related valence of each 
unpleasant attribute, but also by the valence of the category. To prevent these problems in 
future studies I recommend the use of explicit labels that clearly refer to the wanted 
semantic categories. For example, if the aim of the study is to measure target associations 
towards disgust and appeal, one should use 'disgust' and 'appeal' as semantic category 
label. Teachman et al. (2001) successfully applied four IAT assessing the associations 
between the targets 'spider vs. snake' and the attribute dimensions of 'bad vs. good', ‘afraid 
vs. unafraid', ‘danger vs. safety', and ‘disgusting vs. appealing'. Results demonstrated that 
associations tested by the two fear-related IAT tasks (afraid-unafraid, danger-safety) 
capture individual differences above and beyond the simple effects of the 'bad-good' IAT 
task.  
 
Variants of IAT design and data analysis 
Despite the promising results of IAT research in recent years it remains unresolved 
what IAT design one should choose. The original IAT introduced by Greenwald et al. 
(1998) involved 5 steps ((a) target discrimination, (b) attribute discrimination, (c) first 
combined task, (d) reversed target discrimination, and (e) reversed combined task). Each 
Conclusions  
 
103
category consisted of 25 stimulus words. Each category in set (a), (b), and (d) consisted of 
100 trials. Combined tasks consisted of a practice block (50 trials) and 150 trials for data 
collection, which represents a total of 700 trials in one IAT. Analyzing IAT literature 
published so far, there are numerous variants of different IAT designs reported. Although 
most researchers focus on the 5-step procedure introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998), 
there are several short versions with only two combined tasks (e.g., Teachman et al., 2001; 
Teachman & Woody, 2003; Experiment 2, 3, 4, & 5 in this dissertation). IATs consisting 
of 4 steps were used by de Jong et al(2003). Large variance is also found in the number of 
trials presented in the critical tasks of the IAT. Some featured large numbers of critical 
trials (about 150 combined data trials; Greenwald et al., 1998; Experiment 1 - 5 in this 
dissertation). Others had medium numbers of about 60 combined data trials (e.g., Eggloff 
& Schmukle, 2002), while some had very low numbers of about 36 data trials (e.g., 
Teachman et al., 2001; Teachman & Woody, 2003). Although all of these IATs are based 
on the same principal comparing response latencies of a compatible and an incompatible 
task, these different designs make it extremely difficult to compare the results of different 
studies. As results of Study 1 indicate, the short version of the IAT in Experiment 2 was 
not able to differentiate between individuals with high and low fear as in the long version 
of Experiment 1. However, the short version was sensitive to large differences between 
groups (e.g., between enthusiasts and nonfearful controls). At the present point there is no 
standard and recommended IAT design. Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2003) discuss 
some methodological issues and properties of the IAT in a recent paper, including analytic 
methods, optimal number of stimulus items per category, influence of individual stimulus 
vs. category valence, task order effects. Unfortunately, these indications are based on studies 
that used large datasets from demonstration Web sites, making it difficult to generalize the 
reported results. 
Similar to the various IAT designs there are numerous ways of analyzing the data of IAT 
experiments. Greenwald et al. (1998) eliminated outliers by counting response latencies 
less than 300 ms or greater than 3,000 ms as errors and recode these responses as 300 or 
3,000 ms and log transforms the response times. Although this strategy is often used in 
IAT research it contains some methodological problems (e.g., increasing frequencies at 
both ends of the distribution). Greenwald et al. (2003) recommended a new appropriate 
strategy of data reduction and analysis depending on the correlation between the IAT effect 
with its parallel explicit measure for the entire sample, with average latency for the 
subsample of self-characterized strong supporters for each target. Besides that, there are 
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several alternative methods to analyze IAT data (see Footnote 3 in Experiment 1 or 
Greenwald et al., 2003), but unfortunately, no strategy is generally recommended. From a 
methodological viewpoint, the results of this dissertation show that it is useful to analyze 
and report IAT effects separately for pictures and word stimuli. As results of Experiment 1 
showed, IAT effects with verbal attribute stimuli differentiated between participants with 
spider fear and controls, whereas target pictures did not. On the other hand, in the masked 
versions of the IAT (Experiment 4 & 5) IAT effects for target pictures revealed larger 
effects. I suggest that researchers routinely analyze and report IAT effects separately for 
targets and attributes. Otherwise, important differences might be obscured by reporting 
only IAT effects, averaged across all materials. 
Because of these different design and analysis strategies, I conclude that it is most 
important for future research to achieve comparable results within different experimental 
studies. This requires a standardized application and analysis strategy for the relevant 
studies. Using indirect measures as instruments for diagnostic purpose, researchers should 
focus on psychometric properties, such as different types of validity and reliability. 
Without these strict norms it is unlikely that indirect measures become reliable measures 
that are able to predict criterion variables such as fearful behavior.  
 
From relative to absolute - new variants of indirect measures 
One of the major disadvantages of the Implicit Association Test is the fact that 
results will only provide information about the relative strength of associations. Although 
some researchers have tried analyses of subsets of IAT trials to obtain separate evaluations 
of two target concepts in the IAT (e.g., de Jong et al., 2003), it is unclear whether the 
parameters of the IAT allow any meaningful breakdown of two concepts as if they 
represented independent concepts. Nosek et al. (2003) demonstrated that the relative nature 
of the IATs procedural format cannot be undone via analytic methods. Even when trials of 
only one concept are the focus of analysis, the IAT remains a relative measure of 
association strengths. This result supports the importance of selecting the appropriate 
comparison category in the IAT. In this dissertation I choose butterflies as a second target 
category, because different IAT effects between individuals with phobias and controls may 
certainly be due to different attitudes towards spiders if evaluations of the second target are 
comparable in both groups. Beyond this group comparison, however, interpretation of IAT 
effects is more problematic because of the relative nature of the IAT. Other alternatives for 
the second target category are the selection of a random, neutral, or irrelevant comparison, 
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although this may not fulfill researchers’ expectations for measuring an independent 
association for their target concept of interest. Researchers interested in assessing 
associations with a single target concept could use several new methods designed for that 
purpose. 
Nosek and Banaji (2001) have introduced the Go/No-go Association Task (GNAT) 
as a variant of the IAT. Different to the two target categories of the IAT the GNAT does 
not require the use of a second category. In one condition, the GNAT requires the same 
response - “go” (press the space bar) - to items that belong to instances of a category (e.g., 
flower) and a particular evaluative attribute (e.g., good). No response “no-go” (do not press 
any key) is called for when items appear that do not belong to the target category and 
attribute. A second condition requires simultaneous identification of stimuli that represent 
the same target category and an alternative attribute (bad). The difference in accuracy and 
reaction times between these conditions is taken as a measure of automatic attitude or 
associations assuming that performance is facilitated when targets and attributes are highly 
associated.  
Wigboldus et al. (2001) introduced an alternative to the original IAT that does allow 
for absolute judgments. In this Single Target IAT (STIAT), the associations between one 
single target category and the two poles of the evaluative dimension are measured 
independently. Similar to the relative IAT participants categorize presented attributes 
according to a given valence dimension (e.g., left key = positive words vs. right key = 
negative words). Different to the relative IAT is that there is only on target category 
introduced for the two combined tasks (e.g., spider), which would switch from the left 
response in the first combined task to the right response key in the second combined task. 
For the example above, in the compatible task spiders and positive words are assigned on 
the left key vs. negative words on the other key, compared to the incompatible task, when 
positive words are assigned to the left key vs. spiders and negative words on the left key. 
Comparing the target responses of the incompatible and compatible task, the STIAT 
measures the association between the concept spider and valence in an absolute way. 
The third IAT-related paradigm is the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST, De 
Houwer, 2003) that I already introduced in Study 3 of this dissertation. The EAST is based 
on a comparison of performance on trials within a single critical task rather than on a 
comparison of performance on different tasks. In an EAST, participants classify uncolored 
attribute words on the basis of stimulus valence (positive vs. negative) and colored target 
words on the basis of color (e.g., green vs. blue). In the critical task targets are presented 
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either in the color that is assigned to the positive key, or in the color that is assigned to the 
negative key. Performance for targets is superior on those trials where the color of the 
target is compatible with the extrinsic valence of the response key. 
Because the three variants have been developed only recently, little is known about 
their validity. However, with the results of Study 3 there is positive evidence about a 
successful application of the EAST. Additional research will have to address the 
psychometric properties and fundamental processes of the EAST, GNAT, and STIAT, 
showing that these measures are reliable and valid instruments. Nevertheless, because IAT 
effects reflect the relative strength of associations, I recommend paradigms such as the 
GNAT, STIAT, or EAST for researchers that want to assess the strength of single 
associations. 
 
5.3 Final Conclusions 
 
The intent of this dissertation was the adoption and application of indirect measures 
of associations in spider phobia. The advantage of indirect measures, like IAT and EAST, 
is the performance based approach on specific associative structures without having to ask 
the participant for a verbal report. Because of the assumption that these paradigms also 
refer to automatic and uncontrollable aspects of fear associations, this research might 
represent important additional information about cognitive characteristics of spider phobia, 
and related disorders that fit into the etiological concept of preparedness. 
With the introduction of spider enthusiasts as a third experimental group, a new 
methodological feature of masked category labels, and a first clinically-related application 
of the EAST the studies presented here aimed for an innovative contribution to the current 
state of knowledge in this field of research. The results of this paper lead to the conclusion 
that the performance-based methodology of the IAT and EAST is sensitive to the strength 
of fear relevant implicit associations and able to predict anxious behavior, partly beyond 
the predictions of direct measures such as questionnaires. 
However, despite the copious activity, research concerning these measures has been 
methodological, empirically-driven, but surprisingly a-theoretical. Moreover, several 
methodological aspects of the IAT and the EAST remain unresolved and unexplained, as it 
concerns the underlying mechanisms, the effects of context, or the role of awareness. 
 Currently, the use of indirect measures in clinical psychology is still at its beginning, 
and it requires intensive methodological and theoretical efforts. In the long run, implicit 
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aspects of fear associations may be useful for possible implications in psychopathology, 
such as the prediction of treatment outcome and the likelihood of relapse after therapy, or 
for the identification of cognitive factors of vulnerability. Moreover, indirect measures 
may provide important theoretical insights about the effects of schema and maladaptive 
cognitive structures in anxiety disorders. 
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7. Appendix  
 
Appendix A. Stimulus Words Used in Experiment 1, Evaluation by Spider Phobic and  
  Control Participants 
 
German words English     
translation 
Mean Valence 
Spider Phobics 
Mean Valence 
Controls 
 
     
Genuss pleasure 1.83 (.387) 1.63 (.50) (t(46) = 1.64, n.s.) 
Begeisterung exaltation 1.75 (.44) 1.75 (.44) (t(46) = .00, n.s.) 
Vergnuegen amusement 1.79 (.42) 1.67 (.48) (t(46) = .96, n.s.) 
glücklich happy 1.88 (.34) 1.75 (.44) (t(46) = 1.1, n.s.) 
Zufriedenheit contentment 1.50 (.59) 1.33 (.57) (t(46) = 1.00, n.s.) 
Froehlichkeit happiness 1.64 (.49) 1.71 (.46) (t(46) = .31, n.s.) 
erholen to recreate 1.54 (.59) 1.29 (.63) (t(46) = 1.63, n.s.) 
unbeschwert easygoing 1.17 (.57) 1.25 (.74) (t(46) = .44, n.s.) 
Urlaub vacation 1.42 (.65) 1.50 (.65) (t(46) = .25, n.s.) 
Jubel exultation 1.54 (.59) 1.50 (.66) (t(46) = .23, n.s.) 
 mean - pleasant 1.61 (.24) 1.53 (.28) (t(46) = .91, n.s.) 
     
Panik panic -1.79 (.42) -1.79 (.42) (t(46) = .00, n.s.) 
Furcht fear -1.58 (.50) -1.50 (.51) (t(46) = .57, n.s.) 
quaelen to torment -1.83 (.38) -1.92 (.28) (t(46) = .86, n.s.) 
Schock shock -1.58 (.58) -1.67 (.48) (t(46) = .54, n.s.) 
Todesangst mortal fear -1.92 (.28) -2.00 (.00) (t(46) = 1.45, n.s.) 
Entsetzen horrify -1.67 (.57) -1.54 (.51) (t(46) = .81, n.s.) 
Angstanfall panic attack -1.92 (.28) -1.79 (.42) (t(46) = .01, n.s.) 
bedrohlich threateningly -1.38 (.50) -1.42 (.59) (t(46) = .18, n.s.) 
gefaehrlich dangerously -1.33 (.48) -1.33 (.64) (t(46) = .00, n.s.) 
Angstschweiss cold sweat -1.67 (.57) -1.50 (.66) (t(46) = .89, n.s.) 
 mean - unpleasant -1.67 (.24) -1.65 (.26) (t(46) = .55, n.s.) 
 
Ratings: -2 = "very unpleasant", -1="unpleasant", 0=neutral, 1= "pleasant", 2= "very pleasant" 
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Appendix B. Mean ratings of target stimuli regarding emotional valence, magnitude of 
  disgust, and threatening potential (with Standard Deviations)   
  in Experiment 1 
 
 Spider Phobic Control  
Spider Pictures    
Valence -1.66 (68) -.29 (.73) (t(24) = 6.75, p < .001) 
Disgust 4.67 (.32) 2.02 (.90) (t(46) = 13.6, p < .001) 
Threat 4.50 (.73) 1.78 (.80) (t(46) = 12.4, p < .001) 
Butterfly Pictures    
Valence 1.29 (.79) 1.13 (.76) (t(24) = .69, n.s.) 
Disgust 1.13 (.28) 1.05 (.14) (t(24) = 1.22, n.s.) 
Threat 1.14 (.23) 1.05 (.14) (t(24) = 1.58, n.s.) 
 
Valence Ratings:  -2 = "very unpleasant", -1="unpleasant", 0=neutral, 1= "pleasant", 2= "very pleasant" 
Disgust and Threat: 1 = "very low", 2 = "low", 3 = "medium", 4 = "high", 5 = "very high" 
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Appendix C. Stimulus Words Used in Experiment 2, Evaluation by Spider Phobic and  
  Control Participants 
 
German 
words 
English     
translation 
Mean 
Valuation 
spider phobics 
Mean 
Valuation 
Controls 
 
     
Genuss pleasure 1.70 (.47) 1.88 (.34) (t(45) = 1.5, n.s.) 
Begeisterung exaltation 1.61 (.66) 1.63 (.58) (t(45) = .09, n.s.) 
Vergnuegen amusement 1.61 (.50) 1.58 (.50) (t(45) = .17, n.s.) 
glücklich happy 1.70 (.47) 1.79 (.42) (t(45) = .74, n.s.) 
Zufriedenheit contentment 1.35 (.57) 1.38 (.58) (t(45) = .16, n.s.) 
Froehlichkeit happiness 1.35 (.57) 1.42 (.50) (t(45) = .43, n.s.) 
erholen to recreate 1.30 (.56) 1.17 (.56) (t(45) = .84, n.s.) 
unbeschwert easygoing 1.09 (.67) 1.04 (.69) (t(45) = .23, n.s.) 
Urlaub vacation 1.57 (.51) 1.42 (.65) (t(45) = .87, n.s.) 
Jubel exultation 1.35 (.65) 1.54 (.51) (t(45) = 1.14, n.s.) 
 mean - pleasant 1.46 (.28) 1.48 (.28) (t(45) = .28, n.s.) 
     
Panik panic -1.91 (.28) -1.79 (.42) (t(45) = 1.16, n.s.) 
Furcht fear -1.52 (.59) -1.21 (.51) (t(45) = 1.95, n.s.) 
quaelen to torment -1.87 (.46) -1.79 (.59) (t(45) = .51, n.s.) 
Schock shock -1.52 (.59) -1.63 (.65) (t(45) = .75, n.s.) 
Todesangst mortal fear -1.91 (.29) -2.00 (.00) (t(45) = 1.48, n.s.) 
Entsetzen horrify -1.39 (.66) -1.46 (.51) (t(45) = .39, n.s.) 
Angstanfall panic attack -1.70 (.47) -1.83 (.38) (t(45) = 1.11, n.s.) 
bedrohlich threateningly -1.57 (.51) -1.46 (.51) (t(45) = .72, n.s.) 
gefaehrlich dangerously -1.43 (.59) -1.25 (.53) (t(45) = 1.13, n.s.) 
Angstschweiss cold sweat -1.74 (.54) -1.67 (.48) (t(45) = .49, n.s.) 
 mean - unpleasant -1.66 (.24) -1.61 (.21) (t(45) = .73, n.s.) 
 
Ratings: -2 = "very unpleasant", -1="unpleasant", 0=neutral, 1= "pleasant", 2= "very pleasant" 
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Appendix D. Mean ratings of target stimuli regarding emotional valence, magnitude of 
  disgust, and threatening potential (with Standard Deviations)   
  in Experiment 2 
 
 Spider Phobic Control  
Spider Pictures    
valence -1.54 (1.03) -.19 (.54) (t(24) = 5.58, p < .001) 
disgust 4.84 (.22) 2.08 (.71) (t(46) = 18.54, p < .001) 
threat 4.49 (.38) 1.55 (.61) (t(46) = 19.75, p < .001) 
Butterfly Pictures    
valence 1.33 (.91) 1.50 (.41) (t(24) = .83, n.s.) 
disgust 1.28 (.44) 1.10 (.25) (t(24) = 1.72, n.s.) 
threat 1.20 (.37) 1.05 (.25) (t(24) = 1.62, n.s.) 
 
Valence Ratings:  -2 = "very unpleasant", -1="unpleasant", 0=neutral, 1= "pleasant", 2= "very pleasant" 
Disgust and Threat: 1 = "very low", 2 = "low", 3 = "medium", 4 = "high", 5 = "very high" 
Appendix  
 
123
Appendix E. Stimulus Words Used in Experiment 3, Evaluation by Spider Lovers and  
  Control Participants 
 
German words English     translation 
Mean Valuation 
Spider Lovers 
Mean Valuation 
Controls  
     
Genuss pleasure 1.89 (.33) 1.78 (.44) (t(16) = .60, n.s.) 
Begeisterung exaltation 1.56 (.73) 1.78 (.67) (t(16) = .68, n.s.) 
Vergnuegen amusement 1.11 (1.30) 1.67 (.71) (t(16) = 1.15, n.s.) 
glücklich happy 1.67 (.50) 1.78 (.44) (t(16) = .50, n.s.) 
Zufriedenheit contentment 1.33 (.71) 1.67 (.50) (t(16) = 1.15, n.s.) 
Froehlichkeit happiness 1.44 (.53) 1.56 (.73) (t(16) = .37, n.s.) 
erholen to recreate 1.56 (.53) 1.56 (.53) (t(16) = .00, n.s.) 
unbeschwert easygoing 1.33 (.71) 1.22 (.67) (t(16) = .34, n.s.) 
Urlaub vacation 1.56 (.53) 1.44 (.53) (t(16) = .45, n.s.) 
Jubel exultation 1.78 (.44) 1.33 (1.00) (t(16) = 1.22, n.s.) 
 mean - pleasant 1.52 (.36) 1.58 (.41) (t(16) = .30, n.s.) 
     
Panik panic -1.78 (.44) -1.33 (.71) (t(16) = 1.60, n.s.) 
Furcht fear -1.22 (.44) -1.22 (.67) (t(16) = .00, n.s.) 
quaelen to torment -2.00 (.00) -1.67 (.50) (t(16) = 2.00, n.s.) 
Schock shock -1.67 (.50) -1.44 (.53) (t(16) = .92, n.s.) 
Todesangst mortal fear -1.78 (.44) -2.00 (.00) (t(16) = 1.51, n.s.) 
Entsetzen horrify -1.11 (.60) -1.00 (.00) (t(16) = .55, n.s.) 
Angstanfall panic attack -1.56 (.53) -1.89 (.33) (t(16) = 1.60, n.s.) 
bedrohlich threateningly -1.11 (.33) -1.11 (.33) (t(16) = .00, n.s.) 
gefaehrlich dangerously -1.44 (.57) -.78 (.83) (t(16) = 2.03, n.s.) 
Angstschweiss cold sweat -1.56 (.53) -1.56 (.53) (t(16) = .00, n.s.) 
 mean - unpleasant -1.52 (.12) -1.40 (.01) (t(16) = 1.57, n.s.) 
 
Ratings: -2 = "very unpleasant", -1="unpleasant", 0=neutral, 1= "pleasant", 2= "very pleasant" 
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Appendix F. Mean ratings of target stimuli regarding emotional valence, magnitude of 
  disgust, and threatening potential (with Standard Deviations)   
  in Experiment 3. 
 
 Spider Lovers Controls  
Spider Pictures    
Valence 1.37 (.55) .32 (.64) (t(16) = 3.72, p < .01) 
Disgust 1.24 (.35) 2.54 (.93) (t(16) = 3.89, p < .01) 
Threat 1.22 (.33) 2.09 (.78) (t(16) = 3.08, p < .001) 
Butterfly Pictures    
Valence 1.67 (.54) 1.61 (.44) (t(16) = .26, n.s.) 
Disgust 1.00 (.00) 1.15 (.30) (t(16) = 1.51, n.s.) 
Threat 1.01 (.30) 1.09 (.24) (t(24) = 1.00, n.s.) 
 
Valence Ratings:  -2 = "very unpleasant", -1="unpleasant", 0=neutral, 1= "pleasant", 2= "very pleasant" 
Disgust and Threat: 1 = "very low", 2 = "low", 3 = "medium", 4 = "high", 5 = "very high" 
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Appendix G. Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS) 
 
The Spider Anxiety Screening (SAS, Spinnenangst Screening; Rinck, Bundschuh, Engler, 
Müller, Wissmann, Ellwart, & Becker, 2002) is a short and efficient questionnaire based 
on four DSM IV criteria for Specific Phobia (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
The four statements concern (1) subjective experience of spider fear, (2) physiological 
arousal, (3) avoidance of spiders, and (4) distress about the fear of spiders. Participants rate 
on a 7 point Likert-Scale (from "0 = absolutely not true" to "6 absolutely true") to what 
extent the statements correspond with their own evaluations.  
Below are the 4 SAS statements in German and English. 
 
01 Ich habe Angst vor Spinnen. 
02 Beim Anblick von Spinnen bekomme ich Herzklopfen. 
03 Ich vermeide Spinnen. 
04 Meine Angst vor Spinnen belastet mich. 
 
01 I'm afraid of spiders. 
02 When I see a spider my heart starts to palpitate. 
03 I avoid spiders. 
04 I am distressed about my fear of spiders. 
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Appendix H. Spider Fear Questionnaire (FAS) 
 
The Spider Fear Questionnaire (FAS, Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen; Rinck, 
Bundschuh, Engler, Müller, Wissmann, Ellwart, & Becker, 2002) is the German version of 
the "Fear of Spiders Questionnaire" (Szymanski & O'Donohue, 1995). It consists of 18 
statements regarding spiders or spider relevant situations. Participants rate on a 7 point 
Likert-Scale (from "0 = absolutely not true" to "6 absolutely true") to what extent the 
statements correspond with their own evaluations.  
Below are the 18 FAS statements in German. 
 
01 Wenn ich jetzt auf eine Spinne stoßen würde, würde ich jemanden zu Hilfe holen, 
um Sie zu beseitigen. 
02 Zur Zeit halte ich manchmal Ausschau nach Spinnen. 
03 Wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sähe, würde ich denken, dass sie mir schaden wird. 
04 Ich denke momentan häufig an Spinnen. 
05 Ich würde mich etwas fürchten, jetzt einen Raum zu betreten, in dem ich schon 
einmal eine Spinne gesehen habe. 
06 Ich würde momentan alles tun um zu versuchen, Spinnen zu vermeiden. 
07 Zur Zeit denke ich manchmal daran, von einer Spinne gebissen zu werden. 
08 Wenn ich jetzt auf eine Spinne treffen würde, wäre ich nicht in der Lage, damit 
angemessen umzugehen. 
09 Wenn ich jetzt auf eine Spinne treffen würde, würde es lange dauern, sie wieder 
aus meinem Kopf zu verbannen. 
10 Wenn ich jetzt auf eine Spinne stoßen würde, würde ich den Raum verlassen. 
11 Wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sehen würde, würde ich denken, sie könnte versuchen 
mich anzuspringen. 
12 Wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sähe, würde ich jemand anderes bitten, sie zu töten. 
13 Würde ich jetzt einer Spinne begegnen, würde ich die Vorstellung haben, wie sie 
versucht, mich zu kriegen. 
14 Wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sähe, würde ich mich vor ihr fürchten. 
15 Wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sähe, würde ich in Panik geraten. 
16 Spinnen gehören zu meinen schlimmsten Ängsten. 
17 Ich würde mich sehr nervös fühlen, wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sähe. 
18 Wenn ich jetzt eine Spinne sähe, würde ich wahrscheinlich in Schweiß 
ausbrechen und mein Herz würde schneller schlagen. 
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Appendix J. Stimuli presented in the Human EAST and the Spider EAST (English  
  translations) 
 
positive words negative words feature words situation words 
pleasure panic legs attic 
exultation to strike dead to crawl walls 
to relax anxiety net cellar 
happy shock to weave foliage 
holidays threateningly filament window 
enjoyment fear hair corner 
enthusiasm dangerous   
gladness panic attack   
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8. German Summary - Zusammenfassung 
 
Einleitung. Mehr oder minder starke Angst vor Spinnen ist in der Bevölkerung weit 
verbreitet, und die krankhafte Angst vor Spinnen (Spinnenphobie, Arachnophobie) ist eine 
der häufigsten Angststörungen. Aus evolutionärer Sicht besteht die Aufgabe der Angst 
darin, vor Gefahren zu warnen und Reaktionen auf diese Gefahren - Flucht oder Kampf - 
vorzubereiten. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass Gefahrenreize besonders schnell 
verarbeitet werden (Le Doux, 1996). So werden auch spezielle Gefahrenschemata und 
Angstassoziationen postuliert (Beck, 1976; Lang, 1979), die zum Teil genetisch 
vorprogrammiert sind ("preparedness", vgl. Seligman, 1971). Unter anderem scheinen 
Spinnen solche Gefahrenreize darzustellen, bei denen aufgrund der "preparedness" eine 
Angstreaktion besonders leicht erlernt wird, obwohl die in Mitteleuropa lebenden Spinnen 
völlig ungefährlich sind. Auffällig ist bei Spinnenängstlichen, dass ihnen die Irrationalität 
ihrer Angst in der Regel wohl bewusst ist, ohne dass dies zu einer Reduktion der Angst 
führt. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass neben den expliziten und bewussten Einstellungen 
gegenüber Spinnen auch andere, schlechter kontrollierbare Prozesse eine wichtige Rolle 
spielen. Diese assoziativen Prozesse sind bisher fast nie untersucht worden, obwohl die 
generelle Bedeutung kognitiver Prozesse für die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von 
Angststörungen unstrittig ist. In der hier vorgestellten Dissertation wurden deshalb 
'implizite', möglicherweise automatische und unkontrollierbare Prozesse bei Spinnenangst 
mit Hilfe sogenannter indirekter Verfahren der Assoziationsmessung untersucht. Bei den 
indirekten Maßen handelt es sich um den "Implicit Association Test" (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) und den Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 
2003). Diese indirekt erfassten Assoziationsmaße wurden mit direkten Maßen wie 
Fragebögen, Interviews und dem Verhalten bei Konfrontation mit Spinnen verglichen. 
Die Dissertation konzentriert sich auf drei Fragestellungen. Studie 1 befasste sich mit 
der Frage, ob angstrelevante Assoziationen bei Spinnenangst mit Hilfe des IATs messbar 
sind und reales Verhalten vorhersagen. Weiterhin war von Interesse, ob das indirekte Maß 
neben direkten Fragebögen und Interviewdaten noch zusätzliche Informationen über 
angstrelevante Assoziationen liefert. Erstmalig wurde dafür neben spinnenängstlichen und 
nichtängstlichen Versuchspersonen eine Gruppe von Spinnenliebhabern (Züchter, 
Sammler) untersucht, wodurch es möglich wurde, die Ausprägung und Charakteristik von 
automatischen Angstassoziationen besser einzuordnen und zu interpretieren.  
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Eine zweite, methodisch orientierte Studie beschäftigte sich mit der Frage nach den 
Wirkmechanismen des IATs, speziell mit dem Einfluss der Valenz einzeln dargebotener 
Stimuli im Vergleich zur Valenz ihrer übergeordneten Kategorie. Dabei wurde eine 
modifizierte IAT-Variante mit maskierten Kategoriendimensionen entwickelt, die 
besonders für den klinischen Bereich nützliche Anwendungsmöglichkeiten bieten könnte. 
Im dritten Teil der empirischen Studien stand die Frage im Mittelpunkt, inwieweit 
'implizite' Angstassoziationen von jeweilig aktivierten Kontextbedingungen bei hoch und 
niedrig spinnenängstlichen Versuchpersonen abhängig sind. Um methodische Probleme 
des IAT zu vermeiden, wurde der EAST bei einer differentiell-klinischen Fragestellung 
angewandt.  
Methoden. Der IAT und der EAST sind reaktionszeitbasierte Paradigmen, welche 
auf der Prämisse beruhen, dass man schneller und fehlerfreier reagieren kann, wenn hoch 
assoziierte Stimuli (z.B. Spinnenbilder und Angstwörter) die gleiche Antwortreaktion 
(Taste) erfordern. Dagegen sollten sich die Reaktionszeiten verlängern, wenn auf 
gegensätzliche oder nicht assoziierte Inhalte (z.B. Spinnenbilder und positive Wörter) mit 
der gleichen Antworttaste reagiert werden soll. Beim IAT wird aus der Differenz 
gemittelter Reaktionszeiten in zwei kritischen Testphasen (kompatible vs. inkompatible 
Phase) auf die Assoziation zwischen Zielreizen ("targets", z.B. Spinnenbilder) und 
Eigenschaftswörtern ("attributes", z.B. Angstwörter) geschlossen. Da im IAT nach 
Greenwald et al. (1998) zwei Zielreizkategorien und zwei Attributkategorien verwendet 
werden, erlaubt dieses Verfahren nur Aussagen über die relativen Assoziationsstärken 
zwischen Zielreizen und Attributen (siehe De Houwer, 2002). Der EAST (De Houwer, 
2003) erlaubt dagegen, die absolute Assoziationsstärke zwischen einer Zielreizklasse und 
einer Attributdimension zu messen. Darüber hinaus ist es möglich, mehrere relevante 
Zielreize gleichzeitig in einer kritischen Phase zu testen.  
Als direkte Maße der Spinnenangst dienten der 'Fragebogen zur Angst vor Spinnen' 
(FAS), sowie das 'Spinnenangst Screening' (SAS; Rinck et al., 2002), ein klinisch-
diagnostisches Interview nach dem F-DIPS (Margraf et al., 1996), und Verhaltensmaße der 
Konfrontation mit einer lebenden Spinne. Insgesamt nahmen an den 6 Experimenten der 
drei Studien 256 Versuchspersonen teil. 
Ergebnisse. Personen mit hoher versus keiner Spinnenangst unterschieden sich in 
Studie 1 signifikant hinsichtlich ihrer IAT Werte, was auf stärkere, angstrelevante implizite 
Assoziationen bei Spinnenängstlichen schließen lässt. Neben diesen Gruppenunterschieden 
deuten signifikante Korrelationen zwischen dem indirekten Maß und 
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Konfrontationsverhalten (selbst bei Herauspartialisierung der Fragebogenwerte) darauf hin, 
dass der IAT zusätzliche Informationen über angstrelevante Assoziationen liefern kann. 
Trotz der Gruppenunterschiede zwischen hoch- und nichtängstlichen Probanden erlauben 
die IAT Vergleiche mit Spinnenliebhabern die Vermutung, dass selbst explizit 
nichtängstliche Versuchspersonen Spinnen mit aversiven, angstrelevanten Inhalten 
verbinden, während Spinnenliebhaber dies nicht tun. 
Die Ergebnisse von Studie 2 unterstützen die Annahme, dass sich die Valenz einzeln 
dargebotener Attributstimuli auf die IAT Effekte auswirkt, auch wenn die Stimuli nicht 
nach ihrer Valenz, sondern nach einer neutralen Dimension kategorisiert werden (z.B. 
Groß- vs. Kleinschreibung). Diese Maskierung der eigentlichen Valenzdimension im IAT 
bietet somit auch die Möglichkeit, den IAT bei Fragestellungen einzusetzen, die keine 
klare Valenzunterscheidung der interessierenden Attribute zulassen (z.B. bei 
störungsspezifischen Stimuli).  
In der dritten Studie wurde untersucht, ob angstrelevante Assoziationen bei 
Spinnenangst  ständig aktiviert sind, oder ob sie vom jeweiligen Kontext abhängen. Dazu 
wurde in einer Versuchsbedingung ein 'neutrales' und in einer zweiten Bedingung ein 
Spinnenschema aktiviert. In beiden Bedingungen wurde das Ausmaß der (Angst-
)Assoziationen gegenüber den gleichen Zielwörtern (Situationen und Merkmale wie z.B. 
krabbeln, Netz, Keller etc.) untersucht und festgestellt, dass diese Assoziationen 
kontextabhängig sind und mit Hilfe des EAST erfasst werden können. Nur wenn ein 
Spinnenschema aktiviert war, assoziierten spinnenängstliche Versuchspersonen bestimmte 
Situations- und Merkmalswörter mit aversiven, angstrelevanten Inhalten, jedoch nicht in 
der neutralen Bedingung. 
Diskussion und Schlussfolgerungen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation erlauben 
die Schlussfolgerung, dass performanzbasierte Verfahren wie IAT und EAST durchaus 
sensitiv gegenüber angstrelevanten impliziten Assoziationen sind und darüber hinaus auch 
ängstliches Verhalten vorhersagen können. Durch die Einführung einer dritten 
experimentellen Gruppe von Spinnenliebhabern, durch die Modifikation des klassischen 
IATs mittels Maskierung der Valenzdimension, sowie durch die erste experimentelle 
Anwendung des EAST zur Erfassung von Kontexteinflüssen konnten neue Erkenntnisse 
und Beiträge auf dem Gebiet der indirekten Assoziationsmessung erbracht werden.  
 Trotz erfolgversprechender Ergebnisse und zahlreicher experimenteller Arbeiten 
bleiben einige kritische Anmerkungen gegenüber indirekten Methoden bestehen. So fehlt 
den bisher eher empirisch geleiteten Anwendungen indirekter Verfahren eine ausreichend 
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fundierte, theoretische Untermauerung. Darüber hinaus bleiben einige ungelöste 
methodische Aspekte und Probleme des IAT und EAST bestehen, wie die genaue 
Erklärung der Wirkmechanismen oder die psychometrischen Eigenschaften der Verfahren. 
Zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt befindet sich der Einsatz indirekter Paradigmen in der 
klinischen Psychologie noch am Anfang und es bedarf weiterer intensiver methodischer 
und theoretischer Anstrengungen, die praktische Anwendbarkeit dieser Methoden 
voranzutreiben. Auf lange Sicht könnte aber die Messung automatischer 'impliziter' 
Aspekte von Angstassoziationen einen wichtigen Beitrag in der klinisch-psychologischen 
Forschung leisten, wie bei der Vorhersage von Therapieerfolg oder 
Rückfallswahrscheinlichkeiten, sowie der Identifikation von kognitiven 
Vulnerabilitätsfaktoren bei psychischer Störungen. 
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